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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis describes and analyzes the earnings inequality in the United Kingdom and 
related countries in particular Italy and Germany, incorporating institutional measures 
and changes. There are three main tasks: firstly, Chapter 2 shows that earnings 
inequality as well as skill premiums have increased substantially over the last thirty 
years. A simple supply-demand analysis can only broadly fit with the wage structure 
changes, but leave much space for institutional explanation (Chapter 3).  
 
Secondly, after controlling for the workers’ main characteristics, changes of 
technology, industrial structure and labor market conditions, our estimates imply that 
institutional changes (mainly trade union decline) can account for a substantial part of 
the rise of skill premiums since the 1970s (Chapter 4).   
 
Finally, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 compare the real wage flexibility in the UK with 
Italy and Germany, which have centralized collective agreements. We find flexible 
wages in the private sector in the UK and only in the prosperous regions in Italy (the 
north) and Germany (the west). When regions within a country are prosperous, the 
different types of wage-setting institution give similar results. However, when a 
region is lagging, collective bargaining delays recovery.    
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
 
“The history of Europe demonstrates that inequality is 
necessary to reveal progress by different people…… If 
equality is enforced by socialist law, or encouraged by 
conservative custom, it slows down or suppresses 
progress. The peoples of Europe would have remained 
poorer longer…… Inequality in actions is the way to 
equality in result.” (Arthur Seldon, 1990, “The Virtues of 
Capitalism.” The Collected Works of Arthur Seldon, 
Volume 1, p213) 
 
Arthur Seldon’s “capitalism”, as he described it, is only a convenient simplification 
for “the price system,” or “the market economy”. Labour economists believing in the 
market agree with him that the flexible price system in labour markets (i.e. wages) can 
adjust market forces back to equilibrium. This strand of ideas is obviously following 
the tradition of “the invisible hand” advocated by Adam Smith (The Wealth of 
Nations, 1776, vol. IV, ch 2.9). In other words, flexible wages help people to be 
employed in the face of adverse economic shocks. Consequently, less unemployment 
brings more happiness for the whole society, not only for those unemployed but also 
for those employed, since “almost any job is better than no job” (Layard 2003, p5). 
 
However, for the whole society, inequality is perhaps just as unhappy a thing 
as unemployment is. Relative income position can play a very important role in 
happiness (Layard 2003, Table 1, p3). If more and more people are located below the 
average line of the earnings distribution, the welfare of the whole society declines. 
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Hence, even with a much higher unemployment rate than that in the UK, different 
institutional “rigidities” are regarded as useful tools for social equality and stability in 
many continental European countries, and are politically difficult to remove (Boeri 
2005). Arthur Seldon argued that inequality in actions is the way to equality in result. 
The problem is what action can lead to the right way. This dilemma calls for a balance 
between the government’s aims of employment and equality, and can only be resolved 
by the interaction of institutions and market forces.   
 
1.1 Identifying the problem 
This thesis is not going to set another fire to the hot debate on labour market 
flexibility and rigidity in European countries. Even though the series of essays in this 
thesis aim to contribute to this debate, they only provide clearer empirical facts which 
may be used by both sides. The focus of interest here is to describe and analyze 
earnings inequality in the United Kingdom and related countries in particular Italy and 
Germany, incorporating institutional measures and changes.  
 
Earnings inequality in the United Kingdom has increased substantially since 
the 1970s. In 1972, the top ten percent of males, between the ages of 16 and 66 earned 
double the hourly wages of the bottom ten percent of males. The wage gap had soared 
by about 40 percent in the mid of 1990s. Even in 2002, the 90th-10th percentile 
differential of male was still about 20 percent higher than thirty years ago.1 Among 
industrialized countries, only the United States has had an increase of similar 
magnitude during the same period.  
 
                                                 
1 The figures in this paragraph are all derived from the General Household Surveys, and are based on 
the definition and conventions outlined later in this thesis. See Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2. 
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This thesis tracks the growth of earnings inequality in the United Kingdom 
over the three decades from 1972 to 2002. Since the unemployment rate in the UK has 
been controlled below 5% in recent years (Berthoud 2007, Figure A, p2), containing 
earnings inequality and reducing the number of poor families are aimed to be right at 
the top of the government’s social policy agenda (DWP 2006, p1). This thesis 
achieves some answers to questions such as “what has happened regarding wage 
inequality in the British labour market over the last three decades? In addition, if 
possible, what will happen in the next stage?” An understanding of how the British 
earnings distribution reached its current position could provide valuable clues on 
directions for future policy. 
 
Moreover, this thesis sheds light on more difficult questions as “Which factor 
or factors, among market forces (labour supply and demand), neutral/non-neutral 
technical shifts, international trade and institutional changes, play the most important 
role in these changes?” In the broader literature on earnings inequality, much 
disagreement remains concerning the fundamental causes of the rising earnings 
inequality in the UK and US. One class of explanations postulates that changes in the 
British wage structure are driven by skill-biased technological change (Machin and 
Van Reenen 1998 Table 1, p1220, Katz and Autor 2000 section 5.5, Machin 2001, 
p774 and O’Mahony et al 2008). They argue that skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) – the quick diffusion of computers or other Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) facilities at work – raised the relative demand for more skilled 
workers and reduced the demand for less skilled workers. Krugman (1994, p70) and 
Nickell and Bell (1996, p302) also agree that the technology impact in the 1980s 
would be more adverse to unskilled workers who cannot adapt to SBTC, maybe due 
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to poor quality primary education. There is strong evidence of the empirical 
association between proxies for SBTC and the widened wage gap of the UK and US 
in the 1980s. Thus, SBTC is an important factor in the earnings inequality through 
inducing skill-biased labour demand.   
 
Although the SBTC explanation is successful in explaining the rising earnings 
inequality in the UK and US in the 1980s, it is also widely realised that the diffusion 
of computers at work has become so widespread in the 1990s that a simple headcount 
no longer measures SBTC-induced demand shifts (Machin 2001, p772). Card and 
DiNardo (2002) review the evidence in favour of the SBTC hypothesis and focus on 
the implications of SBTC for economy-wide trends in wage inequality, and for the 
evolution of wage differentials between various groups. They argue that a 
fundamental problem for the SBTC hypothesis is that wage inequality in the US 
stabilized in the 1990s, despite continuing advances in computer technology. SBTC 
also fails to explain the closing of the gender gap, the stability of the racial wage gap, 
and the dramatic rise in education-related wage gaps for younger versus older workers 
in the US. Thus, they conclude that the SBTC hypothesis is not very helpful in 
understanding the myriad shifts in the structure of wages that have occurred over the 
past three decades. This thesis will push this argument further in late chapters using 
British data.  
 
An alternative explanation focuses on changes in product demand largely 
associated with large trade deficits from the 1970s.2 Wood (1995, p64-67, see also 
1994 and 1998)  tries to prove that the growth of manufacturing imports from newly 
                                                 
2 Nickell (2006, Table C) shows trade deficits of the UK since 1955.  
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industrializing economies has led to a sharp decline in manufacturing employment 
and a shift in employment towards those skill-intensive sectors. He argues that 
international trade lowers the economy-wide relative demand for unskilled labour by 
about 20%. Thus, international trade can explain not only the rise in earnings 
inequality throughout the industrialized countries, but also the trend towards higher 
joblessness.  
 
However, the trade explanation does not convince many labour economists 
(see Machin and Van Reenen 1998, p1239) and even many trade economists (see 
Sachs and Shatz 1994). Schmitt (1995) uses the General Household Survey (GHS) 
from 1974-1988 to perform an industry-based shift-share decomposition on the 
changes of education differentials in the UK. He does not find that employment shifts 
from manufacturing to service sector have made a significant contribution towards the 
rise in education differentials during the 1980s, hence suggesting that trade effects on 
earnings inequality may not be as important as Wood describes.3      
 
On the other hand, the rising wage inequality in the UK has been accompanied 
by institutional reforms in the labour market since the Thatcher-era (Blanchflower and 
Freeman 1993). A labour policy directed by US-style flexibility may be part of the 
causation of rising wage inequality. Evidence includes the fact that those continental 
European countries, such as Italy, Germany and Sweden, with little or no increase in 
earnings inequality since the 1970s, all continue to have some form of centralized 
wage setting (see Erickson and Ichino 1995 for Italy, Abraham and Houseman 1995 
for Germany and Edin and Holmlund 1995 for Sweden). This difference in wage 
                                                 
3 However, Acemoglu (2003b, p200) thinks that increased international trade may be more important 
than generally believed because it induces skill-biased technical change. He thus argues that the two 
competing explanations, international trade and SBTC, for the increasing skill demand may be related. 
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inequality across countries has led to a view which is sometimes called the “Krugman 
hypothesis”. It states that the rise in wage inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries and 
the rise in unemployment in continental Europe are “two sides of the same coin”, 
namely a fall in the relative demand for unskilled workers under different wage 
setting institutions (see Krugman 1994, p28-39, Nickell and Bell 1996, p302 and 
Puhani 2003, p1). 
 
Figure 1.1 describes the supply-demand changes behind the “Krugman 
hypothesis”. The horizontal axis represents the relative employment of skilled 
workers to unskilled workers (LS/LU), and the vertical axis represents the relative 
wages of skilled workers to unskilled workers (WS/WU). As the relative demand (D1) 
and relative supply (S) cross, the original equilibrium is at the point A where skilled 
workers have relative wage w1 and relative employment l1. In the face of SBTC, the 
relative demand curve for skilled workers will increase from D1 to D2.  
 
In Anglo-Saxon countries, flexible labour market institutions allow relative 
demand D2 and supply S to achieve the new equilibrium B. We find that skilled 
workers at the new equilibrium have a higher relative wage w2, that is, higher wage 
inequality. Flexible wages of unskilled workers can be adjusted low enough for them 
to keep their jobs or find new jobs. In addition, some unskilled workers may quit 
voluntarily and make the relative employment of skilled workers rise to l2. Thus, in 
the face of SBTC, overall unemployment rates in Anglo-Saxon countries are still kept 
at a natural level, but wage inequality is higher than before. 
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In continental European countries, however, centralized wage setting 
institutions may prevent the wage of unskilled workers from falling to an extent that 
employers are still willing to employ them. Hence, the relative wage of skilled 
workers may stay around w1, and wage inequality does not change much. In the face 
of SBTC, a rigid wage leads to a relative employment gap (l3-l1) between relative 
supply and demand of skilled workers. The relative supply of skilled workers is still at 
point A, while the relative demand rises to point C. The rigidity of labour market 
pushes the wage of unskilled workers above equilibrium. There is an excess-demand 
for skilled workers as well as a higher unemployment rate for unskilled workers. Thus, 
it is not surprising to see the evidence of a negative association between wage 
inequality and the rigidity of labour market institutions in cross-country analysis (e.g. 
Koeniger et al 2004, Table3, p27, see also the survey in Siebert 2006, Figure 1, p14).  
 
Institutions in this thesis include trade unions, the combined system of taxes 
and welfare benefits, and minimum wages (similar to DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 
1996). These institutions have been regarded as the primary factors in different 
patterns of earnings inequality across countries by many authors, for example Katz et 
al (1995), Blau and Kahn (1996), Machin (1996), Gottschalk and Joyce (1998), Card 
et al (2003) and Koeniger et al (2004, 2007). These cross-country analyses tend to 
treat the UK as an intermediate case between the rigid labour market in continental 
European countries and the “epitome” of labour market flexibility, the United States. 
Therefore, examination of the evolution of wage structure in the UK and exploring the 
possible causation behind the movement have been an important part of the 
international argument about issues of earnings inequality, unemployment and labour 
market flexibility.  
 8
1.2 Objectives 
There are three main tasks for this thesis: the first aim is to describe and analyze the 
changes in the wage structure of the United Kingdom over the period 1972-2002 
(Chapter 2 and 3). Chapter 2 is a further development of Schmitt (1995) and Katz et al 
(1995), aiming to describe the changes in the wage structure. We find that wage 
inequality fell slightly in the 1970s and rose rapidly in the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
In last years of my sample period, wage inequality has been contained to some extent. 
The cyclical pattern of skill premium, with an increasing trend after the 1970s is 
analyzed using a repeated cross-section regression in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 3 continues the first aim and analyzes how supply and demand 
interactions result in the changes of wage inequality in the UK. We test the Katz and 
Murphy (1992) hypothesis (that fluctuations of labour supply combined with stable or 
steadily growing labour demand decided wage movements, hence a negative 
association between employment and wage changes), and the Machin (2001) 
hypothesis (that fluctuations of labour demand combined with steady changes of 
labour supply decided wage changes, hence a positive association between 
employment and wage changes), using a simple supply and demand framework. 
Empirical results in Chapter 3 show that this supply and demand framework, 
following either Katz and Murphy’s hypothesis or Machin’s hypothesis, can only 
broadly fit with the employment/wage changes in the last thirty years and leave much 
space for institutional explanations.   
  
Secondly, the above two chapters regard institutions as the underpinning 
factors of wage changes, however, a formal analysis of institutional effects on skill 
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premiums is made in Chapter 4. A fairly consensual position is that the wage 
distribution reflects both market factors and the institutional environment. Institutions 
presumably work through supply and demand to affect the wage distribution. It is 
empirically demanding to quantitatively identify and assess the effect of institutions. 
Chapter 4 aims to disentangle the labour market institutions from the above simple 
supply and demand framework. A union bargaining model, involving institutional 
factors such as trade unions, earnings tax, unemployment benefit and minimum 
wages, is applied to explain the changes of skill premiums. After controlling for the 
workers’ main characteristics, changes of technology, industrial structure and labour 
market conditions, our estimates suggest that labour market institutions can account 
for a substantial part of the dramatic increase in skill premium and earnings inequality 
after the 1970s.  
 
The third task is to analyze the effect of different wage-setting institutions on 
wage flexibility. With worse economic performance than the US and the UK, policy-
makers of many continental European countries particularly emphasized labour 
market flexibility in recent years. Devereux and Hart (2006) point out that the extent 
to which wages respond to market conditions determines the extent to which adverse 
shocks from business cycles result in wage adjustments rather than unemployment. 
Thus, attainment of overall wage cyclicality has become the central goal of labour 
market flexibility.   
 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 compare real wage cyclicality in the UK with two 
continental European countries: Italy and Germany. The wage in the UK is set at the 
company or individual level, compared with the centralised collective agreements in 
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Italy and Germany. These two chapters find an overall procyclical wage in the UK, in 
contrast to procyclical wages only in prosperous regions of Italy (the north) and 
Germany (the west). The rigid wage in the poor regions of Italy (the centre-south) and 
Germany (the east) is apparently associated with the centralised and coordinated wage 
setting institutions in both countries. With the same access to technology and 
international competition, the big difference in the real wage cyclicality of these three 
countries implies that wage setting institutions play important roles in earnings 
inequality. The difference can support the “Krugman hypothesis” that flexible wage-
setting institutions allow increasing wage inequality and keep unemployment lower, 
just as rigid institutions contain wage inequality but bring a higher unemployment rate. 
 
In the concluding chapter, I summarise my findings and attempt to shed light 
on these various issues. On the one hand, it may be argued that the coordinated wage-
setting institutions as in Italy and Germany (OECD 2004, Table 3.5, p151) are 
necessary for labour market flexibility. The collective bargaining in Germany and 
Italy possibly achieve flexible wages in prosperous regions, but it obviously delays 
recovery of lagging ones. The advantage of wage bargaining at individual or company 
level in the UK is that the freedom of bargaining can provide employment 
opportunities to all participants in labour market. On the other hand, the US-style 
labour market institutions (such as the decline of the National Minimum Wages, see 
DiNardo et al 1996) seem not the only way to improve labour market performance, 
especially considering the cost of higher earnings inequality. The efficiency of such 
institutional reforms is further questioned in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
CHANGES IN THE WAGE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 1972-2002 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to describe the changes in the wage structure of the United 
Kingdom over the period 1972-2002. Wage inequality in the United Kingdom has 
increased substantially since the 1970s and arrived at a high level in terms of either 
the UK’s own historical experience or by comparison with other European countries. 
Since the patterns and determination of inequality always draw the attention of 
economists and common public, the evolution of the wage structure over the 1980s 
and the early 1990s has been well documented by a number of papers.  
 
Schmitt (1995) uses the General Household Survey (GHS) from 1974-1988 to 
describe how earnings inequality among males fell slightly during the 1970s, only to 
rise rapidly in the 1980s in the UK. Gosling et al (2000) report that the gap between 
the 90th and 10th percentile of the wage distribution changed little during the 1960s 
and early 1970s and has widened rapidly throughout the 1980s and early 1990s using 
the GHS 1978-1991 and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 1978-1995. Dickens 
(2000) reports a doubling of the variance of the logarithm of hourly wages during the 
same period using the New Earnings Survey (NES) 1975-1995.  
 
Current literature continues the story. Gosling and Lemieux (2001) report that 
wage inequality in the UK remained more stable in the second half of the 1990’s 
mainly using the FES 1978-1996, supplemented with the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
1997-1999. Prasad (2002) studies the NES and discusses wage inequality from 1975 
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to 1999. He argues that there has been virtually no change in wage inequality of the 
UK in the latter half of the 1990s. Kalwij and Alessie (2003) confirm the above 
observation by examining the variance-covariance structure of log-wages of British 
men in the NES 1975-2001. They also find that wage inequality has risen sharply 
during the 1980s and early 1990s and remained fairly constant in the second half of 
the 1990s. A strong increase in transitory wage inequality and a lesser increase in 
permanent wage inequality are the main causes of the worsening wage inequality 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. They attribute the stable wage inequality in the 
second half of the 1990s to the stabilization of permanent and transitory wages 
inequality, especially the strong decrease in the transitory wage inequality for the new 
entrants. Thus, current research is in sharp contrast to earlier literature and illuminates 
the “mild miracle” of the British economy in the last 10 years which is enjoying low 
unemployment, strong money, faster growth of GDP and improved earnings 
inequality.  
 
However, the main data sources in above pioneering research are the NES and 
the FES, which cannot provide accurate information about the education level of 
workers over time. This research cannot analyze issues such as the education and 
experience premium, permitting a further analysis on the recent improvement in 
earnings inequality. Schmitt (1995) and Gosling et al (2000) use the rich information 
of workers in the GHS, but their data only cover the 1980s. Examining the skill 
(education) premium over the last three decades in the UK by using the GHS 1972-
2002 is the main contribution of this chapter. 
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Many researchers compare changes of the wage structure in the UK with other 
OECD countries, especially the United States and continental European countries. In 
these respects, wage inequality in the British labour market shows similar trends to 
that in the US. Although other industrialised countries have experienced the same 
changes in global economy over the last decades, the increase of wage inequality is 
much less pronounced than in the UK and the US. Many continental European 
countries such as Italy, (West) Germany, France and Scandinavia are even absent 
from the worsening process of wage inequality during the 1980s (see details in Katz et 
al 1995, Blau and Kahn 1996, and Gosling and Lemieux 2001). This cross-national 
research attributes the similarity in the US and UK to the convergence of “US-style” 
reform in British labour market institutions, in contrast to the rigid labour market in 
continental Europe. Therefore, understanding the evolution of wage structure is the 
first step to consider those important issues such as earnings inequality, 
unemployment and labour market flexibility in the UK. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze a long time series of the wage structure of 
the UK. It can be treated as an updating of Schmitt (1995) and Katz et al (1995). Our 
research indicates that the British wage structure has changed a lot since the 1970s. 
This chapter supports previous findings that wage inequality in the UK fell slightly in 
the 1970s, and then rose rapidly in the 1980s and early 1990s.  This increasing trend 
has been effectively contained in the late 1990s and 2000s. The evolution of skill 
premiums, by education and experience is described and analyzed in this chapter 
using the GHS 1972-2002. Results in this chapter show that the movement of the 
degree premium fits the change of wage inequality well.  
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Another contribution of this paper is that the same analysis is applied not only 
to males but also females, as a reflection of the increasing role of women in terms of 
workforce participation. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
describes the main data sources. Section 3 describes the changes in the wage structure 
and earnings inequality in the UK over the period 1972-2002. In section 4, we apply a 
standard earnings equation to check the changes of skill premium. The last section 
concludes. 
 
2.2 Data description 
2.2.1 Demographic trends in the GHS 
The principle data in this thesis come from the series of the annual General Household 
Survey (GHS) from 1972 to 2002. The GHS is a continuous multipurpose survey of 
large random samples of households across Great Britain, conducted on an annual 
basis by the Office for National Statistics (ONS 2004). The survey has been carried 
out continuously except for two breaks in 1997 when the survey was reviewed and 
1999 when the survey was redeveloped. Hence, there are 29 years of data over the 
total 31 years of 1972-2002. Since 2000, the annual sample has been based on 
financial years. That is, the GHS has been conducted continuously from April of one 
year to March of the next year, but they are labelled according to the first-named year 
for convenience. Hence, the phrase “the year of 2000” in this paper actually indicates 
a time period from April of 2000 to March of 2001.4 
 
                                                 
4The General Household Survey 1972-2002 is distributed by the Economic and Social Data Service, 
Office of National Statistics (ONS). Crown Copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the 
Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland.  For a detailed description of the GHS, visit 
the website of ONS: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase or the GHS home of Economic and Social 
Data Service (ESDS government) http://www.esds.ac.uk/government/ghs/. 
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The GHS include about 13,000 households in each year, that is, about 16,000 
adults aged 16 and over in England, Scotland and Wales. Data are collected on five 
core topics including education, employment, health, housing, and population and 
family information. These surveys provide individual information on wages and 
employment for 337,836 workers during the period 1972-2002. Hence, each of the 29 
annual GHS included in the analysis covers about 12,000 males and females with 
wage and employment information. Other variables such as education and working 
hours are also covered in a continuous way. The GHS datasets are reasonably 
consistent over time for wage variables of workers with age, gender, education and 
other demographic characteristics and thus provides consistent and nationally 
representative information on individuals.  
 
We use three demographic characteristics: gender, education and potential 
labour market experience (simplified as experience for further analysis) to categorize 
our sample. The education variables used in this thesis are based on the highest 
educational qualification earned by the respondent, which is either vocational or 
academic. Schmitt (1995) argues that the use of qualification-based variables in the 
GHS offers two advantages over education measures based on years of schooling. 
First, the qualification variables outperform years variables in standard human capital 
equations (see Schmitt 1991). Second, the value of different types of qualifications, 
particularly vocational as opposed to academic qualifications, may shed more light on 
the workings of the supply and demand for skills than an undifferentiated years 
variable. In order to simplify the complicated structure of British qualifications, all 
highest qualifications earned by the respondent are categorized into six groups: 
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NOQUAL, BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, HIGHER and DEGREE. The complete list and 
brief description of education variables are in the Table 2.1.  
 
Since 1973, all British children have had to attend full-time education until the 
age of sixteen. Those who have never gone to school and who have never earned a 
qualification consist of the group of workers without qualifications (NOQUAL). 
According to the GHS, NOQUAL was the largest group in the total employment 
before 1994 (for example, about 61.5 percent in 1972). This group has decreased 
rapidly over the last thirty years so that only about 15 percent of workers had no 
qualifications in 2002, as shown in Panel A of Figure 2.1.  
 
Those who earn qualifications follow either a vocational or an academic track. 
Following Schmitt (1995), the vocational qualifications increase in skill from 
miscellaneous, relatively low-skilled apprenticeships (VOC-OTHER) through 
incremented, nationally recognized apprenticeships (VOC-LOW, VOC-MIDDLE, and 
VOC-HIGH). The highest level vocational qualifications can involve some instruction 
at college level.5 School children following the academic track prepare for and sit a 
series of national tests by academic subject. Those who finally earn the lowest 
academic (below O-LEVEL) or vocational qualifications (VOC-OTHER) are 
categorized into the BOLEV group. The BOLEV group also decreased from about 14 
percent in 1972 to 11 percent in 2002 in Panel A of Figure 2.1. 
 
                                                 
5 Works generally earn vocational qualifications while they work, through apprenticeship schemes, 
part-time study, or relatively short periods of full-time study “sandwiched” between spells of 
employment, often with the same employer. Thus, we involve company training (if with qualifications) 
in this education variable. 
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Students passing grades on a series of national tests by academic subject, 
generally taken around age 16, may earn qualifications that would place individuals in 
the OLEVEL 1-4, O-LEV&CLER, and O-LEVEL 5+ categories. The “Ordinary 
Level” examination categories distinguish between students who pass between one 
and four examinations, and those who attempt and pass five or more. The distinction 
is important for some employers and for further study. Workers with these O-LEVEL 
equivalent or VOC-LOW qualifications are categorized into the OLEV group, which 
increased from about 10 percent in 1972 to about 20 percent in 2002 in Panel A of 
Figure 2.1.    
 
After O-LEVEL, some students (usually around age 18) take further national 
examinations at “Advanced level”. For some students, A-LEVEL is a terminal 
qualification; for others they are only a prerequisite for university admission. Workers 
with these A-LEVEL equivalent or VOC-MIDDLE qualifications are categorized into 
the ALEV group. The ALEV group has increased five-fold from about 4 percent to 19 
percent over the entire period.  
 
The remaining two education groups have also increased over the last thirty 
years. The HIGHER group includes college equivalent qualifications, which consist 
of all educational or professional qualifications below degree level but above GCE A-
level (For example, Teaching, Nursing and VOC-HIGH etc). The employment share 
of the higher education group (HIGHER, about 10 percent in 2002) has doubled in the 
last thirty years. The DEGREE group here includes all respondents who successfully 
finished the standard three-year university course as well as those who study further. 
In particular, the employment share of the DEGREE group has increased about nine-
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fold from 2.7 percent to 22 percent over the period 1972-2002. Thus, the employment 
composition has shifted to a more educated (skilled) structure, revealing big changes 
of relative supply in the British labour market. 
 
The experience variable is defined in the standard way as the minimum of 
(age-years of education-5, age-16). 6  This assumes that all workers should enter 
education at the age of five and cannot leave school before they are sixteen years old. 
Observations are categorized into eight groups, each covering five years of 
experience. Card and Lemieux (2001) argue that the United Kingdom experienced 
baby boom in the 1950s and the falling supply of college graduate in this cohort may 
raise the return of college for young in the 1980s. Daveri and Maliranta (2007) also 
reveal the impact of age and seniority on wages and productivity in Finland. More 
British people are staying longer in the workforce so common practice of excluding 
experience over 40s may be introducing biases. Thus, workers with more than 40-year 
experience are also put into the last experience group.  
 
In Panel B of Figure 2.1, the employment share of new entrants (with 0-10 
years experience) was quite stable in the 1970s and decreased from about 25 percent 
to about 19 percent during the 1980s and early years of the 1990s. At the same time, 
the employment share of prime experienced workers (with 21-30 years experience) 
had continuously increased from about 20 percent to about 27 percent. Just as in other 
developed countries such as the US and Canada, the evolution of experience structure 
in Britain reflects baby boom in the 1950s (also see Card and Lemieux 2001) and the 
long term aging process of the workforce. Thus, higher employment shares of prime 
                                                 
6 See Katz and Murphy (1992, p37).  
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experienced workers reflect a slight shift to the more experienced structure in the 
British labour market. 
 
2.2.2 Wage variables in the GHS 
The wage variable used in this chapter is the real gross hourly earnings, deflated by 
the annual Retail Price Index (RPI) with 1995 as 100. This deflating factor is 
calculated from the prices of all items excluding mortgage interest payments provided 
by the Office for National Statistics (ONS 2008). The wage variable is from a wage 
sample including all full-time employees aged sixteen to sixty-six. “Full time 
employee” here is defined as workers (excluding employer and self-employed) with 
weekly working hours exceeding 35 hours. Self-employed workers, part time workers 
and those working without pay are excluded from the sample. Our variables for 
earnings are all calculated from the wage sample which provides accurate wage 
information by excluding noise from extreme cases.  
 
The complete list and a description of the earnings variables appear in Table 
2.2. This hourly wage variable is derived as follows. Firstly, gross earnings before any 
deduction are divided by the corresponding payment period (weeks). This process is 
applied for every year of the entire period except 1979-88, during which the GHS 
provides hourly earnings directly. Although the definitions of hourly earnings in GHS 
change a little from period to period, which may affect comparability between 
periods, the consistency of the hourly earnings variable can be taken as satisfactory. 
Schmitt (1995, p179) also thinks the real gross weekly wage is the most continuous 
measure of the unit price of labour input in the GHS. 
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Secondly, real weekly earnings are divided by weekly working hours 
(workhrs) to calculate real hourly earnings. According to the ONS (2006, p3), before 
1996 workhrs gives the “Usual number of hours worked per week excluding mealtime 
and overtime”. But, after 1996, this variable includes mealtime and overtime. Figure 
2.2 describes changes of the weekly working hours by gender. The left vertical axis 
represents the mean working hours for all full time workers, males and females. The 
right vertical axis represents the working hours gap between males and females. We 
can find weekly working hours of all three groups are quite stable over the entire 
period. Full time males work longer time, about 42 hours per week than females 
(about 39 hours per week). Moreover, the working hours gender gap has been slowly 
increasing after the 1970s, from about 2 hours in 1980 to about 4 hours in 2002. Since 
the working hour variable before 1996 does not include over time, our hourly earnings 
variable may be affected by the different coverage of the weekly earnings variable and 
working hour variables in the GHS.  
 
The main concern about our wage variable is likely to be the measurement of 
overtime hours. Overtime working is commonly regarded as short-term employment 
adjustment mechanism that enables firms to meet unexpected variations in demand 
without incurring the fixed costs of hiring or firing workers (e.g. Bils, 1987). Hart et 
al (2000) find that significant numbers of employees work more hours in the 
workplace than their contract stipulates. Hence, overtime working is an important part 
of working hours in the British labour market and the quantitative significance of both 
paid and unpaid overtime is even greater in the UK (than in Germany).7 Thus, the 
                                                 
7 Bell and Hart (2003a, p471) find that about 35% of total male workers and 18% of women in the 
1998 NES sample worked overtime. Of the non-managerial men they studied, 49% worked overtime.  
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missing overtime problem in working hours (ONS 2006, p3) may bring upwards 
biases in wage rate.  
 
Bell and Hart (2003a, p475-6) show that without national laws regulating 
overtime assignment or compensation, British overtime premium is independent of 
overtime hours and the proportions of overtime workers working at given average 
rates are very similar across the hours groups. Moreover, Bell and Hart (2003b) show 
that overtime hours and pay are not wholly geared to meeting short-term shifts in 
production requirements even in labour markets like Britain where statutory overtime 
rules do not apply. The maximum lengths of standard weekly hours set by many firms 
follow wider industrial or regional or national collective bargaining norms. These 
observations are consistent with the view that the conditions for overtime working 
follow “custom and practice” and a long-term contractual role for overtime, 
suggesting that the effect of overtime working in our hourly earnings may be stable 
(Bell and Hart 2003a, p478). Thus, the missing overtime problem in our working 
hours variable may be not very serious.8  
 
Therefore, hourly wage can exclude the effect of working hours from our 
earnings variable hence be a more accurate measurement. Even though this hourly 
earnings variable may be affected by the different coverage of the weekly earnings 
variable and working hour variables in the GHS, hourly earnings is still a better 
measure of the unit price of labour input than the weekly earnings.9 
                                                 
8 We will discuss more on the working hour problem in different data sources in Chapter 5 and 6.  
9 In fact, the missing overtime problem in the working hours variable does not appear to be serious, 
because the main conclusions remain. In particular, I still find cyclical patterns for labour demand in 
Chapter 3. Moreover, Chapter 4’s results about increased unskilled trade union power reducing 
earnings inequality also remain. (The interested reader can find results for weekly earnings in 
Appendixes to Chapter2 and 3, and in sensitivity tables for Chapter 4). 
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2.3 Changes in Wage Structure 
2.3.1 Mean wage changes by gender 
This section provides a broad empirical characterization of the evolution of the wage 
structure in the UK during the period 1972-2002. Figure 2.3 describes changes of the 
real hourly wages by gender. The left vertical axis represents the log form mean wage 
for all full time workers, and for males and females. The right vertical axis represents 
the wage gap between males and females. We can see that over the entire period, the 
real hourly wage of all full time workers increases by about 60 percent (from 1.46 in 
1972 to 2.06 in 2002).10 Since about two thirds of the full time workers are males, the 
mean wage of males has increased by a similar magnitude as the full work force, that 
is, 50 percent over the entire period (from 1.61 in 1972 to 2.11 in 2002).  
 
At the same time, Figure 2.2 indicates that the mean wage of females has 
increased by about 90 percent over the last thirty years (from 1.06 in 1972 to 1.96 in 
2002). This result implies that the gender gap between males and females has 
decreased by about 40 percent (=90-50). In 1972, full time males earned about 55 
percent (=1.65-1.10) more than females, while wage gap decreased to less than 40 
percent in 1980, and then to only 16 percent (=2.10-1.94) in 2002.11 Since the wage 
gap between males and females has been decreasing over the last three decades, the 
narrowing gender gap should decrease overall earnings inequality. Thus, the well 
                                                 
10 We refer to 100 times log changes as percentage changes. 
11 GHS oversampled married women in the early years so reduction in the wage gap might also reflect 
this sampling bias. The GHS Summary Quality Report from ONS (2007a) also admits: “one of the 
limitations of the GHS is that the nature of the sample design means that the precision of survey 
estimates is reduced ……Although this effect is reduced by the use of stratification it is nevertheless a 
limitation of the survey.” However, we find that the ratio of married women is quite stable in our 
sample during the period 1972-1995. Thus, the oversample problem on married women may be not 
very serious in our research.  
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documented rising earnings inequality in the UK must be from the worsening 
inequality within rather than between gender groups.  
 
2.3.2 Wage inequality within gender group 
In order to illustrate the rising inequality within each gender group, Panel A of Figure 
2.4 summarizes movements of wage inequality by gender. It plots the times series of 
wage inequality for males and females as measured by the log wage differentials 
between the ninetieth and the tenth percentiles of the wage distribution. Overall 
hourly wage inequality (90th-10th percentile differentials) increased about 25 percent 
(from about 1.0 in 1972 to about 1.25 in 2002) for males as well as about 13 percent 
(from about 1.0 in 1972 to about 1.13 in 2002) for females over the entire period. 
Moreover, with this long term increasing trend, wage inequality in the UK follows a 
cyclical pattern over the entire period. The figure shows earnings inequality narrowed 
in the 1970s, especially for females, and moved up until the early years of the 1990s. 
After 1995, the rising trend of earnings inequality was definitely reduced for females 
and kept quite stable for males. This graph is consistent with results of Prasad (2002).  
 
We use the national unemployment rate of males as an indicator of business 
cycle, which is derived from the Labour Force Survey (LFS, ONS 2007b). Panel A of 
Figure 2.4 shows that the earnings inequality increases as the labour market becomes 
loose, vice versa. This phenomenon is even more prominent for females. Barlevy and 
Tsiddon (2006) also find the cyclical pattern of earnings inequality using data that 
during the first half of the 20th century. They argue that recessions should contribute 
more to raising inequality when inequality is rising over the long run than when it is 
falling. Our findings in Panel A are consistent with their model.  
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Barlevy and Tsiddon (2006) also point that cyclical fluctuations as well as 
other factors, such as changes in the incidence of unemployment, search and matching, 
dynamic contracting and so on all affect earnings over the business cycle, and are all 
important in ultimately shaping the distribution of earnings. Panel B of Figure 2.4 
illustrates this image by plotting the cumulative log real wage growth of three groups 
- the tenth, fiftieth, and ninetieth percentiles of the wage distribution - for males. More 
precisely, the figure displays the log ratio of each group’s real hourly earnings in each 
year relative to that group’s level of real earnings in 1972 (the base year), and gives us 
a snapshot of the movement in earnings of the three groups.  
 
In Panel B of Figure 2.4, recessions in business cycle correspond to periods of 
low productivity, so all three groups show procyclical wages, in line with micro 
evidence from the past thirty years of the UK (Devereux and Hart 2006) and the US 
(Solon et al 1994). However, wages of the top percentile group are more sensitive to 
the recovery of business cycle and increase much faster than the middle and bottom 
percentile group during the 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, wages of the poor group 
have achieved the least growth (only about 42 percent) among the three groups over 
the entire period, and then the middle group (about 48 percent), while the wages of the 
rich group have grown fastest (about 62 percent). Hence, the rich have grown richer at 
faster pace than the poor in the last thirty years and ultimately reshape the earnings 
distribution. 
 
For example, responding to the two big unemployment shock around the mid- 
1980s and the mid-1990s (see also Berthoud 2007, Figure A, p2), wages of the rich 
group showed very high procyclicality and recovered from the shock very quickly. 
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Brewer et al (2008) investigate two different sources of data – the Households Below 
Average Income data-set (HBAI) and the Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI), and also 
find that the rich have grown richer at faster pace than most workers and their 
incomes may have accelerated even further in recent years on the back of a rising 
stock market. They argue that with so many working in finance, there is a strong link 
between fortunes of the rich group and those of the stock market. Similarly, the graph 
of the 90th percentile in Panel B maintained high speed over the entire period, maybe 
due to the ICT booming in production (see O’Mahony et al 2008) and the “dot-com 
bubble” in financial market covering roughly 1995–2001 (Goldfarb et al 2008, Figure 
5-8, p55-58). Hence, wage of the rich group is not only following a long term 
increasing trend but also highly procyclical to business fluctuation.  
Wages of the middle and poor groups also show overall procyclical pattern 
over time. However, wages of the poor group are not as sensitive as the middle and 
rich groups to the business recovery around the mid-1980s. Hence, wages of the poor 
group had been left behind further by the other two groups during the big 
unemployment shock around the mid-1980s. With the decline of trade union’s 
collective bargaining (see Blanchflower and Bryson 2007), wages of the poor group 
become more sensitive to business cycle during the 1990s and the 2000s and increase 
very fast after the unemployment shock of the mid-1990s. This time, it is wages of the 
middle group that are sticky and insensitive to the business recovery. This result is 
consistent with the findings of O’Mahony et al (2008, p16) that the intermediate skill 
groups became more disadvantageous in the 1990s than in the 1980s. O’Mahony et al 
(2008) also find an increasing complementarity between capital and unskilled labour 
in the 1990s. Thus, with help of better adaptation for technology in the 1990s, the 
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earnings of the poor group converged to the middle group quickly over the last years 
in our sample.12  
 
2.4 A standard earnings equation 
2.4.1 Evolution of the skill premium 
In this section, we apply a standard earnings equation to do repeated cross-section 
regressions. Workers’ educational qualifications and experience are used as skill 
proxies to analyze the evolution of skill premiums over time. Moreover, we also 
estimate residual wages after these repeated cross-section regressions. Residual wage 
inequality is the dispersion of wages after controlling for the measured supply-
demand changes of skill groups. Thus, residual inequality is the part of overall 
inequality unexplained by measurable skill variables such as education and 
experience. 
  
Hourly earnings are estimated for males and females in a repeated cross-
section regression as in Katz et al (1995, p 39, Table 1.2): 
 
lnwi = a + b1Qi  + b2 Expi + b3 Expi2 + b4Ri +b5Wi+b6Mi +b7 Tt +ei              (2.1) 
 
The dependent variable lnwi is log form real gross hourly pay. Explanatory variables 
include a vector of five education dummies Qi: BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, HIGHER 
and DEGREE (NOQUAL as the base group); the quadratic experience terms (Exp and 
Exp2) to capture the concavity of the experience earnings profile, a vector of four 
region dummies Ri: MIDLAND, SOUTH, WALES and SCOTLAND (Northern 
                                                 
12 We discuss the effect of wage setting institutions on wage cyclicality (and earnings inequality) in 
Chapter 5 and 6 using panel data of three European countries: Italy, Germany and the UK.  
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England as the base group), an ethnicity dummy set as 1 for white people (Wi), a 
marital status dummy set as 1 married people (Mi) and a vector of year dummies Tt 
only for pooled datasets; ei is an error term. We use Stata’s OLS regression 
programme (reg, see Stata 2003a) to estimate equation (2.1).  
 
Table 2.3 presents estimated coefficients for males and females using the 
pooled datasets of six periods: 1972-76, 1977-81, 1982-86, 1987-91, 1992-96 and 
1998-2002. As can be seen, education premiums are represented as the estimated 
coefficients of the education dummies in equation (2.1). Higher educated workers 
have a higher level of education premiums for both males and females in each period. 
For instance, during the period 1998-2002, males in the DEGREE group earn about 
68.1 percent more than males in the NOQUAL group, while males in the BOLEV 
group only earn about 8.7 percent more than the NOQUAL group. The highest return 
from education is for the DEGREE group, which is about 30 percent higher than the 
second highest educated group (HIGHER) for both males and females. Hence, more 
education brings higher earnings. And, degrees from university are the most important 
education qualification for earnings.  This result is consistent with the considerable 
existing literature on education return e.g. Harmon, Hogan and Walker (2003), 
Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2003) and Walker and Zhu (2003, 2005).13 
 
Education premiums in Table 2.3 have shown a cyclical pattern with an 
increasing trend over the entire period for males, but this increasing trend is more 
                                                 
13 For example, Walker and Zhu (2003) demonstrate, mainly using the Labour Force Survey (LFS), that 
there is a large earnings premium associated with more education – perhaps as much as 10 per cent per 
additional year of education. 
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evident after the 1970s.14 Moreover, the more educated are male workers, the faster 
do their education premiums grow after the 1970s. This clear ranking in education 
premium growth after the 1970s is as follows: 12.1 percent for DEGREE (=0.681-
0.560), 4.1 percent for HIGHER (=0.4-0.359), about 2 percent for ALEV and OLEV, 
and no much change for BOLEV. Those males who are more educated seem to have 
faster wage growth. Consequently, the more dispersed education premiums have 
pushed up male wage inequality since the 1970s.  
 
Females in Table 2.3 also show that the large earnings premium is associated 
with more education. And, education premiums of females are higher than those of 
males (also see Walker and Zhu 2003, Figure 1, p147). However, females’ education 
premiums are more stable and cyclical than males. And, primary education (BOLEV 
and OLEV) are much more important for females’ earnings than for males’. For 
example, wages of females in the BOLEV group have increased by about 3.08 percent 
(=0.1517-0.1208) as well as about 5 percent (=0.228-0.1822) in the OLEV group 
since the 1970s. Earnings premiums of higher educated groups (ALEV, HIGHER and 
DEGREE) have not changed much over the entire period.  
 
Therefore, we find the earnings premiums of all education groups have been 
increasing, at least stable after the 1970s for both males and females. With recent 
rapid expansion of high education (see Figure 2.1), our results suggest that the 
increased supply of graduates has been absorbed by the labour market, implying that 
the demand for skills has overwhelmed the supply of skills, at least increased roughly 
                                                 
14 Repeated cross section regressions do not account for influence of overall pattern of the business 
cycle on wage earnings, which might cause misspecification problem in our regression. We will follow 
the standard two step method in Solon et al (1994) and Devereux and Hart (2006) to capture the effect 
of business cycle in the Chapter 4-6.   
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in tandem in recent two decades. Our findings are consistent with Harmon, Hogan and 
Walker (2003) and Walker and Zhu (2005) using different data sources. 
 
The coefficients of quadratic experience are reported in the next four rows in 
Table 2.4. Similar to education premiums, there is also an increasing trend of the 
experience premiums for both males and females over the entire period (especially 
after the 1970s). Moreover, the females’ experience premiums increase much faster 
than males’. As can be seen, the experience premiums of females increase from 3.56 
percent in the period 1972-1976 to 4.59 percent in the period 1998-2002, while the 
experience premiums of males only increase from 4.32 to 4.58 percent.  
 
Considering the quadratic effect of experience, and controlling for other 
variables, a female worker with 10 years experience would earn about 28.6 percent 
(=3.56×10-0.07×100) more than a new entrant in the period 1972-1976, while she 
would earn about 36.9 percent (=4.59×10-0.09×100) more in the period 1998-2002. 
However, there is no such dramatic increase in the experience premiums of males. 
Thus, the experience premiums of females have grown faster than males and become 
similar to males in recent years. 
 
Our regressions also show some other points worthy of mention. Firstly, 
regional premium is only prominent for the south of England (including the Great 
London area), which increases from 6.77 percent to 16.01 percent for males, and from 
11.56 percent to 16.43 percent for females over the last thirty years. For other regions, 
there is no continuous significant regional premium compared with the north of 
England. Hence, only the south of England (including the Great London area) is 
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different from other regions and the wage gap between the south of England and 
others is becoming wider, showing it is becoming the most prosperous area in the UK.  
 
Secondly, ethnicity is important for males but not for females (especially in 
the 1970s and 1980s). Married males earn more than unmarried, while married 
females may earn a little less, but not significant. Obviously, these control variables 
contribute little to changes of wage structure (and the increasing earnings inequality). 
The main measurable variables to explain the higher earnings inequality are skills, i.e. 
education attainment and its earnings premium (see Gosling, Machin and Meghir 
2000, and Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker 2003).  
 
Finally, R-squared values in Table 2.4 decrease from 36.95 percent in 1972-76 
to 19.26 percent in 1998-2002 for males. Much literature also shows that measured 
characteristics (gender, education and experience) of workers can only explain about 
thirty percent of wage variations (see Katz et al 1995, p39, Table 1.2). The declining 
explanatory power of measured characteristics may reflect the inaccuracy of 
educational qualifications as an approximation of human capital. For instance, Nickell 
and Bell (1996) argue that primary education quality in the UK has declined, which 
may decrease the explanatory power of primary education. Since educational 
qualifications are imperfect proxies of human capital, wage variations from policy 
changes or other unmeasured characteristics such as ability or education quality are 
reflected in the residuals of equation (2.1). 
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2.4.2 Residual wage inequality 
We now do the repeated cross-section regressions for each year. After controlling for 
the characteristics of workers, the distribution of residuals from these regressions may 
be thought of as capturing the dispersion of wage unexplained by the supply and 
demand framework. The Panel A of Figure 2.5 plots the 90th-10th percentile 
differentials of residual earnings for males and females and shows a very similar 
cyclical pattern to the overall inequality in Figure 2.4. The recessions around the mid-
1980s and mid-1990s would contribute to raising residual inequality, while the 
recovery around the year of 1990 and the 2000s dramatically decrease residual 
inequality. Our results show that, after controlling for skills (and their cyclicality), 
residual inequality is still affected by business cycle.  
 
Moreover, if the increase in overall inequality were due solely to rising 
inequality between education-experience groups, we would expect the residual 
distribution to show no tendency toward greater inequality. The overall inequality 
would only stem from changing skill endowments or market valuations of human 
capital that the earnings regressions would remove from the data (Schmitt 1995, p187). 
The Panel A of Figure 2.5 seems supportive to Schmitt (1995)’s argument. For 
example, the residual inequality of females only shows a cyclical movement without 
tendency toward greater inequality over the entire period (around 0.9 in 1972 and 
2002). During which the overall inequality has increased by 13 percent over the same 
period (see Panel A of Figure 2.4). Hence, changes in the skill endowments and 
market valuation can fully account for the changes in female earnings inequality over 
the entire period.  
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For males, the residual inequality has increased by only 14 percent from 1972 
(0.83) to 2002 (0.97), compared with 25 percent in the overall inequality (from about 
1.0 in 1972 to about 1.25 in 2002, see Panel A of Figure 2.4). By this crude measure, 
changes in the skill endowments and market valuation can account for about 44 
percent i.e. (25-14)/25 of the changes in male earnings inequality over the entire 
period. Hence, for males, approximately 56 percent (=14/25) of the increase of overall 
earnings inequality has occurred within education and experience groups. This result 
is very similar to Schmitt (1995, p187) who claims that about 60 percent of the 
increase of earnings inequality occurred within education and experience groups in 
the period 1978-1988. Therefore, the residual inequality of males shows a cyclical 
movement with a much less increasing tendency toward greater inequality over the 
entire period.15 
 
Panel B of Figure 2.5 plots the cumulative growth of the tenth, fiftieth, and 
ninetieth percentiles of males’ residual wage. The residual wages of three groups 
show different sensitiveness to shocks from business cycle, which decides the 
evolution of residual wage inequality. Firstly, the residual wages of the middle group 
(or semi-skilled workers) are quite stable around zero and insensitive to shocks from 
business cycle before 1990. Furthermore, the jump of residual wages around the mid-
1990s even shows a counter-cyclical pattern, which may be associated with 
                                                 
15 The increasing residual or within earnings inequality is a widely observed phenomenon in the USA 
and UK (see Figures 1.3D, 1.4D in Katz et al 1995, p34, 37). Rosen (1981) pioneers the economics of 
superstars and argues that the standard competitive model is virtually silent about any special role 
played by either the size of the total market or the amount of it controlled by few people. MacDonald 
(1988) emphasises that the young in occupations such as acting and finance earn well below what their 
current alternative offers, and success is rare and rewarded highly in these occupations (also see Brewer 
et al 2008). Even with the same skill qualifications, most young participants will not become superstars 
in these occupations and are paid less than their peers in other occupations at least, which presumably 
increases the within earnings inequality. 
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disadvantage of semi-skilled workers in capital complementarity in the 1990s (see 
O’Mahony et al 2008). Hence, compared with the middle group in Figure 2.4, wage 
procyclicality with the increasing trend of the middle group has been represented by 
changes in skill endowments and market valuation. 
 
Secondly, the residual wages of the poor group are also quite stable around 
zero and insensitive to business cycle during the 1970s and the 1980s. However, after 
1990, their residual wages show high procyclicality and become very sensitive to the 
recovery of business cycle. Hence, the tenth percentile of residual wages increases 
very fast and quickly converges to the middle group in the last ten years of our sample. 
This result is consistent with O’Mahony et al (2008) which find an increasing 
complementarity between capital and unskilled labour in the 1990s.  
 
Finally, the residual wages of the rich group only show an increasing trend 
without clear cyclicality. Hence, the 90th-50th percentile differentials of residual wages 
have been increasing after the 1970s. Compared with the rich group in Figure 2.4, 
wage procyclicality and its partial increasing trend of the rich group have been 
represented by changes in skill endowments and market valuation. Thus, the 
increasing residual wage inequality of males is mainly from the increasing trend of the 
rich group, which cannot be explained by changes in skill endowments and premiums.   
 
2.5 Conclusions  
Through a standard earnings equation, we do repeated cross-section regressions for 
real wages of males and females.  The basic changes in the British wage structure can 
be summarized as follows: 
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1. The overall real hourly wage has increased about 60 percent in the UK from 
1972 to 2002. Gender premiums have been decreasing over the last thirty years. 
Wages of females increase by 40 percent relative to the wages of males.   
 
2. Overall hourly wage inequality (90th-10th percentile differentials) increased 
about 25 percent for males as well as about 13 percent for females over the entire 
period. Wage inequality shows a cyclical pattern, which may be from the different 
wage cyclicality of the top, middle and bottom percentile groups.  
 
3. The education premiums of males also show a cyclical pattern with 
somewhat increasing trend, especially after the 1970s. Higher educated male workers 
have experienced a faster growth of the education premiums so that the wages of 
males have become more dispersed after the 1970s. However, female workers with 
only primary education have faster wage growth than higher educated ones.  
Moreover, the experience premiums of females have grown faster than males and 
become similar to males in recent years. 
 
5. Changes in the skill endowments and market valuation can fully account for 
the changes in female earnings inequality over the entire period. However, the 
residual earnings inequality accounts for about 56 percent of changes in overall 
earnings inequality of males, which cannot be explained by changes in skill 
endowments and market returns.   
 
6. The evolution of the wage structure, including changes in gender gap, 
overall wage inequality, skill premiums as well as residual wage inequality are 
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induced not only by business cycle, but also by different type of technological 
changes and institution evolution. Our results demand further analysis on labour 
market performance with those underpinning forces.   
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Figure 2.1: Relative skill shares in total employment  
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B.Experience groups in total employment, male and female 16-66
17
19
21
23
25
27
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0-10 years 21-30 years
 
Sources: General Household Surveys 1972-2002. All numbers are from the males and females aged 16-
66. Except the first and last years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Figure 2.2: Mean working hours changes by gender, the GHS 1972-2002 
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Sources: General Household Surveys 1972-2002. All numbers are from the full-time workers aged 16-
66 (workhrs>35). Except the first and last years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Figure 2.3: Mean wage changes by gender, the GHS 1972-2002  
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Note: The numbers in the figure represent log hourly wages using data from the General Household 
Surveys, 1972-2002. Wage samples include full-time workers aged 16-66 years who were not self-
employed and all earnings numbers are deflated based on 1995 pounds.  Except the first and last years 
(1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Figure 2.4: Wage inequalities in the UK 
Panel A Changes in hourly earnings inequality by gender
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Note: The numbers in the figure represent log changes in hourly wages using data from the General 
Household Surveys, 1972-2002. Wage samples include full-time workers aged 16-66 years who were 
not self-employed and all earnings numbers are deflated based on 1995 pounds.  Except the first and 
last years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Figure 2.5: Residual wage inequalities in the UK 
Panel A Changes in residual hourly earnings inequality by gender
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Panel B Cumulative residual real hourly earnings growth by percentiles, 
male 16-66
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Note: The numbers in the figure represent log changes in hourly wages using data from the General 
Household Surveys, 1972-2002. Wage samples include full-time workers aged 16-66 years who were 
not self-employed and all earnings numbers are deflated based on 1995 pounds.  Except the first and 
last years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Table 2.1a: Education qualification variables in the GHS 1972-2002 
 
Variable Description 
NOQUAL NOQUAL includes: Without any qualification or never attended school. 
Below O-
LEVEL 
Below O-LEVEL includes: 
CLERICAL: Commerce and clerical qualification without O-levels; 
 
OTHER : CSE grade 2-5 and CSE below grade 1, GCSE below grade c, O-level 
degraded, SCE degraded, plus all remaining qualifications, which consist mainly 
of local or regional school-leaving certificates and college or professional awards 
no regarded as “ higher educational”, i.e. not above GCE A-level or O-level 
standard; 
 
FOREIGN: foreign qualification; etc. 
 
VOC-OTHER: Miscellaneous apprenticeships; 
 
O-LEVEL O-LEVEL includes: 
O-LEVEL 5+ and equivalent: Five or more subjects at GCE O-level obtained 
before 1975 or in grades A-C if obtained later, five or more subjects at SCE 
Ordinary obtained before 1973 or in bands A-C if obtained later, five or more 
subjects at CSE grade 1 or at School Certificate, SLC Lower, or SUPE Lower; 
 
O-LEVEL 1-4 and equivalent: Less than five O-LEVELS with or without clerical 
or commercial qualification such as typing, shorthand, bookkeeping, commerce 
etc; 
 
VOC-LOW: City and Guilds Craft or Ordinary etc; 
A-LEVEL A-LEVEL and equivalent includes: 
GCE A-level in one, two or more subjects, 
 
Scottish Leaving Certificate (SLC), Scottish Certificate of Education (SCE), 
Scottish University Preliminary Examination (SUPE) at Higher Grade, Certificate 
of Sixth Year Studies; 
 
VOC-MIDDLE: 
City and Guilds Advanced or Final, Ordinary National Certificate (ONC) or 
Diploma (OND), BEC/TEC National, General, or Ordinary etc. 
HIGHER  
EDUCATION 
HIGHER EDUCATION includes: 
TEACHING: Non-graduate teaching qualifications (Census Level C); 
 
NURSING: Nursing qualifications (e.g. SEN,SRN,SCM); 
 
VOC-HIGH: 
HND and equivalent: Higher National Diploma [HND]/Higher National 
Certificate [HNC], BEC/TEC Higher Certificate or Higher Diploma; City and 
Guilds Full Technological Certificate, qualifications obtained from colleges of 
further education or from professional institutions below degree level but above 
GCE A-level standard 
DEGREE DEGREE includes: 
Higher degrees (Census Level A), first degree, university diploma or certificate, 
qualifications obtains from colleges of further education or from professional 
institutions of degree standard (Census Level B) 
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Table 2.1b: Recoding process of six education groups in the GHS 1972-2002 
 
Years Variable  NOQUAL Below O-LEVEL O-LEVEL A-LEVEL Higher Education Degree 
1972-1982 hedqual  (0=0)  (10/14=8) (7/9=11) (6=12)  (3/5=14) (1 2=15) 
    no qual clerical & comm qual;  
cse other;  
apprenticeship; 
any foreign qual; 
other qual. 
gce'o'level-5 or more;  
gce'o'1-4,with c&c; 
gce'o' 1-4,no c&c 
gce'a'level, 
onc, 
ond 
teaching qual-non gr; 
hnc, hnd, tech cert; 
nursing qual.  
higher degrees 1st ; 
degree, univ. dip 
1983-1988 edlev  (16/20=0)  (11/15=8) (8/10=11) (6 7=12)  (3/5=14) (1 2=15) 
    no quals; 
never went 
to school 
com qual no o levels;    
cse grades 2-5;  
apprenticeship;  
foreign quals; 
other qual. 
gce o level 5+; 
gce o lev1-4 & cq;  
gce o lev1-4 no cq 
gce a level 2+; 
gce a level 1 
teaching qual; 
other higher qual; 
nursing qual 
higher degree ; 
first degree 
1989-1998 edlev2  (8=0)  (5/7=8) (4=11) (3=12)  (2=14) (1=15) 
    none cse gra2-5 equiv; 
sg 6-7 no award; 
foreign, other 
gcse olev equiv gce alevel equiv <degree higher q degree or equiv 
2000-2002 edlev00  (-9 13=0)  (10/12=8) (8/9=11) (6 7=12)  (3/5=14) (1 2=15) 
    no qual cse below grade 1; 
gcse below grade c;  
apprenticeship;  
other qualification 
gcse/olevel,  
standard grades, 5+; 
gcse/olevel 1-4 
gce a level in two 
or more subjects; 
gce a level in 
one subject  
teaching qual; 
other higher qual; 
nursing qual 
higher degree; 
first degree 
Sources: The General Household Survey 1972-2002. 
Notes: Adapted from Table 5.1 in Schmitt (1995, p181) and Code manuals of the General Household Survey 1972-2002 (ONS, 2004). Even with the same name, variables 
may change in definition and label value. For example, “edlev” in 1986 and 1987 is different since the latter year includes one more qualifications and changes the label 
values. Another example is that the “other qualification” in “edlev00” is not directly comparable with “other qualification” in previous GHS “edlev” output categories. It was 
not possible to separate foreign qualifications and other qualifications given the current set of questions. The foreign qualifications do not exist in the period 2000-2002. Even 
though these changes may affect the comparability between different time periods (jumps are found in the aggregate the NOQUAL group in 1983 and the OLEV group in 
1986), the consistency of this broad education categorization is satisfactory over the entire period. 
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Table 2.2: Calculation of weekly/hourly earnings variable 
 
Years Variable of  Earnings 
Corresponding 
Working 
Weeks 
Weekly 
Earnings 
Weekly 
Working 
Hours 
Hourly 
Earnings
1972-1978 incempx incempw 
incempx 
/incempw workhrs 
incempx 
/incempw 
/workhrs 
1979-1982 - - payweek workhrs 
payweek/ 
workhrs  
1983-1986 paygross payperd (perd) 
paygross 
/perd workhrs 
paygross 
/perd 
/workhrs 
1987-1991 - - uge workhrs 
uge 
/workhrs 
1992-1996 - - geind workhrs 
geind 
/workhrs 
1998-2002 - - grearn workhrs 
grearn 
/workhrs 
 
Sources: Code manuals of the General Household Surveys 1972-2002 (ONS, 2004).  
Note:  Definition of earnings variables in the GHS:  
Incempx:  Gross income from employment in last year. 
Incempw: No. weeks income from employment in last year. 
Workhrs:  No. hours worked per week in main job -excluding meals and overtime. 
Payweek: Gross weekly earnings from main job. 
Paygross: Gross pay of last time from main job before any deduction. 
Payperd (perd): Period covered by last wage or salaries, which is corresponding working weeks of 
paygross16. 
Uge: Usual gross weekly earnings from main job and other jobs. 
Geind: Usual gross weekly earnings from main job and second job. 
Grearn: Gross weekly earned income from main job and second job.  
 
For years 1972-1978, weekly earnings were derived from all earnings including wages, salaries, tips, 
bonus and commissions in all jobs held in the previous twelve months. For years 1979-1986, weekly 
earnings were estimated as the usual gross earnings including tips and bonuses per pay period from the 
worker’s main job, divided by the usual number of weeks covered in each pay period. In the 1987-2002 
surveys, weekly earnings include all income earned from the main job and other (or second) jobs. 
These changes may affect comparisons of earnings between different two periods, but no evident 
discontinuity is found. On the other hand, weekly earnings include payments for bonuses and overtime 
but the measurement of working hours per week excludes overtime which varies across individuals and 
over the business cycle. That implied that hourly earnings in this paper may suffer upwards bias, 
though the GHS is still consistent and comparable with the hourly earnings from other datasets.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Perd is a variable derived by author from payperd, according to rules: one calendar month = 4.3 
weeks, one quarter =13 weeks. 
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Table 2.3: Log Hourly Earnings Equations, the GHS 1972-2002. Estimation from 
equation (2.1) 
 
A. Males (full time workers) 
  
1972- 
1976 
1977- 
1981 
1982- 
1986 
1987- 
1991 
1992- 
1996 
1998- 
2002 
BOLEV 0.1030*** 0.0851*** 0.0935*** 0.1152*** 0.1097*** 0.0870*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0084) (0.0099) (0.0147) (0.0229) 
OLEV 0.2123*** 0.1656*** 0.1863*** 0.2066*** 0.1664*** 0.1826*** 
  (0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0084) (0.0090) (0.0124) (0.0203) 
ALEV 0.2986*** 0.2558*** 0.2927*** 0.3344*** 0.2922*** 0.2720*** 
  (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0098) (0.0101) (0.0135) (0.0210) 
HIGHER 0.4434*** 0.3589*** 0.4216*** 0.4478*** 0.3894*** 0.3999*** 
  (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0099) (0.0102) (0.0140) (0.0227) 
DEGREE 0.6593*** 0.5602*** 0.5917*** 0.6683*** 0.6145*** 0.6810*** 
  (0.0104) (0.0091) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0138) (0.0206) 
EXP 0.0432*** 0.0407*** 0.0481*** 0.0516*** 0.0481*** 0.0458*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0021) 
EXP2 -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
MIDLAND 0.0169*** 0.0054 -0.0058 0.0238*** 0.0598*** 0.0158 
  (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0122) (0.0181) 
SOUTH 0.0677*** 0.0658*** 0.0953*** 0.1513*** 0.1696*** 0.1601*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0054) (0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0097) (0.0144) 
WALES -0.0059 -0.0265*** -0.0135 -0.0601*** -0.0488*** 0.0011 
  (0.0094) (0.0110) (0.0138) (0.0150) (0.0208) (0.0290) 
SCOTLAND 0.0062 -0.0005 0.0133 -0.0052 0.0014 0.0187 
  (0.0062) (0.0081) (0.0105) (0.0118) (0.0153) (0.0228) 
WHITE 0.0506*** 0.0455*** 0.0648*** 0.1190*** 0.1218*** 0.0408* 
  (0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0135) (0.0149) (0.0199) (0.0261) 
MARRIED 0.2124*** 0.1830*** 0.1658*** 0.1671*** 0.1818*** 0.1063*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0121) (0.0158) 
y1 0.0662*** -0.0985*** -0.0501*** -0.0724*** -0.0289*** 0.0599*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0068) (0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0123) (0.0164) 
y2 0.1209*** -0.0810*** -0.0449*** 0.0005 -0.0480*** 0.0799*** 
  (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0125) (0.0161) 
y3 0.1848*** 0.0026 -0.0450*** 0.0245*** 0.0053 0.1340*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0089) (0.0092) (0.0127) (0.0163) 
y4 0.1409*** 0.0541*** -0.0067 0.0382*** -0.0122 - 
  (0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0127) - 
R2 0.3695 0.3160 0.3424 0.3707 0.2352 0.1926 
N 34,086 30,300 21,329 21,635 18,543 12,239 
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B. Females (full time workers) 
 
1972- 
1976 
1977- 
1981 
1982- 
1986 
1987- 
1991 
1992- 
1996 
1998- 
2002 
BOLEV 0.1525*** 0.1208*** 0.1183*** 0.1460*** 0.1750*** 0.1517*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0105) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0193) (0.0299) 
OLEV 0.2293*** 0.1822*** 0.2259*** 0.2804*** 0.2392*** 0.2280*** 
  (0.0097) (0.0101) (0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0165) (0.0271) 
ALEV 0.3787*** 0.3345*** 0.3551*** 0.4331*** 0.3524*** 0.3326*** 
  (0.0180) (0.0169) (0.0172) (0.0156) (0.0199) (0.0278) 
HIGHER 0.4663*** 0.4490*** 0.4834*** 0.5864*** 0.5473*** 0.4588*** 
  (0.0162) (0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0148) (0.0195) (0.0291) 
DEGREE 0.7357*** 0.6720*** 0.6690*** 0.7679*** 0.7223*** 0.6799*** 
  (0.0270) (0.0208) (0.0185) (0.0165) (0.0202) (0.0270) 
EXP 0.0356*** 0.0341*** 0.0424*** 0.0460*** 0.0447*** 0.0459*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0025) 
EXP2 -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
MIDLAND -0.0156 0.0129 -0.0239* -0.0036 0.0304** 0.0144 
  (0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0164) (0.0224) 
SOUTH 0.1156*** 0.1014*** 0.1247*** 0.1746*** 0.1753*** 0.1643*** 
  (0.0087) (0.0090) (0.0108) (0.0100) (0.0129) (0.0176) 
WALES -0.0244 -0.0311* 0.0019 -0.0661*** -0.0467* 0.0180 
  (0.0173) (0.0181) (0.0226) (0.0206) (0.0268) (0.0349) 
SCOTLAND -0.0051 0.0069 0.0075 0.0122 0.0198 0.0524** 
  (0.0103) (0.0131) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0199) (0.0266) 
WHITE 0.0218 0.0085 0.0299 0.0194 0.0321 0.0726*** 
  (0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0204) (0.0176) (0.0228) (0.0280) 
MARRIED -0.0127 -0.0016 -0.0148 -0.0033 0.0266** -0.0243 
  (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0138) (0.0183) 
y1 0.0593*** -0.0116 0.0131 0.0679*** -0.0806*** 0.0695*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0163) (0.0200) 
y2 0.1569*** 0.0855*** 0.0094 0.1282*** -0.0406*** 0.0949*** 
  (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0138) (0.0127) (0.0166) (0.0195) 
y3 0.2727*** 0.1396*** 0.0310** 0.1394*** -0.0096 0.1534*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0136) (0.0129) (0.0165) (0.0197) 
y4 0.2782*** 0.0905*** 0.0312** 0.1286*** 0.0065 - 
  (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0137) (0.0128) (0.0165) - 
R2 0.2786 0.2360 0.2660 0.3280 0.2136 0.1771 
N 12,833 11,891 9,440 11,501 10,496 7,459 
 
Note: The numbers in the table represent the estimated coefficients and standard errors using the pooled GHS 
datasets of six periods: 1972-76, 1977-81, 1982-86, 1987-91, 1992-96 and 1998-2002. Samples include full-
time workers aged 16-66 years who were not self-employed and all hourly earnings numbers are deflated based 
on 1995 pounds. The dependent variable is log gross hourly pay. Explanatory variables include a vector of five 
education dummies (BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, HIGHER and DEGREE, NOQUAL as the base group), the 
quadratic in experience (Exp and Exp2), four region dummies (MIDLAND, SOUTH, WALES and 
SCOTLAND, the North of England as the base group), an ethnicity dummy (WHITE), a marital status dummy 
(MARRIED) and a vector of year dummies. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for 
two-tail tests.  We use Stata’s OLS regression programme (reg, see Stata 2003a) to estimate equation (2.1).  
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Appendix 2.1 Results using weekly earnings 
 
Figure A2.1: Weekly wage changes by gender, the GHS 1972-2002 
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Note: The numbers in the figure represent log weekly wages using data from the General Household 
Surveys, 1972-2002. Wage samples include full-time workers aged 16-66 years who were not self-
employed and all earnings numbers are deflated based on 1995 pounds.  Except the first and last years 
(1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Figure A2.2: Weekly wage inequalities in the UK 
Panel A Changes in weekly earnings inequality by gender
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Note: The numbers in the figure represent log changes in weekly wages using data from the General 
Household Surveys, 1972-2002. Wage samples include full-time workers aged 16-66 years who were 
not self-employed and all earnings numbers are deflated based on 1995 pounds.  Except the first and 
last years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Figure A2.3: Residual weekly wage inequalities in the UK 
Panel A Changes in weekly earnings inequality by gender
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Note: The numbers in the figure represent log changes in weekly wages using data from the General 
Household Surveys, 1972-2002. Wage samples include full-time workers aged 16-66 years who were 
not self-employed and all earnings numbers are deflated based on 1995 pounds.  Except the first and 
last years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Table A2.1: Log Weekly Earnings Equations, GHS 1972-2002. Estimation from 
equation (2.1). 
 
A. Males (full time workers) 
  
1972- 
1976 
1977- 
1981 
1982- 
1986 
1987- 
1991 
1992- 
1996 
1998- 
2002 
BOLEV 0.0891*** 0.0768*** 0.0887*** 0.1234*** 0.1206*** 0.0972*** 
  (0.0043) (0.0064) (0.0088) (0.0118) (0.0154) (0.0253) 
OLEV 0.2030*** 0.1417*** 0.1747*** 0.2137*** 0.1601*** 0.1902*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0065) (0.0084) (0.0104) (0.0128) (0.0221) 
ALEV 0.2775*** 0.2265*** 0.2800*** 0.3409*** 0.2914*** 0.2812*** 
  (0.0061) (0.0078) (0.0096) (0.0115) (0.0137) (0.0226) 
HIGHER 0.4052*** 0.3261*** 0.4114*** 0.4595*** 0.3744*** 0.4173*** 
  (0.0066) (0.0083) (0.0098) (0.0116) (0.0142) (0.0241) 
DEGREE 0.6459*** 0.5241*** 0.5957*** 0.6906*** 0.6378*** 0.7109*** 
  (0.0080) (0.0087) (0.0101) (0.0119) (0.0139) (0.0220) 
EXP 0.0515*** 0.0487*** 0.0623*** 0.0608*** 0.0567*** 0.0554*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0026) 
EXP2 -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0010*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
MIDLAND 0.0167*** 0.0086 -0.0057 0.0491*** 0.0694*** 0.0276 
  (0.0047) (0.0066) (0.0087) (0.0104) (0.0124) (0.0191) 
SOUTH 0.0688*** 0.0748*** 0.1011*** 0.1833*** 0.1944*** 0.1805*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0070) (0.0085) (0.0098) (0.0151) 
WALES -0.0156** -0.0007 -0.0232 -0.0534*** -0.0406** 0.0130 
  (0.0076) (0.0110) (0.0155) (0.0174) (0.0210) (0.0304) 
SCOTLAND 0.0042 0.0107 0.0242*** 0.0013 0.0058 0.0159 
  (0.0048) (0.0081) (0.0102) (0.0135) (0.0156) (0.0238) 
WHITE 0.0645*** 0.0507*** 0.0808*** 0.1262*** 0.1506*** 0.0560** 
  (0.0069) (0.0095) (0.0133) (0.0168) (0.0201) (0.0270) 
MARRIED 0.2338*** 0.1787*** 0.1433*** 0.1929*** 0.1945*** 0.1292*** 
  (0.0050) (0.0066) (0.0089) (0.0102) (0.0122) (0.0163) 
y1 0.0569*** -0.1455*** 0.0047 -0.1112*** -0.0428*** -0.0183 
  (0.0047) (0.0068) (0.0087) (0.0107) (0.0125) (0.0172) 
y2 0.1059*** -0.1346*** 0.0111 -0.0353*** -0.0615*** 0.0167 
  (0.0048) (0.0068) (0.0090) (0.0109) (0.0127) (0.0168) 
y3 0.1565*** -0.0470*** 0.0157* -0.0049 0.0021 0.0665*** 
  (0.0047) (0.0069) (0.0091) (0.0106) (0.0128) (0.0170) 
y4 0.1196*** -0.0587*** 0.0490*** -0.0356*** -0.0137 - 
  (0.0047) (0.0070) (0.0088) (0.0108) (0.0129) - 
R2 0.4182 0.3593 0.3865 0.3631 0.2706 0.2129 
N 47582 26812 19655 20349 17381 11388 
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B. Females (full time workers) 
 
1972- 
1976 
1977- 
1981 
1982- 
1986 
1987- 
1991 
1992- 
1996 
1998- 
2002 
BOLEV 0.1062*** 0.0925*** 0.0993*** 0.1602*** 0.1655*** 0.1568*** 
  (0.0083) (0.0100) (0.0135) (0.0162) (0.0195) (0.0313) 
OLEV 0.1943*** 0.1470*** 0.2114*** 0.2647*** 0.2178*** 0.2182*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0096) (0.0123) (0.0143) (0.0166) (0.0283) 
ALEV 0.3665*** 0.2928*** 0.3612*** 0.4293*** 0.3430*** 0.3416*** 
  (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0170) (0.0185) (0.0199) (0.0287) 
HIGHER 0.4645*** 0.4468*** 0.5386*** 0.6196*** 0.5542*** 0.4873*** 
  (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0158) (0.0176) (0.0193) (0.0300) 
DEGREE 0.7583*** 0.6680*** 0.7001*** 0.8159*** 0.7600*** 0.7544*** 
  (0.0242) (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0200) (0.0279) 
EXP 0.0377*** 0.0367*** 0.0489*** 0.0527*** 0.0557*** 0.0546*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0028) 
EXP2 -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
MIDLAND -0.0261*** 0.0188* -0.0059 -0.0143 0.0451*** 0.0163 
  (0.0094) (0.0109) (0.0133) (0.0149) (0.0162) (0.0227) 
SOUTH 0.0926*** 0.0960*** 0.1241*** 0.1675*** 0.1841*** 0.1713*** 
  (0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0105) (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.0178) 
WALES -0.0239* -0.0232 -0.0086 -0.0652*** -0.0451* 0.0196 
  (0.0151) (0.0173) (0.0249) (0.0244) (0.0266) (0.0353) 
SCOTLAND -0.0048 0.0160 0.0082 -0.0024 0.0095 0.0352 
  (0.0085) (0.0125) (0.0152) (0.0186) (0.0198) (0.0268) 
WHITE -0.0051 0.0083 0.0291 0.0396* 0.0442** 0.0800*** 
  (0.0126) (0.0146) (0.0197) (0.0209) (0.0224) (0.0282) 
MARRIED -0.0370*** -0.0069 -0.0212** -0.0083 0.0089 -0.0372** 
  (0.0075) (0.0088) (0.0114) (0.0126) (0.0136) (0.0183) 
y1 0.0760*** -0.0103 -0.0085 0.0929*** -0.0722*** 0.0451** 
  (0.0089) (0.0109) (0.0141) (0.0152) (0.0161) (0.0202) 
y2 0.1772*** 0.0829*** -0.0330*** 0.1420*** -0.0427*** 0.0505*** 
  (0.0092) (0.0109) (0.0141) (0.0149) (0.0165) (0.0197) 
y3 0.2937*** 0.1356*** -0.0224* 0.1668*** -0.0092 0.1101*** 
  (0.0090) (0.0108) (0.0140) (0.0152) (0.0164) (0.0200) 
y4 0.2962*** 0.0932*** -0.0120 0.1516*** 0.0087 - 
  (0.0090) (0.0109) (0.0136) (0.0152) (0.0163) - 
R2 0.2942 0.2693 0.2975 0.2864 0.2477 0.2073 
N 16631 11164 9340 11227 10134 7187 
 
Note: The numbers in the table represent the estimated coefficients and standard errors using the pooled GHS 
datasets of six periods: 1972-76, 1977-81, 1982-86, 1987-91, 1992-96 and 1998-2002. Samples include full-
time workers aged 16-66 years who were not self-employed and all earnings numbers are deflated based on 
1995 pounds. The dependent variable is log gross weekly pay. Explanatory variables include a vector of five 
education dummies (BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, HIGHER and DEGREE, NOQUAL as the base group), the 
quadratic in experience (Exp and Exp2), four region dummies (MIDLAND, SOUTH, WALES and 
SCOTLAND, the North of England as the base group), an ethnicity dummy (WHITE), a marital status dummy 
(MARRIED) and a vector of year dummies. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for 
two-tail tests.  We use Stata’s OLS regression programme (reg, see Stata 2003a) to estimate equation (2.1).  
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 CHAPTER THREE:  
THE MARKET MECHANISM AND WAGE 
INEQUALITY IN THE UK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we described the changes of the wage structure in the British 
labour market. Wage inequality has increased substantially in the United Kingdom 
over the last thirty years. However, not all changes in wage structure cause increases 
in wage inequality. For instance, the narrowing gender gap (see Figure 2.3) has tended 
to decrease overall wage inequality.  
 
We find that three prominent changes in the British labour market contribute 
to rising wage inequality. Firstly, the increase in education/experience inequality has 
made total employment more heterogeneous (see Figure 2.1). Secondly, skill 
premiums (mainly education and experience premiums) have been increasing over the 
entire period, especially after the 1970s (see Table 2.3). Finally, even after we control 
for the changes of skill endowment and returns, the residual wage inequality of males 
still increases after the 1970s (see Figure 2.5). This implies that the composition shifts 
and skill premium changes cannot capture all wage changes in the British labour 
market. A significant residual space is left for technological, institutional and other 
explanations (Garicano and Hansberg 2006), which definitely need further analysis. 
Thus, in this chapter, we apply a further supply and demand framework to analyze the 
rising wage inequality.   
 
The usual approach to analyze earnings inequality begins by considering a 
standard supply and demand framework, and then generalizes further by considering 
labour-market institutions and the role of unemployment (Machin 1996, p57). This 
 53
chapter aims to check whether a simple supply and demand framework can fit with 
wage structure changes in the British labour market over the last thirty years. The 
basic idea here is that one has a supply and demand for workers of different skill 
attributes and that one can trace out a relative supply and demand model. We use two 
strands of research to explain relative wage changes. The first one is from the work of 
Katz and Murphy (1992). They argue that fluctuations in the growth rate of relative 
supply for skill, combined with steadily growing relative demand can explain changes 
of the skill premium.  
 
Katz and Murphy’s hypothesis is plotted in Figure 3.1. As in previous chapters, 
the horizontal axis represents the relative employment of skilled workers to unskilled 
workers (LS/LU), and the vertical axis represents the relative wage of skilled workers 
to unskilled workers (WS/WU). The relative demand (D1) intersecting relative supply 
(S) give the original equilibrium point A, in which skilled workers have relative wage 
w1 and relative employment l1. Since the relative demand is constant or steadily 
growing, the relative demand curve for skilled workers would stay at D1 or increase 
from D1 to D2. At the same time, relative supply S1 increases to S2. Hence, the new 
equilibrium B or C shows that changes of relative wages are negatively associated 
with the relative supplies. Katz and Murphy (1992, p51, Table III) examine this 
negative association using the Current Population Surveys (CPS) 1964-1988. 
 
On the other hand, many economists find that the changes in the British wage 
structure are driven primarily by shifts in the relative labour demand favouring more 
skilled workers over less skilled workers (see Nickell and Bell 1995, 1996, Katz and 
Autor 2000, Machin 2001 and references therein). In a relative supply and demand 
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framework, a simultaneously rising skill premium and employment share of skilled 
workers can only suggest that relative demand must have risen at a faster rate than 
supply. Figure 3.2 describes the supply-demand changes behind this argument. 
Machin (2001, p755) argues that skill-biased technology changes (SBTC) increase the 
relative demand for skilled workers, hence the relative demand curve for skilled 
workers would increase from D1 to D2. At the same time, the relative supply of skilled 
workers stays at S1 or steadily increases from S1 to S2. Hence, the new equilibrium has 
a higher relative wage w2 or w3 (that is, higher inequality) and higher relative 
employment l2 or l3 for skilled workers. Over the period of rising wage inequality, 
relative demand for skill has won the race against the increasing relative supply of 
skill. There is a positive association between relative skill wage and relative supply of 
skill.  
 
Therefore, Katz and Murphy (1992) argue that supply fluctuations dominate 
the relative wage changes in the USA during 1964-1988 by proving the negative 
association between relative wage and supply. Machin (2001, p 756, Table 1) tests the 
positive associations and concludes that relative demand has surpassed relative supply 
in both the UK and the US during 1980-2000. The positive or negative associations 
between relative supply and relative wage are outcomes of a horse-race between 
relative supply and demand for skill.  
 
This chapter tests whether this supply-demand framework can fit the wage 
structure changes in the British labour market over the last thirty years. In the same 
vein as Katz and Murphy (1992), we treat the different demographic (gender-
education-experience) groups as distinct labour inputs, and hence imperfect 
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substitutes for each other in the production process. The interaction between relative 
supply and demand decides relative wages. We concentrate on the Katz and Murphy 
(1992) hypothesis (negative associations between relative supply and wage) and 
Machin (2001) hypothesis (positive associations between relative supply and wage) 
using a simple supply-demand framework.  
 
Even though the changes of skill supply can be due to exogenous institutions 
such as education policy, we do not know why the relative demand should change in 
the same way as described in Katz and Murphy hypothesis or Machin hypothesis. It is 
true that many economists have analyzed the causal factors underpinning the relative 
demand shifts based on concepts of skill-biased technical changes (see Machin and 
Van Reenen 1998 for seven OECD countries and O’Mahony et al 2008 for four 
countries), international trade (Wood 1994, 1995 and 1998) and labour market 
institutions (Addison et al 2003 and Card et al 2004 for trade union, Gosling and 
Lemieux 2001 for trade union and minimum wage, and Daniel and Siebert 2005 for 
EPL). In this chapter, we are not going to tackle these deeper forces behind the 
changes of relative demand, which will be analyzed in the next chapter in details as 
we introduce the institutional explanations. Thus, the supply-demand framework 
applied here cannot isolate the above causal factors, but it is still a useful way to see 
how the market mechanism works in the British labour market.  
 
We here assume that the shocks from trade patterns, technology and 
institutions have been completely absorbed by the relative demand changes. Hence, 
there is no unemployment above the natural level in this framework as described in 
Figure 3.1 and 3.2. Holding the full employment assumption, the observed relative 
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wage and employment must be “at the equilibrium” and the changes of relative wages 
can be explained by the interaction between the relative supply and demand. We will 
loosen these assumptions in the next chapters. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the simple model of supply and demand in 
Katz and Murphy (1992). Section 3 describes the main data sources and measurement 
of relative wage and relative labour supply. In Section 4, we provide the basic 
empirical results. The last section concludes. 
 
3.2 A model of supply and demand  
In this section, we simply review the basic model of supply-demand derived by Katz 
and Murphy (1992) and discuss the possibility of Machin (2001) hypothesis in this 
theoretical model. This model involves an aggregate production function, which 
provides K types of outputs and requires J types of labour inputs (J=96 here, that is, 
2×6×8 by two gender, six education and eight experience groups). It is assumed that 
there are K sectors in the aggregate production function and each sector can only 
provide one kind of output k but may employ all J types of labour. Each sector applies 
a different technology to combine labour inputs. Thus, the production function of 
sector k can be written as:     
 
)ktkttkt (XFAY =                                                      (3.1) 
 
where Ykt is the output of sector k in year t; At is the total factor productivity (TFP) 
decided by the neutral technology, that is, an index of the productivity level of the 
whole economy in year t; Xkt is a J × 1 vector of labour inputs employed in the sector 
k in year t; Fkt(Xkt) is the contribution from the labour inputs, which is concave for 
each input and decided by non-neutral technology. Hence, the aggregate production 
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function is: )ttt F(XAY = , where Yt is a K×1 vector of all kinds of outputs in year t; 
Xt is a J×1 vector of total labour inputs employed and F(Xt) is also concave for each 
aggregate labour input.  
 
Under the free entry assumption, wages are set equal to the marginal products 
of labour inputs: )tXtt (XFAW = . Then, the labour demand for one kind of labour 
input is the sum of labour demand for this labour input in all sectors, that 
is, ∑
=
−=
K
k t
tX
ktt A
W
FX
1
1 )( . Thus, the aggregate labour demand is simplified as    
 
),( t
t
t
t ZA
WDX ≡                                                     (3.2) 
                 
Xt is the labour demand associated with the aggregate production function. In this 
demand function, Wt/At is a J×1 vector of relative wage to the total productivity in 
year t. In addition, Zt is Z×1 vector of labour demand shifts induced by changes of 
technology, international competition and institutions. Under the assumption of a 
concave production function Fkt(Xkt), the relationship between the wage changes and 
labour supply is negative in each sector, given constant labour demand (Zt-Zt-1=0). 
According to Walras’ Law of markets, if all output markets are in equilibrium, the 
market for labor will also be in equilibrium. Hence, there is a negative relationship 
between relative wage (to the contemporary TFP) and labour supply.17  
 
                                                 
17 That is, { } 0)'( 1
1
1 ≤−− −
−
−
tt
t
t
t
t XX
A
W
A
W . If there is not much change in the TFP, i.e. At=At-1, this inequality 
can be simplified as (Wt-Wt-1)’ (Xt-X t-1) ≤ 0. This is the common sense of the supply-demand theory: 
as the labour supplies increase, the prices of labour inputs decrease, ceteris paribus. 
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Moreover, even if the demand in equation (3.2) shifts over the time (Zt-Zt-1≠0), 
the (J×J) matrix of cross relative wage effects on labour demands (i.e.
A
WD ), is still 
negative semi-definite from the concave aggregate production function. Thus, the 
change of labour demand can be written in terms of differentials as: 
 
tZ
t
t
A
Wt dZDA
WdDdX += )(                                                (3.3)  
 
 Katz and Murphy (1992) rearrange equation (3.3) and multiply the two sides 
by the (1×J) vector of relative wage changes, i.e.  )'(
t
t
A
Wd . The negative semi-
definiteness of 
A
WD   implies that 
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WdD
A
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A
Wd                         (3.4) 
 
Thus, changes in labour supplies (dXt) net of demand shifts )( tZ dZD  are 
negatively associated with changes in relative wage. It shows the negative relationship 
between changes of net labour supply and relative wages. The discrete version of 
equation (3.4) is in the form of: 
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The changes of net supplies are the actual changes of labour supply less the demand 
changes that would have happened at fixed wage (Wt-1/At-1). Thus, there is a negative 
association between relative wage changes and net labour supply changes, as 
described in Figure 3.1. 
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Katz and Murphy (1992) firstly assume the relative demand is stable, and then 
there is no change in relative demand over time. Hence, their hypothesis is simplified 
as { } 0)'( 1
1
1 ≤−− −
−
−
tt
t
t
t
t XX
A
W
A
W . Secondly, technological and institutional changes may be 
reflected at last as a steadily growing relative demand for skill. The steady growth of 
relative demand affects equation (3.5) in two ways: a growth in relative wage and a 
decrease in net labour supply. Hence, equation (3.5) can be simplified 
as: { } 0)'( 211
1
1 ≤−−−− −
−
− bXXb
A
W
A
W
tt
t
t
t
t , in which b1 and b2 are the time trends of relative wage 
and relative demand: Wt/At=a0+b1t; Dt=a1+b2t. If the inner products of the detrended 
relative wage changes with the detrended net supplies changes were negative, the 
steadily growing demand hypothesis described in Figure 3.1 would be proved.  
 
Moreover, Acemoglu (2003b, p207) proves that even if the returns to scale are 
constant at the firm level, the aggregate production possibilities set of the economy 
may exhibit increasing returns to scale because technologies are also determined 
endogenously. Hence, the production Fkt(Xkt) in equation (3.1) could be convex for 
skilled labour inputs because of skill-biased technical changes. It suggests that as 
more skilled workers join one sector, the marginal productivity of skilled workers 
may be even higher. The (J×J) matrix of cross relative wage effects on labour 
demands in equation (3.4) may be positive semi-definite from the convex aggregation 
production.  
 
Machin (2001) suggests that SBTC and institutional changes (such as trade 
union decline) were reflected in an accelerating relative demand for skill in the 1980s, 
so that the relative skill supply and skill premium increased together. The wage 
setting institutions should be flexible enough to allow relative wage changes. If wages 
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in a rigid labour market cannot respond to shocks from business cycle, equation (3.5) 
could be a positive inequality. Thus, in the face of SBTC, Machin (2001) hypothesis 
i.e. { } 0)'( 1
1
1 ≥−− −
−
−
tt
t
t
t
t XX
A
W
A
W or { } 0)'( 211
1
1 ≥−−−− −
−
− bXXb
A
W
A
W
tt
t
t
t
t  is also possible in Katz and 
Murphy’s (1992) model.  
 
3.3 Data description and measurement   
3.3.1 Measurement of relative wage and relative supply    
The data used in this chapter is the series of the GHS 1972 to 2002 as in Chapter 2. 
We categorize the data of each year into 96 (2×6×8) distinct labour cells, 
distinguished by two gender, six education (NOQUAL, BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, 
HIGHER and DEGREE) and eight experience groups (from one to forty by five 
years). The 96 labour cells are regarded as distinct labour supplies in the above 
supply-demand model.  
 
Following the same line of Katz and Murphy (1992), two samples are created 
from the GHS data: (1) the count sample: this is a sample taken from the original 
GHS dataset so that we can measure the amount of labour supplied within each 
demographic cell. The count sample is a very close concept to total work force, 
including all individuals who work at least one week in the sample year with clear 
information of weekly working hours (workhrs), regardless of whether they were part- 
or full-time, self employed, or otherwise. We use annual working hours (weekly 
working hours times week number) as measure of labour supply. According to the 
ONS (2006, p3), this variable is the most continuous hours variable in the GHS (see 
Figure 2.2), which reflects “Usual number of hours worked per week excluding 
mealtime and overtime”. Since the working hour variable does not include over time 
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hours before 1996 (see the previous chapter), the main concern about our labour 
supply variable is overtime hours which is an important part of working hours in the 
British labor market (Hart et al 2000). Hence, the missing overtime problem in annual 
working hours may bring biases in our labour supply variable.  
 
Bell and Hart (2003a, b) show that overtime hours and pay are not wholly 
geared to meeting short-term shifts in production requirements even in labour markets 
like Britain where statutory overtime rules do not apply. The maximum lengths of 
standard weekly hours set by many firms follow wider industrial or regional or 
national collective bargaining norms. Their observations are consistent with the view 
that the conditions for overtime working follow “custom and practice” and a long-
term contractual role for overtime, suggesting that the proportion of overtime in our 
labour input measure of annual working hours may be stable. Hence, the missing 
overtime problem in our working hours variable may be not very serious.  
 
Furthermore, the total working hours within each demographic cell are 
calculated for each sample year. Then, the total working hours of each cell is divided 
by the sum of all cells in that year so that they are expressed as proportions. Thus, the 
labour supply concept used in this chapter is actually a proportion to the total working 
hours, hence actually a relative labour supply.18    
 
(2)The wage sample: as in Chapter 2, the wage sample only includes all full-
time employees aged sixteen to sixty-six. “Full time employee” here is defined as 
                                                 
18 See more discussion on the working hours variable (workhrs) in Chapter 2. I have also tested the 
headcount employment measure and found there is not much difference from our basic conclusions. 
The headcount employment is an inferior measure of labour input to working hours. Hence, we only 
present results using working hours in this chapter. The interested reader can find results for headcount 
employment in Appendix 3.2. 
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workers with weekly working hours exceeding 35 hours (excluding employer and 
self-employed). Self-employed workers, part time workers and those working without 
pay are excluded from the sample. The wage variable used in this chapter is the real 
gross hourly earnings deflated by the annual Retail Price Index (RPI) based on the 
year of 1995, which is derived from the wage sample using the same calculation 
process as in Chapter 2 (see Table 2.2).19 Wage variable is calculated only from the 
wage sample since it can provide accurate wage information by excluding noise from 
extreme cases. In GHS 1972, the count sample is broader than the wage sample by 33 
percent. The coverage difference between the two samples increases to 61 percent in 
the GHS 1995, which is consistent with the widely agreed fact of more labour 
participation of women as part-time workers after the 1970s.  Even though the wage 
sample is much narrower than count sample, we still have enough observations in 
each cell.    
 
Empirically, we measure variables in equation (3.5) using the above two 
samples.  First of all, we calculate the working hours shares of 96 demographic cells 
for each sample year from the count sample. The average working hours share of each 
cell over the entire period 1972-2002 is the fixed weight for that cell, i.e. E  (see Table 
A3.1 in Appendix 3.1). For example, male workers without any education 
qualification, but with experience less than 5 years provided about 3.19 percent of the 
total labour input in 1972. The proportion declined to only about 0.23 percent in 2002. 
Hence, the fixed weight of this cell (male-NOQUAL-5) is the average working hours 
share over the entire period: about 1.27 percent. On the other hand, male workers with 
more than 35 years experience in the DEGREE group provided about 0.15 percent of 
                                                 
19 The interested reader can find results for weekly earnings in Appendix 3.2. 
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the total labour input in 1972. The proportion increased to about 0.64 percent in 2002. 
Hence, the fixed weight of this cell (male-DEGREE-40) is the average working hours 
share over the entire period: about 0.44 percent. 
 
Secondly, we calculate the mean hourly wage of each cell for each sample 
year. Hence, Wt in equation (3.5) is a 96 ×1 vector, which denotes the mean wages for 
our 96 demographic (gender-education-experience) cells in year t (t=1972…2002). 
Using the average working hours shares ( E ), the fixed weighted mean wage of that 
year is calculated, that is the wage index of that year (At, see the upper part of Table 
A3.2 in Appendix 3.1). The fixed weighted mean wage was about 5.22 pounds (based 
on 1995 pounds) per hour in 1972, and then increased to about 7.07 pounds per hour 
in 2002. Thus, after controlling for the labour input composition shifts, the 
productivity level in the UK has increased about 35.4 percent, i.e. (7.07-5.22)/5.22.  
 
 Consequently, the mean wage of each cell is divided by the wage index of 
that year to get the relative wage of the cell (Wjt/At, see the lower part of Table A3.2 
in Appendix A3.1). The average relative wage of each cell over the entire period 
1972-2002 is the efficiency units of this worker group. For example, the mean wage of 
the male-NOQUAL-5 group was about 55 percent of the wage index in 1972. In 2002, 
the relative wage of this group was about 58 percent. The average relative wage over 
the last thirty years is about 0.55. On the other hand, the mean wage of the male-
DEGREE-40 group was about 2.54 times of the wage index in 1972 and 1.77 times in 
2002. Hence, the efficiency units of this group are about 1.91. 
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Finally, the relative labour supply used in this chapter is the working hours 
share of each cell measured in efficiency units. The working hours share of each cell 
multiplies its efficiency units, and divided by the sum of all cells (see Table A3.3 in 
Appendix 3.1). Hence, the relative supply is quite different from the simple working 
hours share, especially for low skilled and high skilled workers. For example, the 
working hours share of the male-NOQUAL-5 group was about 3.19 percent in 1972 
(see the first row of Table A3.1). However, as labour input is measured in efficiency 
units, this group only provided about 1.97 percent of total efficiency input in 1972. 
That is because the productivity of this group is only about 55 percent of the average 
level (see the first row of Table A3.2).  
 
Nevertheless, the working hours share of the male-DEGREE-40 group was 
only 0.15 percent in 1972 (see the middle row of Table A3.1), while the efficiency 
contribution of this group was about 0.32 percent. That is because the productivity of 
this group is 1.91 times of the average level (see the middle row of Table A3.2). 
Moreover, the efficiency share of this group increased from 0.32 percent in 1972 to 
1.07 percent in 2002. This result shows the dramatic increase in working hours share 
of those educated senior males (from 0.15 percent in 1972 to 0.64 percent in 2002, see 
Table A3.1) on the one hand, and the decline of their relative earnings over the last 
thirty years (2.54 in 1972 to 1.77 in 2002, see Table A3.2) on the other hand. We will 
push this argument further in the next section for more aggregated groups.  
 
3.3.2 Changes in relative supply    
We compare relative labour supply with the working hours shares and summarize 
changes of relative supply in Table 3.1. The top panel is the working hours shares for 
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different groups in seven years: 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1998 and 2002. The 
middle panel is relative labour supply measured in efficient unit at the same seven 
years. The bottom panel of Table 3.1 summarizes the corresponding changes in 
relative labour supplies over the 1972-2002 and six sub-periods: 1972-1977, 1977-
1982, 1982-1987, 1987-1992, 1992-1998 and 1998-2002.  
 
In the first two rows of each panel, the overall change in relative supply, i.e. 
Xt-Xt-1 in equation (3.5) is presented by gender. The top panel shows that labour input 
of females has been increasing from about 32 percent to about 43 percent of total 
working hours over the entire period. However, the middle panel shows that the 
relative supply measured in efficiency units of females is much lower than their 
working hours shares, only from about 25 percent to about 36 percent. The difference 
between the two measures is due to the fact that the average productivity of females 
(as measured by their efficiency units) is lower than males. Hence, their relative 
labour supply in efficiency units is lower than simple working hours proportions. The 
bottom panel shows the relative supply of females has increased by about 37.6 percent 
over the entire period, corresponding to a continuous drop of males (-16.2 percent). 
This result reflects not only the increasing role of women in terms of workforce 
participation but also their increasing productivity level. 
 
The similar analysis can be applied for other groups in Table 3.1. The top 
panel shows that working-hours proportions of college graduate (from about 2.3 
percent to about 23 percent) and O-level holders (from about 9.7 percent to about 19.8 
percent) has been increasing over the entire period. Meanwhile, the working-hours 
proportions of the NOQUAL group fell from 59.6 percent to 13.7 percent over the 
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same period. This result is consistent with what we find in headcount employment 
share of education groups over time (see Figure 2.1a).  
 
The middle panel also illustrates that there has been substantial long-run 
growth in the relative supply of college graduates (from 4.1 percent in 1972 to 32.1 
percent in 2002) and O-level holders (from 9.5 percent in 1972 to 17.1 percent in 
2002), while the relative labour supply of the NOQUAL group fell from 54.1 percent 
to 9.8 percent over the same period. Thus, relative labour measured in efficiency units 
is higher than the simple working-hours proportions for high skilled workers, but 
lower for unskilled workers. Relative supply of high skilled workers (28 percent for 
college graduate) is also growing faster than low skilled workers (7.6 percent for O-
level).  
 
As regards the experience groups, the relative supply of male new entrants fell 
almost half from 5.1 percent to 3 percent, while the relative supply of the senior males 
(with 26-30 years experience) is quite stable over the entire period. Therefore, the 
relative labour supply in the UK has shifts more educated and experienced (hence 
more skilled). As we find in Chapter 2, skill premiums have been increasing after the 
1970s (see Table 2.3). Hence, for some specific groups such as females, or high 
educated or prime experienced workers, their relative wages and labour supplies are 
increasing together after the 1970s. After controlling for gender, it seems as though 
that the relative demand for skill accelerated and surpassed the increasing relative 
supply. Evidence to support Machin (2001) hypothesis may be found in years after the 
1970s. We next test Katz and Murphy’s (1992) and Machin’s (2001) hypotheses using 
the inner products of all 96 cells. 
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3.4 Empirical results 
To examine how relative supply changes line up with the relative wage changes, we 
implement the framework outlined above. We firstly test the changes of wage 
structure in the UK are from the interaction between relative labour supply and a 
constant demand. For this test, we compute the inner products of changes of relative 
wages with changes of relative labour supplies between time periods. In order to 
reduce the numbers of computations and minimize the impact of measurement error, 
we aggregate our 29 years into six five-year intervals centred in 1974, 1979, 1984, 
1989, 1994 and 2000. Then, the average relative wages and average relative supplies 
of our 96 demographic cells are computed for these sub-periods. The inner products 
of the changes in these measures of wages and supplies are calculated for each pair of 
these six intervals. 
 
The results of these calculations are given in the top part of Table 3.2. For the 
period taken as a whole, results in the top part appear to be inconsistent with the stable 
demand hypothesis in Katz and Murphy (1992). For males, only eight of all fifteen 
comparisons over the period are negative, as well as three for females. Thus, it seems 
that the stable labour demand hypothesis is only partially proved for the entire period.  
 
Moreover, inner products of wage and supply changes show a cyclical pattern 
for males, but an increasing trend for females over the entire period. As we expect, the 
positive associations between relative wages and labour supply are especially evident 
for males in the 1980s. For example, all comparisons between the interval centred in 
1974 and intervals after 1974 (that is, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 2000) for males are 
negative, while all comparisons between the interval centred in 1979 and intervals 
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after 1979 (that is, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 2000) are positive. Then, all comparisons 
between the interval centred in 1989 and intervals after 1989 (that is, 1994 and 2000) 
are again negative. However, we cannot find negative inner products for females 
except a few comparisons associated with two early intervals centred in 1974 and 
1979, which suggests a continuous acceleration in relative demand for female skilled 
workers after the 1970s.  
 
As the relative supply of skilled workers has been increasing continuously 
over the entire period (see Figure 2.1), the changes of relative supply of skilled 
workers are always positive. Hence, the cyclical pattern of males must be from the 
changes of skill premium. Panel A of Figure 3.3 illustrates possible supply-demand 
movement behind the above comparison for males. The horizontal axis represents the 
relative labour supply of skilled workers to unskilled workers (LS/LU), and the vertical 
axis represents the relative wages of skilled workers to unskilled workers (WS/WU). 
The relative demand (D1) and relative supply (S1) cross in the 1974 interval to achieve 
the original equilibrium. Since the relative supply of skilled workers has continuously 
increased from S1 to S6 over the entire period, the changes of relative wages decide 
the signs of inner products. New equilibriums in later intervals have to follow the 
trace of the dashed curve to keep consistent with Table 3.2. Hence, skilled workers 
have lower relative wages in the intervals centred in 1979 and 1994, but higher 
relative wages in the intervals centred in 1974 and 1989.  
 
The only possible explanation is that the increase of relative supply of skills 
has surpassed relative demand during the 1970s (from D1 to D2) and early years of the 
1990s (from D4 to D5), between which the increase of relative supply of skills has 
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been surpassed by the increase of relative demand. Hence, changes of relative wages 
of skills as well as inner products are negative in the 1970s and early years of the 
1990s. Thus, Katz and Murphy (1992) hypothesis is proved for males during the 
1970s and early years of the 1990s, while the 1980s and the 2000s seems more 
compatible to Machin (2001) hypothesis. 
 
Similarly, Panel B of Figure 3.3 illustrates supply-demand movement for 
females. Equilibrium points also follow the trace of the dashed curve to keep 
consistent with Table 3.2. Hence, skilled female workers have lower relative wages in 
the interval centred in 1984 and higher relative wages in the interval centred in 1974 
and 2000. After the interval centred in 1984, the relative demand of skills has 
surpassed the relative supply and pushed the relative wages to a historical height in 
the 2000s. Thus, Machin (1992) hypothesis is proved for females after the 1970s. 
 
The top part of Table 3.2 rejects the stable demand hypothesis for the period 
taken as a whole. Consequently, the alternative steadily growing demand hypothesis is 
tested in the bottom part. We examine whether the observed relative wage changes 
can be made consistent with the observed pattern of relative labour supply changes, 
simply by allowing for stable increasing relative demand. Thus, we include a time 
trend for relative wages and net labour supply in equation (3.5) to allow a steady 
relative demand growth. And then we take the average residuals over five-year 
intervals for each cell, and compute the inner products of detrended relative wages 
changes and net labour supply changes. 
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The results of this procedure are shown in the bottom part of Table 3.2. If the 
inner products were negative, results would support the steadily growing demand 
hypothesis in Katz and Murphy (1992). Otherwise, the acceleration of relative 
demand hypothesis in Machin (2001) is proved. From the bottom part of Table 3.2, 
we find some evidences to support the steadily growing relative demand hypothesis. 
For males, eight of all fifteen comparisons still show negative associations over the 
period, as well as only three for females. Those positive inner products in the 1980s 
and the 2000s (for example, 0.0017, between 1994 and 2000 for males, and 0.0023, 
between 1974 and 1984 for females) are too big to be regarded as measurement errors. 
This result suggests an acceleration of relative demand for skilled workers in the 
1980s and the 2000s.  
 
In order to test the robustness of our conclusion, Table 3.3 uses the same 
procedure for different time intervals (3-year centred interval) and different years: 
1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993 and 2001. We find a similar cyclical pattern of co-
variation between the relative wages and relative supplies as already shown in Table 
3.2, which rejects the stable relative demand as well. In the bottom part of Table 3.3, 
more detrended results (eleven of all fifteen comparisons) are negative for males. 
Nevertheless, those positive co-variations between relative wages and relative 
supplies such as 1978-1993 (0.0023) for males and 1973-1988 (0.0052) for females, 
again confirm the acceleration of relative demand in the 1980s and the 2000s.20  
 
Figure 3.4 plots (log form) relative supplies’ changes against relative wages’ 
changes of the 96 labour cells between 5 year interval centred in 1974 and 2000 and 
                                                 
20 More sensitiveness tests can be found in Appendix 3.2. Our basic conclusions still remain using 
weekly wages as earnings variable and headcount employment as labour input.  
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five sub-periods: 1974-1979, 1979-1984, 1984-1989, 1989-1994 and 1994-2000. In 
order to find the associations between relative wage and labour supply on these 
periods, we predict wage changes from a weighted least squares regression for each 
period.21 These predicted values are represented as the lines drawn in the Figure 3.4. 
Since males are majority of labour input (see Table 3.1), the overall picture of all 96 
labour cells would follow the cyclical pattern of males. We can find the associations 
between relative wage and labour supply are negative for the entire period 1974-2000, 
also for 1974-1979 and 1989-1994, but positive for the periods of 1979-1984, 1984-
1989 and 1994-2000. Thus, the six graphs shown in the figure reinforce the cyclical 
pattern that we find in the inner products of males. 
  
3.5 Conclusions  
This chapter tests a basic hypothesis about relative supply and demand shifts in the 
British labour market. A supply and demand framework as in Katz and Murphy (1992) 
is built to test the hypothesis that given stable or steadily growing relative demand, 
relative supply shifts can explain the changes of relative wage (that is, Katz and 
Murphy hypothesis, alternatively, Machin hypothesis).  
 
From co-variation of relative wages and relative labour supplies, we reject the 
hypothesis that the relative labour demand is stable over time for both males and 
females. By using detrended relative wages and supplies, we infer that an acceleration 
of relative demand for skills, that is, a positive association between relative wages and 
labour supplies (males in the 1980s and the 2000s, females after the 1970s). Hence, 
the steadily growing relative demand in Katz and Murphy (1992) can only broadly fit 
                                                 
21 Weights used here are the average working hours proportion over the entire period, i.e. E .  
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with the cyclical co-variation of wage and labour supply of males, but not for the long 
term growing trend of females. 
 
The acceleration of relative demand for skilled workers moves beyond the 
steadily growing relative demand model. Moreover, these results cannot tell us why 
there is a steadily growing relative demand and what factors are accelerating relative 
demand for skill. Along with the technological changes, institutional factors such as 
trade unions, tax and unemployment benefits should be important forces behind this 
model. Thus, the next chapter puts this supply and demand argument into a more 
realistic institutional environment.      
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Figure 3.1: Relative supply and demand for skills, Katz and Murphy (1992) 
hypothesis 
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Figure 3.2: Relative supply and demand for skills, Machin (2001) hypothesis 
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Figure 3.3: Relative wages and relative supply in the UK, 1972-2002 
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Figure 3.4:  Price and quantity changes for 96 demographic cells 
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Table 3.1: Relative supply changes in the UK, 1972-2002 
 
  Share of annual working hours (%) 
Group 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 
Gender:        
  Men 68.0 65.6 63.3 61.4 58.2 58.0 57.2 
  Women 32.0 34.4 36.7 38.6 41.8 42.0 42.8 
Education:         
  No qualification   59.6 48.5 40.2 30.6 23.8 14.6 13.7 
  O-level                  9.7 14.9 18.2 20.6 24.7 23.5 19.8 
  Degree                 2.3 5.2 7.1 10.3 11.6 18.4 23.4 
Experience (men):        
  1-5 years 7.5 8.0 7.6 8.0 4.9 4.4 4.6 
  26-30 years 7.4 6.3 6.2 6.1 7.9 6.6 6.6 
  
Relative labour supply (annual working hours measured in 
efficiency units, %) 
Group 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 
Gender:        
  Men 75.4 73.4 71.3 69.4 66.3 65.3 64.1 
  Women 24.6 26.6 28.7 30.6 33.7 34.7 35.9 
Education:         
  No qualification   54.1 42.3 34.4 24.7 18.5 10.5 9.8 
  O-level                  9.5 14.2 16.4 18.4 22.1 20.8 17.1 
  Degree                 4.1 8.9 11.9 16.4 17.9 25.6 32.1 
Experience (men):        
  1-5 years 5.1 5.5 5.1 5.3 3.2 2.8 3.0 
  26-30 years 9.2 8.0 7.8 8.1 10.2 8.6 8.5 
  
Change in log form relative labour supply (annual working 
hours measured in efficiency units,  multiplied by 100) 
Group 
1972 
-1977 
1977 
-1982 
1982 
-1987 
1987 
-1992 
1992 
-1998 
1998 
-2002 
1972 
-2002 
Gender:        
  Men -2.7 -2.9 -2.7 -4.5 -1.5 -1.8 -16.2 
  Women 7.7 7.6 6.5 9.6 2.9 3.3 37.6 
Education:         
  No qualification   -24.7 -20.6 -33.0 -28.8 -56.5 -7.0 -170.6 
  O-level                  39.6 14.8 11.4 17.9 -5.9 -19.5 58.4 
  Degree                 76.4 28.7 32.5 8.6 35.8 22.8 204.8 
Experience (men):        
  1-5 years 7.6 -6.5 3.6 -51.6 -12.8 5.6 -54.1 
  26-30 years -13.6 -3.2 3.8 23.3 -16.9 -0.8 -7.5 
 
Note: Figures in this table represent the shares of annual working hours and relative labour supply 
measured in efficiency units (average relative wage of each demographic cell over the last thirty years) 
using the GHS 1972-2002. Samples include all workers in the count sample. 
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Table 3.2: Inner products of changes in relative wages and changes in relative 
supply (annual working hours measured in efficiency units)  
A. Actual changes 
5-year centred interval 
5-year centred interval 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Inner Products of actually changes: Male 
1979 -0.0120     
1984 -0.0192 0.0029    
1989 -0.0176 0.0101 0.0016   
1994 -0.0384 0.0057 -0.0022 -0.0031  
2000 -0.0270 0.0198 0.0083 -0.0007 0.0068 
Inner Products of actually changes: Female 
1979 -0.0006     
1984 -0.0016 -0.0003    
1989 0.0053 0.0051 0.0020   
1994 0.0079 0.0098 0.0074 0.0008  
2000 0.0070 0.0110 0.0140 0.0039 0.0005 
B. Detrended changes 
Inner Products of changes in 
detrended data:: Male 
1979 -0.0016     
1984 -0.0028 0.0007    
1989 -0.0015 0.0001 -0.0012   
1994 -0.0011 0.0025 0.0000 0.0008  
2000 0.0009 -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0008 0.0017 
Inner Products of changes in 
detrended data: Female 
1979 0.0006     
1984 0.0023 0.0005    
1989 0.0023 0.0008 -0.0010   
1994 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0001  
2000 0.0004 0.0006 0.0036 0.0033 0.0013 
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Table 3.3: Inner products of changes in relative wages and changes in relative 
supply (annual working hours measured in efficiency units)  
A. Actual changes 
3-year centred interval 
3-year centred interval 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
Inner Products of actually changes: Male 
1978 -0.0146     
1983 -0.0207 0.0037    
1988 -0.0299 0.0082 -0.0006   
1993 -0.0520 0.0038 -0.0068 -0.0034  
2001 -0.0470 0.0168 0.0000 -0.0035 0.0065 
Inner Products of actually changes: Female 
1978 -0.0010     
1983 0.0011 0.0010    
1988 0.0036 0.0036 0.0001   
1993 0.0103 0.0107 0.0064 0.0026  
2001 0.0009 0.0080 0.0057 0.0072 -0.0029 
B. Detrended changes 
Inner Products of changes in 
detrended data:: Male 
1978 -0.0017     
1983 -0.0027 -0.0002    
1988 -0.0042 -0.0004 -0.0010   
1993 -0.0025 0.0023 -0.0001 0.0004  
2001 0.0016 -0.0026 -0.0011 -0.0033 0.0006 
Inner Products of changes in 
detrended data: Female 
1978 0.0005     
1983 0.0025 0.0002    
1988 0.0052 0.0016 -0.0001   
1993 0.0012 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0002  
2001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0026 0.0054 0.0004 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
Katz and Murphy (1992) supply –demand framework  
 
Table A3.1: Annual working hours shares by gender, education and experience 
(percentage) 
 
GENDER EDUCATION EXP 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 
Fixed 
Weight 
E  
Male NOQUAL 5 3.19 2.10 1.25 1.32 0.50 0.39 0.23 1.27 
Male NOQUAL 10 3.69 2.09 1.72 1.40 0.44 0.30 0.33 1.40 
Male NOQUAL 15 3.95 3.26 1.91 1.72 1.12 0.49 0.47 1.82 
Male NOQUAL 20 3.68 2.98 2.69 1.64 1.27 0.69 0.55 1.97 
Male NOQUAL 25 3.76 3.00 2.73 2.46 1.52 0.98 0.83 2.23 
Male NOQUAL 30 4.75 3.06 2.93 2.03 2.14 0.93 0.77 2.51 
Male NOQUAL 35 5.20 3.70 3.05 2.21 2.43 1.41 1.05 2.86 
Male NOQUAL 40 10.89 9.91 8.50 5.43 4.40 3.13 3.95 6.67 
Male BOLEV 5 1.24 1.07 1.39 1.35 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.90 
Male BOLEV 10 1.89 0.81 0.99 0.97 0.66 0.40 0.43 0.84 
Male BOLEV 15 1.95 1.05 0.72 0.78 0.67 1.00 0.71 0.93 
Male BOLEV 20 1.51 1.07 0.89 0.59 0.79 0.86 1.07 0.92 
Male BOLEV 25 1.19 1.17 1.02 0.91 0.65 0.59 0.89 0.91 
Male BOLEV 30 1.38 1.46 1.25 0.91 0.86 0.59 1.08 0.98 
Male BOLEV 35 1.38 1.25 1.27 1.26 0.78 0.76 0.81 1.05 
Male BOLEV 40 2.83 2.97 2.89 2.27 1.64 1.52 2.12 2.34 
Male OLEV 5 1.56 2.32 2.50 2.38 1.53 1.13 1.35 1.97 
Male OLEV 10 1.18 1.71 1.86 2.24 2.10 1.13 1.32 1.79 
Male OLEV 15 0.81 1.53 1.31 1.51 2.00 1.94 1.33 1.67 
Male OLEV 20 0.51 1.16 1.41 1.10 1.38 2.22 1.65 1.45 
Male OLEV 25 0.47 0.73 0.88 1.16 1.31 1.90 1.74 1.19 
Male OLEV 30 0.38 0.47 0.62 0.92 1.47 1.12 1.21 0.97 
Male OLEV 35 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.69 1.09 1.36 1.07 0.81 
Male OLEV 40 0.62 0.89 0.66 1.04 1.43 1.93 1.64 1.08 
Male ALEV 5 0.68 1.25 1.19 1.25 1.45 0.98 1.08 1.19 
Male ALEV 10 0.59 1.50 1.47 1.52 1.54 1.61 1.44 1.36 
Male ALEV 15 0.33 1.16 1.24 1.40 1.53 1.57 1.49 1.22 
Male ALEV 20 0.33 0.47 0.82 1.30 1.30 1.89 1.39 1.05 
Male ALEV 25 0.15 0.32 0.58 0.75 1.38 1.46 1.61 0.87 
Male ALEV 30 0.16 0.36 0.41 0.57 1.02 1.23 1.19 0.67 
Male ALEV 35 0.13 0.23 0.27 0.39 0.59 0.98 1.33 0.53 
Male ALEV 40 0.08 0.28 0.48 0.50 0.67 0.99 1.39 0.54 
Male HIGHER 5 0.51 0.73 0.79 1.08 0.62 0.70 0.42 0.66 
Male HIGHER 10 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.25 1.03 0.89 0.37 0.98 
Male HIGHER 15 0.74 1.03 1.37 1.08 1.62 1.56 1.01 1.10 
Male HIGHER 20 0.62 0.67 0.93 1.33 1.30 1.58 1.16 1.08 
Male HIGHER 25 0.62 0.59 0.87 1.13 1.36 1.34 0.94 0.94 
Male HIGHER 30 0.54 0.60 0.61 0.93 1.29 1.51 0.64 0.82 
Male HIGHER 35 0.50 0.51 0.39 0.64 0.73 1.09 0.79 0.65 
Male HIGHER 40 0.57 0.45 0.62 0.69 0.54 0.87 0.81 0.59 
Male DEGREE 5 0.30 0.51 0.51 0.65 0.41 0.73 1.12 0.59 
Male DEGREE 10 0.36 0.88 0.99 1.39 1.10 2.04 1.90 1.15 
Male DEGREE 15 0.32 0.73 1.07 1.27 0.98 1.75 2.23 1.13 
Male DEGREE 20 0.29 0.57 1.00 1.26 1.15 1.83 1.97 1.10 
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Male DEGREE 25 0.18 0.47 0.74 0.99 1.39 1.64 2.08 1.02 
Male DEGREE 30 0.17 0.33 0.36 0.74 1.07 1.22 1.69 0.71 
Male DEGREE 35 0.15 0.39 0.46 0.57 0.81 0.82 1.50 0.59 
Male DEGREE 40 0.15 0.30 0.23 0.44 0.70 0.51 0.64 0.44 
Female  NOQUAL 5 2.42 1.44 0.82 0.74 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.90 
Female  NOQUAL 10 1.67 1.07 0.79 0.75 0.30 0.06 0.16 0.72 
Female  NOQUAL 15 1.33 1.38 1.05 0.75 0.38 0.27 0.18 0.81 
Female  NOQUAL 20 1.59 1.51 1.42 1.13 0.89 0.36 0.31 1.15 
Female  NOQUAL 25 2.16 2.13 1.91 1.51 1.12 0.86 0.50 1.65 
Female  NOQUAL 30 2.99 2.62 2.50 2.08 2.05 1.02 0.75 2.12 
Female  NOQUAL 35 3.05 2.96 2.38 2.23 2.02 1.36 0.91 2.30 
Female  NOQUAL 40 5.22 5.27 4.59 3.26 3.04 2.13 2.56 3.94 
Female  BOLEV 5 0.87 1.17 1.31 1.16 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.84 
Female  BOLEV 10 0.83 0.65 0.83 0.89 0.58 0.28 0.23 0.64 
Female  BOLEV 15 0.49 0.60 0.40 0.54 0.63 0.52 0.64 0.54 
Female  BOLEV 20 0.34 0.61 0.47 0.56 0.42 0.64 0.88 0.55 
Female  BOLEV 25 0.42 0.51 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.48 0.89 0.65 
Female  BOLEV 30 0.46 0.54 0.58 0.64 0.99 0.70 1.28 0.71 
Female  BOLEV 35 0.45 0.67 0.58 0.69 0.88 0.96 0.90 0.69 
Female  BOLEV 40 0.69 0.76 0.89 0.83 0.96 1.05 1.57 0.91 
Female  OLEV 5 1.58 2.41 2.93 2.74 2.16 1.10 1.06 2.06 
Female  OLEV 10 0.91 1.17 2.08 2.20 2.59 1.14 0.80 1.70 
Female  OLEV 15 0.32 0.50 0.89 1.01 1.84 1.67 0.87 1.08 
Female  OLEV 20 0.18 0.37 0.75 0.86 1.42 1.47 1.36 0.90 
Female  OLEV 25 0.19 0.32 0.53 0.93 1.23 1.47 1.18 0.81 
Female  OLEV 30 0.18 0.38 0.51 0.80 1.35 1.36 1.11 0.76 
Female  OLEV 35 0.20 0.16 0.26 0.54 1.01 1.30 0.89 0.62 
Female  OLEV 40 0.20 0.33 0.51 0.50 0.83 1.29 1.23 0.63 
Female  ALEV 5 0.35 0.31 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.17 0.80 
Female  ALEV 10 0.21 0.44 0.57 0.72 1.08 1.52 0.82 0.74 
Female  ALEV 15 0.05 0.11 0.26 0.40 0.53 1.18 0.92 0.48 
Female  ALEV 20 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.31 0.50 0.87 0.55 0.34 
Female  ALEV 25 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.37 0.71 0.72 0.28 
Female  ALEV 30 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.10 0.35 0.66 0.64 0.28 
Female  ALEV 35 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.29 0.40 0.46 0.18 
Female  ALEV 40 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.37 0.68 0.19 
Female  HIGHER 5 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.62 0.45 0.38 0.38 0.44 
Female  HIGHER 10 0.35 0.45 0.65 0.78 0.73 0.62 0.67 0.61 
Female  HIGHER 15 0.22 0.42 0.41 0.60 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.52 
Female  HIGHER 20 0.28 0.30 0.53 0.68 0.79 0.82 0.75 0.60 
Female  HIGHER 25 0.26 0.30 0.45 0.69 0.89 0.56 0.85 0.58 
Female  HIGHER 30 0.21 0.38 0.46 0.50 0.83 0.89 0.96 0.60 
Female  HIGHER 35 0.18 0.32 0.27 0.48 0.62 0.80 0.83 0.46 
Female  HIGHER 40 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.59 0.49 0.64 0.36 
Female  DEGREE 5 0.10 0.22 0.40 0.52 0.63 0.90 1.38 0.52 
Female  DEGREE 10 0.06 0.24 0.44 0.83 0.78 1.61 1.83 0.74 
Female  DEGREE 15 0.01 0.12 0.29 0.48 0.55 1.27 1.46 0.54 
Female  DEGREE 20 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.36 0.58 1.34 1.43 0.46 
Female  DEGREE 25 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.64 1.21 1.32 0.45 
Female  DEGREE 30 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.51 0.71 1.43 0.33 
Female  DEGREE 35 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.56 0.90 0.21 
Female  DEGREE 40 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.26 0.53 0.13 
 
Notes: All figures in this table are calculated from the GHS 1972-2002. 
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Table A3.2: Relative wages of gender-education-experience groups to wage index (ratio) 
 
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 average Wage Index (At), in 1995 
pounds 5.22 5.64 5.97 6.35 6.11 6.08 7.07 6.24 
 
GENDER EDUCATION EXP 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 
Efficiency 
units 
Male NOQUAL 5 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.41 0.59 0.58 0.55 
Male NOQUAL 10 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.76 0.89 0.65 0.80 0.81 
Male NOQUAL 15 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.94 0.91 
Male NOQUAL 20 0.97 1.01 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.87 0.97 
Male NOQUAL 25 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.99 
Male NOQUAL 30 0.92 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.04 0.98 0.98 1.00 
Male NOQUAL 35 0.95 0.97 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.97 0.99 
Male NOQUAL 40 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.92 
Male BOLEV 5 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.50 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.55 
Male BOLEV 10 0.96 0.93 0.86 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.87 
Male BOLEV 15 1.04 1.03 1.00 1.04 1.06 0.91 0.90 0.99 
Male BOLEV 20 1.12 1.10 1.10 1.17 0.97 0.95 0.90 1.07 
Male BOLEV 25 1.07 1.12 1.13 1.10 1.11 0.99 0.93 1.10 
Male BOLEV 30 1.06 1.06 1.20 1.14 1.21 1.11 1.07 1.14 
Male BOLEV 35 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.16 1.00 1.11 1.10 1.14 
Male BOLEV 40 1.01 1.00 1.08 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.03 
Male OLEV 5 0.53 0.60 0.59 0.53 0.60 0.52 0.62 0.56 
Male OLEV 10 0.99 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.88 0.80 0.79 0.92 
Male OLEV 15 1.21 1.08 1.16 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.07 1.08 
Male OLEV 20 1.34 1.22 1.21 1.17 1.22 1.16 1.11 1.21 
Male OLEV 25 1.38 1.32 1.22 1.24 1.25 1.12 1.11 1.25 
Male OLEV 30 1.47 1.27 1.28 1.35 1.12 1.18 1.27 1.31 
Male OLEV 35 1.45 1.47 1.37 1.33 1.38 1.23 1.20 1.30 
Male OLEV 40 1.38 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.22 1.11 1.15 1.24 
Male ALEV 5 0.60 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.61 0.61 0.68 
Male ALEV 10 1.08 1.05 0.98 1.05 1.05 0.92 0.94 1.01 
Male ALEV 15 1.51 1.21 1.18 1.14 1.23 1.24 1.11 1.22 
Male ALEV 20 1.26 1.29 1.30 1.34 1.30 1.22 1.34 1.31 
Male ALEV 25 1.76 1.36 1.29 1.34 1.44 1.38 1.23 1.39 
Male ALEV 30 1.27 1.33 1.53 1.66 1.35 1.46 1.34 1.42 
Male ALEV 35 1.42 1.45 1.64 1.42 1.49 1.18 1.46 1.38 
Male ALEV 40 1.18 1.16 1.20 1.39 1.29 1.17 1.10 1.28 
Male HIGHER 5 0.88 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.82 0.91 0.90 
Male HIGHER 10 1.21 1.20 1.08 1.17 1.20 1.10 1.33 1.18 
Male HIGHER 15 1.40 1.32 1.30 1.39 1.35 1.28 1.26 1.34 
Male HIGHER 20 1.61 1.46 1.47 1.52 1.27 1.42 1.18 1.44 
Male HIGHER 25 1.85 1.54 1.57 1.49 1.51 1.50 1.50 1.53 
Male HIGHER 30 1.72 1.50 1.54 1.42 1.47 1.39 1.61 1.57 
Male HIGHER 35 1.88 1.54 1.73 1.33 1.24 1.39 1.52 1.56 
Male HIGHER 40 1.66 1.38 1.62 1.33 1.47 1.36 1.65 1.45 
Male DEGREE 5 1.00 0.92 0.87 1.10 0.96 1.04 1.10 1.02 
Male DEGREE 10 1.51 1.36 1.34 1.36 1.48 1.45 1.33 1.40 
Male DEGREE 15 1.85 1.65 1.60 1.62 1.80 1.83 1.61 1.70 
Male DEGREE 20 2.25 1.96 1.89 1.86 1.83 2.18 1.78 1.90 
Male DEGREE 25 2.11 1.95 1.81 2.25 1.81 2.23 1.86 1.94 
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Male DEGREE 30 2.48 2.00 1.95 1.90 1.89 1.94 1.86 2.03 
Male DEGREE 35 2.59 1.90 1.73 2.05 1.55 2.12 1.98 2.00 
Male DEGREE 40 2.54 2.21 2.16 1.92 1.65 2.08 1.77 1.91 
Female  NOQUAL 5 0.40 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.58 0.64 0.50 
Female  NOQUAL 10 0.53 0.65 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.64 0.61 
Female  NOQUAL 15 0.54 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.83 0.67 0.46 0.64 
Female  NOQUAL 20 0.51 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.81 0.74 0.65 
Female  NOQUAL 25 0.54 0.65 0.67 0.59 0.62 0.71 0.64 0.63 
Female  NOQUAL 30 0.52 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.67 
Female  NOQUAL 35 0.54 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.68 0.68 0.81 0.67 
Female  NOQUAL 40 0.52 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.72 0.65 0.78 0.65 
Female  BOLEV 5 0.41 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.41 0.47 0.56 0.49 
Female  BOLEV 10 0.65 0.70 0.67 0.62 0.76 0.70 0.78 0.69 
Female  BOLEV 15 0.69 0.77 0.72 0.76 0.76 0.94 0.88 0.79 
Female  BOLEV 20 0.65 0.67 0.80 0.61 1.00 0.79 0.99 0.77 
Female  BOLEV 25 0.67 0.68 0.75 0.72 0.84 0.60 0.94 0.78 
Female  BOLEV 30 0.69 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.93 0.99 0.79 
Female  BOLEV 35 0.64 0.84 0.75 0.81 0.76 0.88 0.86 0.79 
Female  BOLEV 40 0.68 0.80 0.75 0.74 0.86 0.80 0.81 0.79 
Female  OLEV 5 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.63 0.53 
Female  OLEV 10 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.69 0.76 
Female  OLEV 15 0.68 0.83 0.83 0.93 0.84 1.04 0.98 0.88 
Female  OLEV 20 0.63 0.82 0.82 0.90 0.87 1.05 1.01 0.87 
Female  OLEV 25 0.77 0.78 0.86 0.91 0.88 0.96 0.92 0.86 
Female  OLEV 30 0.83 0.76 0.89 0.88 0.75 0.95 0.83 0.84 
Female  OLEV 35 0.91 0.93 0.83 1.00 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.90 
Female  OLEV 40 0.68 0.98 0.91 0.88 0.66 0.89 0.96 0.86 
Female  ALEV 5 0.56 0.59 0.70 0.65 0.59 0.60 0.73 0.62 
Female  ALEV 10 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.79 0.89 0.86 0.81 0.85 
Female  ALEV 15 0.88 1.23 1.01 0.91 1.18 1.12 1.02 1.02 
Female  ALEV 20 0.71 1.34 0.83 1.02 1.17 1.14 1.08 1.04 
Female  ALEV 25 0.77 0.76 0.87 0.95 0.83 1.12 0.96 0.94 
Female  ALEV 30 0.93 0.97 0.90 0.46 1.05 1.21 1.12 0.97 
Female  ALEV 35 1.26 0.75 0.95 0.93 1.02 1.06 1.02 1.16 
Female  ALEV 40 0.79 1.18 0.97 1.09 1.02 0.93 0.85 0.94 
Female  HIGHER 5 0.68 0.71 0.79 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.72 0.76 
Female  HIGHER 10 0.80 0.97 1.01 0.97 1.21 1.07 0.89 0.99 
Female  HIGHER 15 0.71 1.00 1.13 1.08 1.14 1.13 1.12 1.10 
Female  HIGHER 20 1.17 0.89 1.13 1.12 1.24 1.15 1.23 1.08 
Female  HIGHER 25 0.98 1.24 1.10 1.17 1.33 1.14 1.13 1.12 
Female  HIGHER 30 1.11 1.16 1.25 1.32 1.22 1.32 1.32 1.16 
Female  HIGHER 35 1.15 1.09 1.23 0.95 0.92 1.23 1.14 1.08 
Female  HIGHER 40 1.03 0.94 1.20 1.34 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.10 
Female  DEGREE 5 0.84 0.80 0.88 1.00 0.92 0.68 0.84 0.90 
Female  DEGREE 10 1.24 1.26 1.31 1.17 1.31 1.33 1.37 1.23 
Female  DEGREE 15 1.27 0.97 1.23 1.58 1.17 1.61 1.48 1.37 
Female  DEGREE 20 1.80 1.81 1.19 1.19 1.35 1.76 1.61 1.46 
Female  DEGREE 25 0.85 1.85 1.83 1.53 1.50 1.57 1.54 1.41 
Female  DEGREE 30 1.92 1.41 1.11 1.45 1.59 1.54 1.29 1.48 
Female  DEGREE 35 1.34 1.21 0.85 1.46 1.36 1.39 1.41 1.35 
Female  DEGREE 40 2.02 1.61 1.56 1.29 2.08 1.37 1.73 1.60 
 
Notes: All figures in this table are calculated from the GHS 1972-2002. 
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Table A3.3: Relative labour supplies of gender-education-experience groups 
(measured in efficiency units) 
 
GENDER EDUCATION EXP 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 Average 
Male NOQUAL 5 1.97 1.25 0.72 0.73 0.26 0.19 0.11 0.75
Male NOQUAL 10 3.35 1.83 1.46 1.14 0.34 0.22 0.23 1.22
Male NOQUAL 15 4.00 3.18 1.81 1.56 0.97 0.39 0.37 1.76
Male NOQUAL 20 3.98 3.11 2.72 1.59 1.17 0.59 0.47 1.95
Male NOQUAL 25 4.14 3.18 2.82 2.44 1.43 0.86 0.72 2.23
Male NOQUAL 30 5.28 3.28 3.05 2.03 2.03 0.83 0.68 2.45
Male NOQUAL 35 5.74 3.93 3.16 2.19 2.29 1.24 0.91 2.78
Male NOQUAL 40 11.21 9.84 8.21 5.03 3.87 2.57 3.20 6.27
Male BOLEV 5 0.75 0.63 0.79 0.74 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.51
Male BOLEV 10 1.85 0.76 0.90 0.86 0.55 0.31 0.33 0.79
Male BOLEV 15 2.16 1.12 0.75 0.77 0.63 0.88 0.62 0.99
Male BOLEV 20 1.80 1.23 1.00 0.64 0.81 0.82 1.00 1.04
Male BOLEV 25 1.45 1.38 1.17 1.00 0.68 0.57 0.85 1.02
Male BOLEV 30 1.75 1.79 1.49 1.04 0.93 0.60 1.08 1.24
Male BOLEV 35 1.75 1.54 1.52 1.44 0.84 0.77 0.80 1.24
Male BOLEV 40 3.26 3.30 3.13 2.35 1.61 1.40 1.92 2.43
Male OLEV 5 0.98 1.41 1.48 1.34 0.82 0.57 0.67 1.04
Male OLEV 10 1.21 1.70 1.79 2.07 1.84 0.92 1.06 1.51
Male OLEV 15 0.97 1.78 1.48 1.64 2.06 1.87 1.26 1.58
Male OLEV 20 0.68 1.51 1.78 1.33 1.59 2.39 1.75 1.58
Male OLEV 25 0.66 0.99 1.15 1.46 1.57 2.12 1.91 1.41
Male OLEV 30 0.56 0.67 0.85 1.21 1.84 1.31 1.39 1.12
Male OLEV 35 0.68 0.71 0.66 0.91 1.35 1.58 1.23 1.02
Male OLEV 40 0.85 1.18 0.86 1.30 1.69 2.12 1.78 1.40
Male ALEV 5 0.52 0.92 0.85 0.86 0.94 0.60 0.64 0.76
Male ALEV 10 0.67 1.62 1.55 1.54 1.48 1.45 1.27 1.37
Male ALEV 15 0.45 1.52 1.58 1.71 1.77 1.70 1.59 1.47
Male ALEV 20 0.48 0.66 1.13 1.71 1.63 2.21 1.60 1.35
Male ALEV 25 0.24 0.48 0.84 1.05 1.82 1.81 1.97 1.17
Male ALEV 30 0.25 0.55 0.61 0.82 1.38 1.56 1.49 0.95
Male ALEV 35 0.20 0.35 0.40 0.53 0.77 1.20 1.61 0.72
Male ALEV 40 0.12 0.38 0.64 0.64 0.82 1.12 1.56 0.75
Male HIGHER 5 0.52 0.70 0.74 0.98 0.53 0.56 0.34 0.63
Male HIGHER 10 1.37 1.29 1.27 1.48 1.16 0.94 0.38 1.13
Male HIGHER 15 1.11 1.49 1.92 1.46 2.07 1.86 1.19 1.59
Male HIGHER 20 1.00 1.03 1.39 1.92 1.78 2.02 1.46 1.52
Male HIGHER 25 1.06 0.98 1.39 1.73 1.99 1.83 1.26 1.46
Male HIGHER 30 0.96 1.02 1.01 1.46 1.94 2.11 0.89 1.34
Male HIGHER 35 0.88 0.86 0.64 1.01 1.08 1.52 1.09 1.01
Male HIGHER 40 0.92 0.70 0.95 1.00 0.75 1.13 1.04 0.93
Male DEGREE 5 0.34 0.56 0.54 0.67 0.39 0.66 1.00 0.60
Male DEGREE 10 0.56 1.33 1.45 1.95 1.47 2.55 2.34 1.66
Male DEGREE 15 0.62 1.34 1.91 2.18 1.59 2.65 3.33 1.95
Male DEGREE 20 0.61 1.16 1.99 2.41 2.08 3.10 3.28 2.09
Male DEGREE 25 0.40 0.98 1.50 1.92 2.57 2.83 3.55 1.97
Male DEGREE 30 0.39 0.72 0.76 1.51 2.07 2.21 3.01 1.52
Male DEGREE 35 0.34 0.83 0.96 1.14 1.54 1.45 2.64 1.27
Male DEGREE 40 0.32 0.62 0.46 0.85 1.27 0.87 1.07 0.78
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Female  NOQUAL 5 1.34 0.77 0.43 0.37 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.45
Female  NOQUAL 10 1.14 0.70 0.50 0.46 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.44
Female  NOQUAL 15 0.95 0.95 0.70 0.48 0.23 0.16 0.10 0.51
Female  NOQUAL 20 1.15 1.05 0.97 0.73 0.55 0.21 0.18 0.69
Female  NOQUAL 25 1.53 1.45 1.27 0.96 0.68 0.48 0.28 0.95
Female  NOQUAL 30 2.23 1.89 1.75 1.39 1.30 0.61 0.44 1.37
Female  NOQUAL 35 2.27 2.13 1.66 1.49 1.28 0.81 0.53 1.45
Female  NOQUAL 40 3.82 3.71 3.15 2.14 1.90 1.24 1.47 2.49
Female  BOLEV 5 0.47 0.62 0.68 0.57 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.40
Female  BOLEV 10 0.65 0.49 0.60 0.62 0.38 0.17 0.14 0.44
Female  BOLEV 15 0.43 0.51 0.33 0.43 0.48 0.36 0.44 0.43
Female  BOLEV 20 0.29 0.50 0.38 0.43 0.30 0.44 0.59 0.42
Female  BOLEV 25 0.36 0.43 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.33 0.61 0.49
Female  BOLEV 30 0.41 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.75 0.49 0.89 0.57
Female  BOLEV 35 0.40 0.57 0.48 0.55 0.66 0.67 0.63 0.57
Female  BOLEV 40 0.60 0.65 0.73 0.65 0.72 0.74 1.08 0.74
Female  OLEV 5 0.93 1.37 1.62 1.46 1.09 0.52 0.49 1.07
Female  OLEV 10 0.76 0.96 1.64 1.67 1.86 0.77 0.53 1.17
Female  OLEV 15 0.31 0.47 0.82 0.89 1.54 1.31 0.67 0.86
Female  OLEV 20 0.18 0.34 0.68 0.75 1.18 1.14 1.04 0.76
Female  OLEV 25 0.18 0.30 0.48 0.80 1.00 1.12 0.89 0.68
Female  OLEV 30 0.16 0.34 0.45 0.67 1.08 1.02 0.81 0.65
Female  OLEV 35 0.20 0.16 0.25 0.49 0.86 1.04 0.70 0.53
Female  OLEV 40 0.20 0.31 0.46 0.44 0.68 0.99 0.93 0.57
Female  ALEV 5 0.24 0.21 0.39 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.64 0.47
Female  ALEV 10 0.20 0.40 0.51 0.61 0.87 1.15 0.61 0.62
Female  ALEV 15 0.06 0.12 0.28 0.41 0.52 1.08 0.83 0.47
Female  ALEV 20 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.32 0.50 0.81 0.50 0.33
Female  ALEV 25 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.33 0.60 0.59 0.26
Female  ALEV 30 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.10 0.33 0.57 0.54 0.24
Female  ALEV 35 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.32 0.42 0.47 0.21
Female  ALEV 40 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.31 0.56 0.16
Female  HIGHER 5 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.47 0.33 0.26 0.26 0.33
Female  HIGHER 10 0.38 0.48 0.68 0.78 0.69 0.54 0.58 0.59
Female  HIGHER 15 0.28 0.50 0.48 0.67 0.78 0.72 0.73 0.59
Female  HIGHER 20 0.34 0.35 0.60 0.73 0.81 0.79 0.71 0.62
Female  HIGHER 25 0.33 0.36 0.53 0.78 0.95 0.56 0.83 0.62
Female  HIGHER 30 0.27 0.48 0.56 0.58 0.93 0.92 0.98 0.68
Female  HIGHER 35 0.22 0.37 0.31 0.52 0.64 0.77 0.79 0.52
Female  HIGHER 40 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.62 0.48 0.62 0.43
Female  DEGREE 5 0.10 0.22 0.37 0.47 0.54 0.72 1.09 0.50
Female  DEGREE 10 0.08 0.31 0.56 1.02 0.91 1.76 1.96 0.94
Female  DEGREE 15 0.02 0.17 0.42 0.66 0.71 1.55 1.75 0.75
Female  DEGREE 20 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.53 0.81 1.74 1.82 0.75
Female  DEGREE 25 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.37 0.86 1.52 1.63 0.69
Female  DEGREE 30 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.27 0.72 0.93 1.85 0.60
Female  DEGREE 35 0.04 0.09 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.68 1.07 0.38
Female  DEGREE 40 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.07 0.36 0.74 0.25
 
Notes: All figures in this table are calculated from the GHS 1972-2002. 
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APPENDIX 3.2 
Results using weekly earnings and headcount employment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3.1: Relative wage and relative supply in the UK, headcount 
employment 1972-2002 
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Figure A3.2:  Price and quantity changes for 96 demographic cells (weekly earnings and headcount employment) 
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Table A3.4: Relative supply changes in the UK, headcount employment, 1972-
2002 
 
  Share of headcount employment (%) 
Group 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 
Gender:        
  Men 49.0 58.1 56.1 48.0 46.9 50.5 50.5 
  Women 51.0 41.9 43.9 52.0 53.1 49.5 49.5 
Education:         
  No qualification   61.0 46.7 38.5 33.9 26.9 14.4 11.9 
  O-level                  10.5 15.8 19.7 21.2 25.7 25.4 21.8 
  Degree                 2.4 6.0 7.7 8.8 9.6 17.8 22.7 
Experience (men):        
  1-5 years 6.9 7.8 7.4 7.4 5.4 4.5 5.0 
  26-30 years 5.9 6.6 6.3 5.2 6.9 6.4 6.5 
  
Relative labour supply (employment measured in efficiency 
units, %) 
Group 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1998 2002 
Gender:        
  Men 59.4 68.4 66.4 58.6 57.5 60.1 59.7 
  Women 40.6 31.6 33.6 41.4 42.5 39.9 40.3 
Education:         
  No qualification   55.1 40.1 32.5 27.6 21.2 10.4 8.6 
  O-level                  10.3 14.8 17.6 19.1 23.0 21.9 18.4 
  Degree                 4.5 10.6 13.3 15.1 16.0 25.9 32.2 
Experience (men):        
  1-5 years 5.1 5.4 5.0 5.2 3.6 2.9 3.2 
  26-30 years 8.1 8.7 8.3 7.4 9.7 8.9 8.9 
  
Change in log form relative labour supply (employment 
measured in efficiency units,  multiplied by 100) 
Group 
1972 
-1977 
1977 
-1982 
1982 
-1987 
1987 
-1992 
1992 
-1998 
1998 
-2002 
1972 
-2002 
Gender:        
  Men 14.1 -3.0 -12.5 -1.9 4.5 -0.7 0.6 
  Women -25.0 6.1 20.8 2.7 -6.5 1.0 -0.9 
Education:         
  No qualification   -31.7 -20.9 -16.6 -26.1 -71.4 -19.3 -186.0 
  O-level                  35.7 17.5 8.5 18.3 -4.6 -17.5 57.8 
  Degree                 86.9 22.6 12.5 5.5 48.2 21.9 197.6 
Experience (men):        
  1-5 years 6.2 -7.1 4.1 -37.3 -22.6 10.1 -46.5 
  26-30 years 8.0 -5.3 -11.7 27.0 -8.2 -0.1 9.6 
 
Note: Figures in this table represent the headcount employment shares and relative labour supply 
measured in efficiency units (average relative weekly wage of each demographic cell over the last thirty 
years) using the GHS 1972-2002. Samples include all workers in the counter sample. 
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Table A3.5: Inner products of changes in relative weekly wages and changes in 
relative supply (headcount employment measured in efficiency units) for 96 
demographic groups 
 
5-year centred interval 
5-year centred interval 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Inner Products of actual changes:      
1979 -0.0160     
1984 -0.0100 0.0028    
1989 0.0023 0.0136 0.0036   
1994 -0.0228 0.0199 0.0027 -0.0090  
1999 -0.0146 0.0409 0.0219 -0.0053 0.0080 
Inner Products of changes in 
detrended data:      
1979 -0.0031     
1984 0.0026 -0.0039    
1989 -0.0022 -0.0152 -0.0042   
1994 -0.0014 -0.0028 0.0009 -0.0021  
1999 -0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0116 -0.0037 
 
 
 
Table A3.6: Inner products of changes in relative weekly wages and changes in 
relative supply (headcount employment measured in efficiency units) for 96 
demographic groups 
 
3-year centred interval 
3-year centred interval 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
Inner Products of actually changes:      
1978 -0.0221     
1983 -0.0139 0.0046    
1988 -0.0107 0.0089 0.0005   
1993 -0.0296 0.0207 0.0036 -0.0048  
2001 -0.0464 0.0346 0.0119 -0.0043 0.0012 
Inner Products of changes in 
detrended data:      
1978 -0.0060     
1983 0.0033 -0.0029    
1988 0.0018 -0.0149 -0.0039   
1993 -0.0016 -0.0066 0.0005 -0.0020  
2001 -0.0076 -0.0027 -0.0055 -0.0184 -0.0133 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON SKILL PREMIUM  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Wage inequality in the United Kingdom, as we have seen in the last two chapters, has 
substantially increased in the last three decades, which is much higher than that in 
continental European countries. Schmitt (1995) argues that a portion of the changes in 
overall inequality in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s was due to the decline and 
subsequent recovery of financial returns to labour market skills. Analysis of the wage 
distribution in the UK by Gosling, Machin and Meghir (2000) also emphasizes the 
importance of skill (education) attainment of recent cohorts and changes over time in 
the skill (education) wage premium.  
 
Moreover, Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2003) compare the estimated 
education return across the whole of wage distribution to infer the extent to which 
education exacerbate or reduce underlying inequality. Their results suggest education 
returns are higher for those in the top deciles of the income distribution compared to 
those in the bottom deciles and this inequality may have increased in recent years. 
Our results in the Chapter 2 also show that changes in skill (education) attainment and 
wage premium are closely associated with the increasing earnings inequality (see 
Figure 2.4-2.5 and Table 2.3). Even though the supply-demand analysis on skill 
(education) can induce the changes of relative wage (see Figure 3.3-3.4 and Table 3.2-
3.3), we are not clear what are underpinning factors for changes in the supply-demand 
for skills. In this chapter, we analyze the links between labour market institutions and 
the skill (education) premium.  
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Changes in skill premiums are driven by both supply and demand factors and 
the institutional environment. Even though the increasing skill premium in the UK 
can be broadly explained by interaction between relative demand and supply for skill, 
the existing literature has tried to isolate the causal factors underpinning these market 
changes. The most popular candidate is skill-biased technical change (SBTC). In fact, 
there is strong evidence of the empirical association between proxies for SBTC 
(computers or other ICT facilities) and the widened wage gap of the UK and US in the 
1980s (see Krueger 1993, Machin and Van Reenen 1998, Autor, Katz and Krueger 
1998, Katz and Autor 2000, Machin 2001 and O’Mahony et al 2008).  
 
An alternative explanation focuses on changes in product demand largely 
associated with large trade deficits in the 1980s (see trade deficits in Nickell 2006, 
Table C). Wood (1994, 1995 and 1998) argues that the growth of manufacturing 
imports from newly industrializing economies have led to a sharp decline in unskilled 
manufacturing employment and a shift in employment toward other skill-intensive 
sectors. Hence, the decline of manufacturing decreases the relative demand for 
unskilled workers and increases earnings inequality. However, the trade explanation is 
not convincing for many labour economists (see Schmitt 1995, and Machin and Van 
Reenen 1998). And even trade economists such as Krugman and Lawrence (1993) 
and Sachs and Shatz (1994) also point that the effect of international trade on relative 
demand for skill is surprising small. Hence, on the whole the evidence seems to lean 
towards the SBTC explanation (Machin, 1996).    
 
The widening wage gap in the UK has been accompanied by institutional 
reform in the labour market since the Thatcher-era. Labour policy directed by US-
style flexibility may be part of the causation of the widening wage structure. In 
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Chapter 3, a steadily growing relative demand interacted with labour supply shifts 
appears to only broadly explain changes of relative wages of males. However, during 
the 1980s and the 2000s, the positive associations between relative wages and relative 
supply still exist for both males and females even after we detrended the data. The 
acceleration of relative demand for skilled workers after the 1970s is beyond what a 
simple supply-demand model can explain. This chapter aims to analyze the effects of 
changes in labour market institutions (such as trade unions, taxation/unemployment 
benefits and the national minimum wages) on the skill premium. 
 
With the same access to technology and international competition, and having 
had a similar education expansion, the increasing skill premium in the UK, in contrast 
to the stable wage structure in continental European countries can only be explained 
by a different institutional environment. Hence, Acemoglu (2003a) argues that 
changes in the supply and demand for skills are unlikely to fully account for the 
marked differences in skill premium across countries. The “Krugman hypothesis” 
states that the rise in wage inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries as well as the rise 
in unemployment in continental Europe are “two sides of the same coin”, namely a 
fall in the relative demand for unskilled workers under different wage setting 
institutions (Krugman 1994, Nickell and Bell 1996 and Puhani 2003, also see Figure 
1.1 in Chapter 1).  
 
A substantial amount of research on wage inequality has regarded and 
examined labour market institutions as important factors that may affect the wage 
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response of markets to shifts in the relative demand for skills.22 One strand of this 
research has studied how specific labour market institutions affect wage differentials 
in the UK. First of all, the possibility of there being a connection between the wage 
differentials and trade unions has been studied in a large literature. Casual inspection 
shows a striking association between movements in union density over time and 
changes in the earnings dispersion. Schmitt (1995) has calculated that the decline in 
union density could account for 21 percent of the rise in the pay premium for a 
university degree during 1978-1988. Machin (1997) obtains more dramatic results 
that the male variance would have been 40 percent less if the 1980s levels of union 
coverage had prevailed in 1991. Bell and Pitt (1998) also conclude the deunionization 
between the early 1980s and 1990s widened the male earnings distribution by about 
20 percent.23  
 
The latest finding of Addison et al (2007) may be the only one to analyze the 
effect of trade unions on the British wage gap by gender and private/public sector, 
allowing for worker education. They point out that deunionization is shown to 
account for surprising little of the increase in earnings dispersion in the private sector 
for either males or females. The lower union decline in the public sector, however, 
has actually stronger effect. Additionally, in the public sector, trade unions no longer 
reduced earnings dispersion as much as they once did by virtue of their growing 
tendency to organize more skilled groups. But, it is still not very clear why 
deunionization has such a different effect on the wage differentials in the private and 
                                                 
22 The long reference list includes Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower (1995), Blau and Kahn (1996), 
Machin (1996, 1997), Gottschalk and Joyce (1998), Card et al (2003) and Koeniger et al (2004 and 
2007). 
23 Card (2001) for the United States, Card et al. (2004) for a comparison of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada, and Kahn (2000) for OECD countries have also found that higher union 
density is associated with lower wage inequality. 
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public sector. This chapter will push the discussion further and explore the union 
effect on the skill premium over the last three decades in the UK. 
 
Moreover, Dickens et al. (1999) and papers in the special session on the 
British minimum wages in the Economic Journal 2004 have found that national 
minimum wages reduce wage inequality by increasing the bottom deciles of the pay 
distribution without a negative impact on employment (see Dickens and Manning 
2004, Machin and Wilson 2004, Stewart 2004 and the summary of Metcalf 2004 in 
this session). DiNardo et al. (1996) and Lee (1999) also find the same effect of 
minimum wages for the United States. Again, this chapter will push the minimum 
wages discussion further. 
 
For other labour market institutions, the different effects of the tax wedge and 
unemployment benefits on skilled and unskilled workers may affect the skill premium. 
Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2003) argue that the resulting inequality from 
different education return may be dealt with through redistributive tax and social 
security policy. Brewer et al (2008) argue that even though the current government 
has increased taxes on people with high incomes, this has not prevented them from 
racing further away from the average level of living standards across the country. 
They think that the outlook for inequality in Britain may depend more on the outlook 
for the stock market than on government tax and benefit policies. This chapter will 
push these arguments further and investigate the different effects of the tax wedge and 
benefits on skill premiums. 
   
Even though much literature shows that institutional factors such as trade 
unions, minimum wages and the tax/benefit system are important to explain changes 
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of skill premiums, recent literature still contains much disagreement concerning 
whether institutional factors are quantitatively more important than pure market forces 
for changes in the skill premium in the UK. How to disentangle the institutional 
factors from pure demand and supply, and assess their respective importance is still a 
big problem for empirical research. Such an assessment is a further aim of this 
chapter. 
 
Most previous institution-specific empirical studies only use cross-section data 
at country level (see Blau and Khan 1996).  The only two cases of longitudinal data 
are Wallerstein (1999, for 16 developed countries in 1980, 1986 and 1992), and 
Koeniger et al (2004 and 2007, for 11 developed countries over 1973-1998). Our 
analysis builds on Koeniger et al (2004 and 2007), but we construct a balanced panel 
data of six skill (education) groups in the United Kingdom over 1972-2002 from 
several micro-economic datasets. Using these data, we investigate the effects of both 
aggregated and disaggregated supply-demand-institution factors for distinct skill 
groups on skill premiums in the UK, and quantitatively assess respective importance. 
 
 For instance, trade unions in skilled and unskilled groups have different 
effects on the skill premium, because trade unions have different weights on welfare 
of skilled and unskilled workers in its objective function (see Koeniger et al 2004 and 
equation (A17) in Appendix 4.1). Unemployment rates in different skill groups are 
used as control variables for labour market conditions, i.e. business cycle. Since 
wages of different skill groups have different responsiveness to market conditions, 
unemployment rates in different skill groups also affect the skill premium over time. 
The analysis has required attaining data on trade union density, tax and benefit rates, 
unemployment rates, technology index and industry shifts index by skill level for the 
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period 1972-2002 as well. Hence, we can examine the associations between various 
skill premiums and supply-demand-institution changes by skill levels over a much 
longer period than previous research. Finally, cross-national analysis at country level 
cannot tell us whether the story is the same for the private and public sector. The 
public-private distinction will also be our contribution.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
theoretical model based on Koeniger et al (2004) and motivates the estimation log-
linear equation. Section 3 provides our empirical specification and introduces the 
basic framework of our panel data. Section 4 describes the main data sources and 
measurement of variables used in our empirical specification. Section 5 estimates 
empirical results. The last section concludes. 
 
4.2 A model of trade union bargaining 
Our empirical work is based on the union bargaining model provided by Koeniger et 
al (2004). In this section, we review this model, in which labour market institutions 
alter the outside option of skilled and unskilled workers differently, and thus affect 
relative labour demand as well as the wage differentials. Labour supply is regarded as 
an exogenous factor and only reflected into the control variable for market condition. 
This model then evaluates how institutions affect wage differentials, giving union 
bargaining with employers over the wage. Institutions such as union density, the tax 
wedge, unemployment benefits and minimum wages influence outcomes by changing 
the outside option of workers. Thus, if labour market institutions improved the outside 
option for unskilled workers more than for skilled workers, bargaining position of 
unskilled workers would be strengthened and tend to compress the skill premiums.  
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Changes of institutions as well as market conditions, technologies and 
industrial structure are reflected in the following equation24: 
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In equation (4.1), H denotes high skilled workers while L is low skilled workers. The 
skill premium, i.e. log form gross wage differentials for skilled workers, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
L
H
w
wln , 
mainly depends on trade union density (tud), tax wedge (tax), benefit replacement 
ratios (repr), unemployment rates (u), industrial structure shifts (ind) and technology 
(comp) by skill, with the addition of the minimum wage variable (MW).  
 
Skill premiums depend on human capital and forgone earnings, and should be 
remarkably constant over the long run. However, short and medium run factors, 
including variables of institutions, market conditions, technology and industrial 
structure in equation (4.1) also affect skill premiums. Now, we go through the 
variables in the order they appear in the equation and present our arguments 
underlying equation (4.1) as follows.  
 
Let us start with trade unions. Koeniger et al (2004) make union bargaining 
central to their derivation of equation (4.1), but many of their arguments hold in a 
competitive market as well, as we will explain. Firstly, skill premiums would be 
smaller if unions favoured unskilled workers (tudL) more than skilled workers (tudH). 
Figure 4.1a describes the trade union effect for unskilled workers. The horizontal axis 
                                                 
24 See details of derivation in Appendix 4.1.   
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represents the employment of unskilled workers (LU), and the vertical axis represents 
the wages of unskilled workers (WU). As demand (D1) and supply (S1) cross, the 
original equilibrium is at the point A where unskilled workers have wage W1 and 
employment L1. In the face of SBTC, the demand curve for unskilled workers would 
drop from D1 to D2.  
 
Without trade union bargaining, demand curve D2 and supply curve S1 achieve 
the new equilibrium B where unskilled workers have lower wage W2 and lower 
employment L2. Flexible wages of unskilled workers are low enough for them to keep 
their jobs or find new jobs. In addition, some unskilled workers may quit voluntarily. 
However, trade unions will interfere. Since trade unions negotiate the wage, 
employers have “rights to manage” to decide employment and maximize their profit. 
If trade unions bargain wages for unskilled workers, unskilled workers may move to 
point C at the demand curve D2 where they keep the same wage as before i.e.W1, but 
have lower employment level L3. Since unskilled workers would supply labour L1 at 
the wage level of W1, unemployment L1-L3 appears in the model. Thus, trade union 
bargaining for unskilled workers will decrease the skill premium, but make more 
unskilled workers unemployed.   
 
Different effects of union bargaining are likely to appear for skilled workers. 
In Figure 4.1b, the original equilibrium is at the point A where skilled workers have 
wage W1 and employment L1. In the face of SBTC, the demand curve for skilled 
workers would increase from D1 to D2. Without trade union bargaining, the demand 
curve D2 and supply curve S1 achieve the new equilibrium B where skilled workers 
have higher wage W2 and higher employment L2. Since trade unions mainly support 
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the “median” union member25, objective function of trade unions is dependent on the 
skill composition within trade unions. Hence, trade union bargaining should favour 
unskilled/semi-skilled workers more than skilled workers, since they are the major 
part of union membership.  
 
However, skilled workers have become more important for trade unions than 
in the 1970s, as the overall employment composition shifts to more skilled structure 
as the education has expanded over the last thirty years. In Panel A of Figure 2.1, the 
NOQUAL group was the largest group (about 61.5 percent in 1972) in the total 
employment before 1994. In 2002, only about 15 percent of total workers has not any 
qualifications. At the same time, the employment share of workers with A-levels and 
above qualifications was more than 50 percent in 2002. Thus, trade unions also 
bargain wages for semi-skilled/skilled workers and push their wages to a higher level 
W3 with lower employment level L3. Since skilled workers would supply labour L4 at 
the wage level of W3, unemployment L4-L3 appears in the model. Therefore, trade 
union bargaining for skilled workers increases the skill premium, while trade union 
bargaining for unskilled workers decreases it. The overall effect of trade union on the 
skill premium depends upon whether unions favour unskilled workers (tudL) more 
than skilled workers (tudH).     
 
Secondly, Koeniger et al (2004) mark up earnings tax as a part of the gross 
wages for both skilled and unskilled workers. This result also holds in a competitive 
market model with individual bargaining. Figure 4.2 shows that the steep line SU is 
the inelastic supply curve of unskilled workers, and the flat line SS is the elastic 
supply curve of skilled workers. For unskilled workers, without taxation, the supply 
                                                 
25 See a summary for the median voter model in Congleton (2002).  
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curve SU crosses the demand curve DG at point A, where unskilled workers have wage 
WU and employment L1.  
 
As the tax wedge is imposed, the demand curve decreases from DG to DN. The 
gross wages of unskilled workers increase a little from WU to WUG. However, there is 
a big fall in the take home wage from WU to WUN and more unskilled workers 
unemployed (L1-L2). The same analysis can be applied for skilled workers. The elastic 
supply of skilled may mark up the gross wage from WS to WSG. Figure 4.2 shows that 
the mark-up effects on skilled workers’ wage (WSG-WS) may be more than that on 
unskilled workers (WUG-WU). The tax wedge in Figure 4.2 increases the skill 
premium. Thus, the skill premium based on gross wages is associated with earnings 
tax only from the mark-up effect, which occurs with or without union bargaining. 
Higher tax rates for skilled workers (taxH) increase the skill premium, while higher 
tax rates for unskilled workers (taxL) decrease it. These results are consistent with the 
findings in Brewer et al (2008) that even though the current government has increased 
taxes on people with high incomes, this has not prevented them from racing further 
away from the average level of living standards across the country. 
 
A similar analysis can be applied for unemployment benefit (repr) and 
unemployment rates (u) in equation (4.1). For example, higher replacement ratios of 
unemployment benefit mean a better outside option for workers. Hence, the 
employment rent is less than with lower replacement ratios and workers have better 
bargaining position for higher wages. The effect of higher benefit replacement ratios 
can be reflected as a decrease of labour supply from S1 to S2 in Figure 4.3. The 
original equilibrium A is replaced by the new equilibrium B with higher wages from 
W1 to W2 and more unemployed workers (L1-L2). These effects on wages are 
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presumably different for skilled and unskilled workers. Thus, higher replacement 
ratios for skilled workers (reprH) increase the skill premium, while higher replacement 
ratios for unskilled workers (reprL) decrease it. The overall effect of unemployment 
benefit depends on a comparison between its respective wage effect on skilled and 
unskilled workers.  
 
On the other hand, higher unemployment rates decrease the reemployment 
probability of workers and worsen the outside option for workers. As the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate increases in a recession, workers cannot bargain 
strongly for wages and they may accept lower wage to keep employed (the spot 
market matters, see Devereux and Hart 2007). This situation is reflected as an 
increase of labour supply from S2 to S1 in Figure 4.3, which gets back the original 
equilibrium point A where workers have lower wages (W1) and higher employment 
(L1) compared with equilibrium point B. Koeniger et al (2004)’s argument about the 
effect of unemployment on wages is consistent with the wage cyclicality literature 
that wages are negatively associated with the unemployment rate as business cycle 
proxy. 26  Thus, higher unemployment rates for skilled workers (uH) are likely to 
decrease the skill premium, while higher unemployment rates for unskilled workers 
(uL) are likely to increase it.  
 
Thirdly, as DiNardo et al (1996) reveals, a minimum wage can directly 
compress the skill premium by binding wages of unskilled workers, whereas wages of 
skilled workers are not directly affected. Hence, the minimum wages will cut off all 
unskilled wages below it and make the skill premium smaller.   
                                                 
26  Devereux and Hart (2006) prove the negative associations between the real wage and the 
unemployment rates in the UK using the New Earnings Survey (NES). I analyze real wage cyclicality 
of three countries: Italy, Germany and the UK in the next two chapters. 
 102
 
Finally, we also need to discuss industrial structure and technology variables 
in equation (4.1). Industrial structure shifts may reflect the demand for service from 
both international competition and the rising income of the whole society. On one 
hand, the growth of manufacturing imports from newly industrializing economies 
decreases the price of labour-intensive manufacturing goods as well as the demand for 
unskilled workers. International competition has led to a sharp decline in unskilled 
manufacturing employment and a shift in employment towards the service sector. 
Hence, industrial structure shifts from increasing international competition are good 
for skilled workers but bad for unskilled workers, and might increase earnings 
inequality.  
 
On the other hand, the rising income of the whole society induces more 
demand for services. This might lead to greater demand for unskilled workers in 
occupations where it is difficult to substitute technology, e.g. care assistants (see Auto, 
Levy and Murnane 2003). Levy and Murnane (2006, Figure 2, p12) also find the 
employment share of personal and sale service in 1999 was higher than that in 1969, 
which are the only two increasing unskilled occupations. The rise of service sector 
may reflect increasing demand on unskilled workers in the service sector, hence 
decrease earnings inequality. Thus, even more likely to increase the skill premium, 
industrial shifts may have a complex effect on skill premiums. 
 
Skill premiums are also affected by medium and short run shocks from 
technology. New technologies adopted by skilled workers (compH) increase their 
marginal products and push up the skill premium, while new technologies adopted by 
unskilled workers (compL) also increase their marginal products and decrease the skill 
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premium. However, if new technologies are complementary to skills (see Acemoglu 
1998), total factor productivity of skill-intensive sectors (for example, computer 
software industry) grows faster than labour-intensive sectors (for example, textile 
industry). Technological changes may have higher wage effect on skilled workers 
than on unskilled workers. Hence, the overall effect of technology is skill biased and 
pushes up the skill premium.  
 
4.3 Empirical specification   
Koeniger et al (2007) test their model by using cross-country data. They conclude: 
“Our empirical results show that stricter employment protection legislation, more 
generous benefit replacement ratios, longer benefit duration, higher union density, and 
a higher minimum wage are associated with lower male wage inequality. We find that 
changes in these institutions can explain a substantial part of observed changes in 
male wage inequality — at least as much as is explained by our trade and technology 
measures.” (Koeniger et al 2007, p352). Their study therefore sheds light on the cross-
country comparison of wage inequality. My research analyzes skill premiums in the 
UK using their approach.  
 
Our empirical work uses a two-step estimation procedure, which is designed to 
get round the Moulton (1986) problem of explaining earnings based on individual 
data with variables based on aggregate data. He argues that individuals in the same 
year/area will share some common component of variance that is not entirely 
attributable either to their measured characteristics (e.g. gender and age) or to any 
aggregate variable in the year/area. In this case, the error component in an OLS 
regression will be positively correlated across people in the same year/area, causing 
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the estimated standard error of the aggregated variable to be downward biased.27 In 
step 1, we use all individual observations to estimate education wage differentials as 
proxies of skill premiums over time. This equation is given by: 
 
itit
T
t
T
t
titt
T
t
titttitt
t
T
t
T
t
titttitt
T
t
ttit XYDdYHhYAaYOoYBbYnw εβα ++++++++= ∑ ∑∑∑ ∑∑
= === == 1 111 11
0ln                   
(4.2) 
 
where wit is the real gross hourly wage rate, Yt denotes a year dummy representing the 
base line group of NOQUAL; Bit denotes a dummy variable for workers with below 
O-level qualification; Oit denotes a dummy variable for the O-level group; Ait denotes 
a dummy variable for workers with A-levels; Hit denotes a dummy variable for 
workers with higher educational qualification but not degrees; and Dit denotes a 
dummy variable for worker with degree equivalent or above qualification. These 
categories are explained in details in Table 2.1. 
 
Xit is a vector of the main additional factors that may influence wages 
including potential labour market experience, present employment tenure, marital 
status, ethnicity and region, and itε is a random error term. Correspondingly, nt 
(t=1…T, T=29 in this research) are the estimated coefficients of the NOQUAL group, 
which are the wages of this group in year t relative to their wages in the first sample 
year, 1972. Following the same method, bt, ot, at, ht and dt are the estimated 
incremental wage effects of the different education groups: BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, 
HIGHER and DEGREE over the baseline group NOQUAL in year t. These 
coefficients are shown in Figure 4.4 below (also see the first column in Appendix 4.2) 
 
                                                 
27 A similar two-step procedure is used in the wage cyclicality (beginning with Solon et al 1994, see 
also Devereux and Hart 2006) and wage curve literature (Nijkamp and Poot, 2005, p 434). 
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In step 2, we estimate the institutional effect on the skill premium, i.e. the 
incremental wage effect of each educated group in the first step. We stack bt, ot, at, ht 
and dt from equation (4.2) to form a skill premium variable sjt, which is the skill 
premium of each education group relative to the baseline NOQUAL group in the 
same year. Hence, a panel dataset is built to find the links between the skill premium 
and labour market institutions: 
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where sjt is the skill premium for education group j in the year t, and labour market 
institutions indicators and those control variables of labour market conditions (i.e. 
unemployment rates as the proxy for business cycle), industrial shifts and technology 
are defined in equation (4.1). All variables of the baseline group (tudnt, taxnt reprnt, unt, 
indnt and compnt) are also put into equation (4.3) to control for changes in the baseline 
group. TREND is a time trend; jυ  is a vector of education group dummies; tυ  are 
year dummies28; and jtυ  is the stochastic error term. 
 
We concentrate on a study on skill premiums. Equation (4.3) assumes the 
existence of a long run equilibrium relation between skill premiums and institutions. 
Also, the adjustment should be contemporaneous. However, much literature  shows an 
increasing trend in the skill premium (for example, Gosling, Machin and Meghir 2000, 
Figure 3.2, p642) as well as a decline of trade unions since the 1970s (for example, 
Bell and Pitt 1998, Figure 1, p516 and Disney et al 1998, Figure 1-3, p3-4). Since our 
                                                 
28 I have dropped 10 year dummies to avoid the linear dependent problem with the time trend variable 
(TREND) and all variables of the baseline group (tudnt, taxnt reprnt, unt, indnt and compnt).   
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panel data have a 29-year period, the skill premium of each group is probably non-
stationary. Hence, a co-integration problem may exist in the links between skill 
premiums and institutional variables. De-trending and simply differencing the data 
cannot resolve all problems.29 If there is some inertia in the adjustment process a re-
parameterisation of equation (4.3) - as in equation (4.4) below - might be preferable. 
Thus, we put an Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) into equation (4.3) to clear the 
long-term relationship between the level of skill premiums and level of institutions.  
 
Ammermueller et al (2007) use the same ECM approach in their wage curve 
research for Italy and Germany with panel data. We follow their approach, but only 
put the ECM in trade union density variables (tudjt and tudnt) to save degrees of 
freedom, since trade unions are regarded as the most important institutional factor in 
literature and only the union density variable shows non-stationarity over the entire 
period. The error-correction specification is: 
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   (j= b, o, a, h and d)       (4.4) 
 
Thus, in the above specification the long run equilibrium, between the level of the 
skill differentials and level of trade union density is embodied in an ECM. 
 
Furthermore, some interesting assumptions can be tested. When |a|≈1, θ0=θ1 
and n0θ = n1θ  , equation (4.4) reduces to a simple long-term level regression such as 
                                                 
29 Simply de-trending and differencing to remove the non-stationary trend can avoid the spurious 
regression problem, but it also removes the any long-run information (see Harris 1995, p1). 
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equation (4.3). Also, if a≈0 the relationship becomes a skill premium growth model; 
alternatively, when 0<|a|<1 we get a more standard partial adjustment model. The 
coefficient a measures the stickiness of skill premiums to the changes of trade unions: 
the closer a is to unity (in absolute value), the faster is the adjustment of skill 
premiums to decline of trade unions. We use Stata’s fixed effect programme (xtreg, 
fe, see Stata, 2003b) to estimate equation (4.3) and (4.4). 
 
4.4 Data description 
4.4.1 Wage level and skill premiums 
The wage variable used here is the real gross hourly wage in 1995 pounds, which is 
from the GHS 1972-2002 and defined in the same way as in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
Following the tradition of research (see Schmitt 1995, Dickens 2000 and Koeniger et 
al 2004, 2007), we concentrate on male full-time workers.30 Then, we have 138,103 
observations (114, 491 workers in the private sector and 23,612 workers in the public 
sector) in the first step regression based on equation (4.2).  
 
The coefficients of year dummies derived from the first step (nt), is presented 
in the Panel A of Figure 4.4 by sector (see Table A4.1 and A4.2 in Appendix 4.2). 
This graph illustrates the cumulative real wage growth of the NOQUAL group, which 
displays the log ratio of this group’s earnings in each year relative to its level of real 
earnings in 1972. Hence, as a major part of workers in the NOQUAL group, the 
private sector graph here is very similar to the 10th percentile graph in Panel B of 
Figure 2.4, and have increased by about 30 percent (n2002–n1972≈0.3) over the entire 
                                                 
30 Female participation rate was quite low in the 1970s, only about 30% (see Table 3.1). For high 
skilled females, there is no enough observation to construct institutional variables such as trade union 
density in the 1970s. For example, Table A4.4 in Appendix 4.3 shows a lot of missing values in high 
skilled females in the 1970s.  For other institution variables, we met the same problem. Hence, we have 
to give up estimation of the equations for females even they are included in chapters 2 and 3. 
 108
period. However, real wages of unskilled workers in the public sector show big 
difference from the private sectors after the 1970s, which supports the sample division 
in our further analysis. 
 
Moreover, the coefficients of other year dummies in the first step (bt, ot, at, ht 
and dt) are stacked up to build the dependent variable (sjt, j=b, o, a, h and d) used in 
the second step regression. With this panel data of 5 groups over 29 years, we have 
145 observations (5×29) for both private and public sector in the second step 
regression based on equation (4.3), which is presented in the Panel B and C of Figure 
4.4 (see Table A4.1 and A4.2 in Appendix 4.2).  
 
Panel B and C shows skill premiums of education groups (bt, ot, at, ht and dt), 
which are wages of each education group relative to the wage level of the NOQUAL 
group in the same year. For example, in Panel B, the line of DEGREE group shows 
that wages of workers with degrees was about 55.92 percent higher than workers in 
the NOQUAL group in 1979. But, in 1998, wages of workers with degrees was about 
83.33 percent higher than workers in the NOQUAL group. Hence, degree premium 
had increased about 27.41 percent from 1979 to 1998 (=83.33-55.92).  
 
Furthermore, we can see that skill premiums in both sectors share the same 
pattern of “higher skill level equals higher skill premium” in Panel B and C in Figure 
4.5 as we find in the repeated cross section results in Table 2.4. And, in the private 
sector, the skill premiums of the lower skilled groups (BOLEV, OLEV and ALEV) 
increase more slowly than those of the higher skilled groups (HIGHER and DEGREE) 
since the 1970s. This result is consistent with what we find in the repeated cross-
section regressions in Chapter 2 (see Table 2.3) and findings in Walker and Zhu (2003) 
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using different data sources. However, in the public sector, we cannot find an 
increasing trend of the skill premium for any education group. Thus, the worsening of 
wage inequality since the 1970s is perhaps caused by the increasing skill premiums in 
the private sector rather than in the public sector.  
 
4.4.2 Institutional variables 
In this part, we describe the institutional variables such as trade unions, tax wedge, 
unemployment benefit and the NMW used in this chapter. Besides the GHS 1992-
2002, another three datasets have been used to measure those institutions: the UK 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES 1982-2002), the Family and Working Lives Survey 
(FWLS 1994/1995) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS 1991-2002). The 
FES is a continuous survey of household expenditure and income, which has been in 
existence since 1957.31 Annual samples of around 10,000 households (about 1 in 2000 
of all United Kingdom households) are selected each year. Approximately 60 percent 
of these households co-operate by providing information about the household and 
personal incomes and certain payments that recur regularly (e.g. rent, gas and 
electricity bills, telephone accounts and insurances). 
 
The FWLS is a life and work history data, which provide representative 
information about people living in Britain. The dataset was collected in the period 
1994/1995 and the final sample consists of information for 11,237 respondents. The 
focus of the survey is not only on current living conditions, but also a broad variety of 
retrospective questions about the family and working lives of the respondents. In this 
way, the survey tries to get information about the basic event history of the family and 
                                                 
31 The FES was replaced by a new survey in 2001, the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS). Thus, the 
last two years’ data are from the EFS 2001 and EFS 2002, in which they have the same definition. We 
will not differentiate the two surveys in later discussion. 
 110
working lives beginning with the 16th birthday of the respondents. Hence, the FWLS 
provides time series information on socio-economic characteristics of person and 
household; training and education including on and off the job; detail on current job 
and key past events in particular union membership; spells of unemployment and  
details of benefits claims since the 1970s.32   
 
The BHPS was designed as an annual survey of each adult (16+) member of a 
nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 households in the UK, making a 
total of approximately 10,000 individual interviews yearly. The same individuals are 
re-interviewed in successive waves. A development in 1999/2000 was the addition of 
two samples from Scotland and Wales to increase the relatively small sample sizes for 
these regions. In 2001/2002, an additional sample from Northern Ireland was added. 
Thus, the BHPS sample also remains broadly representative of the whole population 
of the UK as it changed through the 1990s and beyond.  
 
The main purpose of using these additional datasets is to compile a time series 
on union density by education level. Information on union membership (tud) since the 
1970s, along with worker’s characteristics is not available in any single British dataset. 
The GHS does not provide information about the trade union membership except in 
one year (1983). The FES can provide indirect information, via a question on 
membership of a trade union or professional body. In the income section of the survey, 
individuals are asked if there are any deductions from pay for subscriptions to friendly 
societies, trade unions or professional bodies. This measure of trade union density has 
been used by several studies (e.g. Disney and Cameron 1990, Lanot and Walker 1998, 
                                                 
32 The FWLS is stored in TDA (Transition Data Analysis) software. See more details about the FWLS, 
programme in TDA syntax for union membership, and the event history dataset used to derive union 
density variables by skill and sector (tudnt and tudjt) in Appendix 4.3.  
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and in particular, Bell and Pitt 1998, Figure 1, p516), which have used response to 
this question as evidence of union membership.  
 
Presumably, it is possible to falsely classify some union members as non-
union workers. Individual who do not pay their union subscription directly at source 
will not be included in this definition of union membership. Bell and Pitt (1998) 
argues that this trade union measure is reliable by comparing it with the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) in 1980 and 1990. However, as we will see later, 
trade union density derived from the FES is very unstable. And, the variable for union 
membership deduction in the FES is only available after 1981 while our investigation 
covers the period 1972-2002. A further well-known problem with the FES is that it 
cannot provide continuous and accurate information about workers’ skill level and 
employment status. Hence, we only use the FWLS and BHPS to derive union density 
by skill. 
 
 Figure 4.5 compares the trade union density changes in different datasets, in 
which we can find trade union density derived from the FES is almost the same as that 
from the FWLS in 1982. In the next five years, however, trade union density in the 
FES dramatically dropped about 15 percent. This big drop cannot be found in the 
FWLS and the data from the Certification Office (The “Bain and Price” series, see 
Disney et al 1998 Figure 1, and Bell and Pitt 1998 Figure 1). Hence, the overall union 
density of all male workers in the FES seems much lower than in the FWLS, the 
BHPS or the “Bain and Price” series. This result confirms our doubts on the reliability 
of union density derived from the FES’ union due question. Whether there are 
deductions from pay for subscriptions seems an inferior indicator for union 
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membership. Thus, we give up trade union density from the FES and use the FWLS 
and BHPS to build union density by skill level. 33  
 
Our union density variable is from the FWLS for the period 1972-1994, and 
for the period 1995-2002, it is from the BHPS. In Figure 4.5, the change of union 
density between 1991 and 1995 is very similar in the FWLS and BHPS, for both all 
workers and for the private sector. This similarity shows that the average union 
density has a consistent pattern for the two datasets. For the BHPS, the union 
questions were only asked for those who moved job in 1992-1994 (but for everyone in 
other years), so we did not include the period 1992-1994 in this figure and do not use 
these data in the analysis.  
 
Figure 4.6 presents trade union density by skill level and sector over the last 
thirty years (see details in Appendix 4.2). The combination of the FWLS and BHPS 
reveals the trade union density in the semi-skilled groups (BOLEV, OLEV and ALEV) 
is higher than the unskilled (NOQUAL) and high skilled groups (HIGHER and 
DEGREE) in the private sector.34 For workers in all skill groups in the private sector, 
trade union density tends to decline after 1979, during which earnings inequality 
moves in the opposite direction. However, the situation in the public sector flips, in 
which union density of unskilled (NOQUAL) and high skilled groups (HIGHER and 
DEGREE) is higher than that in semi-skilled groups (BOLEV, OLEV and ALEV). 
                                                 
33 Moreover, in the FES, there is no variable about private and public sector of workers after 1986. 
Even with private/public sector information during the period 1982-1986, the union density of the FES-
private is also much lower than that of the FWLS-private, just as the overall union density. 
34 The main concern about the FWLS and BHPS may be whether the educational qualifications in these 
two datasets are consistent with the qualification system in the GHS. The FWLS categorize educational 
qualification into 53 groups (see details in Appendix 4.3), as the BHPS can provide accurate 
information about 13 kinds of education and trainings qualifications. We have compared these 
qualifications and found they are the same one as in the GHS (see Table 2.1). Thus, we are confident 
on that the skill variables in the GHS, FWLS and BHPS are comparable.    
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And, we do not find a clear decline of unions in the public sector since the 1970s. It is 
perhaps the reason for the different wage structure in these two sectors. 
 
Moving on to the tax and benefit system, the division into private and public 
sectors is not necessary since the tax wedge and replacement ratios do not depend on 
sector. Concerning the different tax wedge (tax) for skilled and unskilled workers, the 
GHS does not provide information about tax deductions from gross earnings. We 
therefore use the FES, which is a better dataset for tax expenditure. The FES 1972-
2002 in fact provides tax wedges by skill level. The tax rate is defined here as the 
proportion of income tax deduction (Pay As You Earn amount) relative to normal 
gross wages.  
 
As for benefit indices, they measure the proportion of unemployment benefits 
relative to average earnings before tax. The GHS provides information for 
unemployment benefit over the entire period 1972-2000.35  For practical purpose, we 
also put income support and incapacity benefit into our benefit indices since both of 
them will increase the outside option of workers.36 However, a problem arises that 
unemployed workers can only provide the actual amount of benefit received not their 
earnings. Hence, the replacement ratios of benefits (repr) are estimated as the 
proportion of unemployment benefits they received relative to their estimated 
earnings in a standard earnings equation.  
 
                                                 
35 After 1996, the British unemployment benefit changed its name to job seeker allowance. I have kept 
on using the unemployment benefit term in the discussion. 
36 Since the data about housing benefit (particular for council tax) are not consistent over time in the 
GHS, we do not include it.  
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The theoretical model in Koeniger et al (2004) implies that tax wedge is only a 
mark up factor in the gross wages. The relative tax wedge between skilled and 
unskilled workers should be positively correlated with the skill wage differentials. 
From the panel A of Figure 4.7, we see that the tax wedge gap between high skilled 
and low skilled group has been wider since the 1970s. This trend is consistent with the 
increasing skill premium we found in the last chapter and the findings in Brewer et al 
(2008) that government has imposed large rises in taxation to fund higher benefit 
payments and tax credits in recent years. 
 
On the other hand, the Koeniger et al (2004) model implies that the 
replacement ratios should be negatively correlated with the skill differential, if 
unemployment benefit is more generous for unskilled workers. Panel B of Figure 4.7 
describes a higher benefit index for the low skilled groups. The interesting point is 
that the increase of benefit index of the DEGREE group during 1980-1985, in contrast 
to the decline in other groups. This result can help explain the degree premium 
increase in the 1980s.  
 
Finally, as far as the minimum wages (mw) are concerned, the UK National 
Minimum Wage Act came into force on 1 April 1999. We build a variable being zero 
before 1998, and taking the log form of national minimum wages after 1998 as a 
proxy for this policy change (see NMW values after 1998 in Metcalf 2004, Table 1).  
 
4.4.3 Control variables  
The unemployment rate of each skill group plays an important role for the skill 
premium because it represents the labour market conditions (i.e. business cycle) and 
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outside options of skilled and unskilled workers. We calculate the unemployment rate 
by skill level over the entire period using the GHS 1972-2002.37 The theoretical 
model of Koeniger et al (2004) implies that there is a negative (positive) relationship 
between the unemployment rate of skilled (unskilled) workers and the skill premium, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
Panel A of Figure 4.8 shows the different pattern of movement of each group 
over the business cycle. Obviously, the lower educated workers are more vulnerable 
when the labour market is loose. We also see that the unemployment gap between 
lower skilled and higher skilled worker became wider in the 1980s and early years of 
1990s. Higher unemployment rates of unskilled worker worsen their outside option 
and also decrease the collective bargaining power of their trade unions. Thus, the skill 
premium should increase if the unemployment rate of unskilled workers increases 
faster than that of skilled workers. 
 
As frequently used in the literature, industrial structure shifts can be 
represented by the employment movement from the manufacturing to the service 
sector as in Schmitt (1995).  In this chapter, the proxy of the industrial shifts is the 
employment proportion of manufacturing workers within each skill group (ind). Panel 
B of Figure 4.8 shows the employment shifts mainly happen in the low skilled groups 
such as NOQUAL, BOLEV, OLEV and ALEV, which have continuous declines in 
manufacturing employment proportions. For workers in the high skilled groups of 
HIGHER and DEGREE, there is not much change in the manufacturing ratio. In the 
early years of the 1980s, the manufacturing employment proportions even increased 
                                                 
37 We compare the unemployment rates in the GHS with other data sources such as the Labour Force 
Surveys (LFS) and the BHPS. We find not much difference in these three data sources. Hence, we use 
the GHS here for consistency.  
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in high skilled groups. This result may also contribute to the increasing skill premium 
in the 1980s.  
 
As for SBTC, we use computer usage density (comp) as a proxy. Computer 
usage is a widely applied measure of skill biased technology (Kruger 1993). The 
disadvantage of this proxy is that the computer usage variable is not available before 
1984 in the GHS. Hence, I assume computer use in years before 1976 is zero and 
interpolate the years between 1975 and 1984. Panel C of Figure 4.8 shows sparse 
computer usage and a slow climb during years before 1980. Then, the acceleration of 
computer usage in the upper skill groups (ALEV, HIGHER and DEGREE), supports 
the increased skill premiums in the 1980s. Especially for the DEGREE group, 
computer usage increased from about 25 percent in 1980 to about 65 percent in 1995, 
much faster than low skilled groups (for example, only from about 10 percent to about 
25 percent for the NOQUAL group). This pattern is also consistent with the 
dramatically increasing degree premium in the 1980s and early 1990s. On the other 
hand, it is widely realised the diffusion of computers has become so widespread after 
the 1990s that a simple headcount may no longer measure the SBTC-induced demand 
shifts (Machin 2001, p772). Indeed, we find that lower skilled groups have a fast 
convergence process to those high skilled groups for computer usage after 1995. This 
convergence implies that computer usage may be an inferior indicator of skill biased 
technology for recent years.  
 
4.5 Empirical results 
In this section, we explore the associations between institutions and skill premiums 
using equation (4.3) and (4.4). Contribution analysis for every explanatory variable to 
the changes in the skill premium is presented using equation (4.4).  
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4.5.1 Basic results  
Table 4.1 presents the fixed effect results from equation (4.3) by the private and 
public sector. We concentrate on the private sector which is majority of workforce. 
Firstly, there are significant associations between the skill premium and trade union 
density of high skilled groups (tudjt) in the private sector. A point increase of trade 
union density in the skilled group will increase the skill premium by 0.15 percent. As 
the theoretical model predicts, a point increase of trade union density in the baseline 
unskilled group will decrease the skill premium by 0.21 percent, but this effect is not 
significant. Thus, our results suggest that trade unions have different effects on wages 
of workers at different skill levels.  
 
Secondly, the tax wedge shows a significant mark up effect for unskilled 
workers as the theoretical model predicts. A one point increase of the unskilled 
workers’ tax wedge (taxnt) decreases the skill premium by about 1.7 percent. As the 
theoretical model predicts, the same change in the skilled workers’ tax wedge (taxjt) 
increases the skill premium by about 1.03 percent, but insignificant. However, the 
benefit index has no significant effect on the skill premium. Neither does the 
minimum wage variable show significant effects on the skill premium in Table 4.1.  
 
Thirdly, unemployment rates should reflect the business cycle and the outside 
options of workers. Workers can bargain more strongly if the labour market is tight. 
Yet, from Table 4.1, there is no significant effect of market conditions on the skill 
premium. Many researchers point out that more unskilled workers may join the 
employment as labour market is tight and push the overall wages down (see Solon et 
al 1994 for the US and Devereux and Hart 2006 for the UK). Since employment 
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composition within each education group also changes over the business cycle, it is 
not surprising to see insignificant effect of market conditions on skill premiums. 
Hence, the insignificant overall wage cyclicality here may just show the composition 
biases.38 
 
As for other variables, we find significant effect of industrial shifts in skilled 
workers (-0.23) on the skill premium in Table 4.1. Moreover, the computer usage 
variables show significant positive associations with workers’ wages, implying new 
technologies can improve productivity of all workers. A one point increase in 
computer usage of skilled workers (compjt) is associated with a 0.29 percent increase 
of the skill premium, while that of unskilled workers (compnt) decreases about 0.57 
percent of the skill premium. This result suggests that adaptation of new technology 
for unskilled workers is even more important to decrease the skill premium.  
 
For all estimations in the public sector, there is no significant result except 
unemployment rate (0.69) and industrial shifts (1.45) of unskilled workers, implying 
more static skill premiums in the public sector. Skill wage premium in the public 
sector can respond to the market condition (business cycle) of unskilled workers. As 
the unemployment rate of unskilled workers increases, their wage will decrease and 
push up the skill premium. Similarly, more unskilled workers are employed in the 
public manufacturing will increase the skill premium. It seems that the wage setting in 
the public sector does not follow the model of Koeniger et al (2004). Instead, 
bureaucratic and administered price models may be needed to explain wage 
                                                 
38 See more details in the next two chapters, in which we discuss the wage cyclicality and control the 
composition effect using panel data. 
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management in the public sector (see a summary in Kaufman 2007 using transaction 
costs theory).  
 
4.5.2 Results of ECM specification 
The fixed effect results in Table 4.1 would be biased by co-integration problems if the 
skill premium and trade union density were non-stationary. Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) Unit root test shows that the degree premium in the private sector is non-
stationary over the entire period, even more non-stationary during the period 1979-
1998. And, trade union densities of all education groups in the private sector are non-
stationary over the entire period. 39  Hence, results in Table 4.1 may be biased by co-
integration problem. Table 4.2 tries the fixed effect ECM model using the better 
specification in equation (4.4). This improvement in methodology will clear up the 
relationship between institutions and the skill premium.  
 
The main improvement is that institutional effects on the skill premium are 
more important and significant in the private sector. A one point increase of trade 
union density in the skilled group (tudjt) still increases the skill premium by 0.18 
percent. However, the effect of trade unions on skill premiums becomes bigger and 
significant for unskilled workers. A one point increase of trade union density in the 
unskilled group (tudnt) will decrease the skill premium by 0.59 percent.  
 
                                                 
39 ADF test shows that the degree premium is non-stationary over the entire period (t value:-2.68, 
MacKinnon p value: 7.8%), especially during the period 1979-1998 (t value:-1.60, MacKinnon p value: 
48.4%). Skill premiums of other groups are all stationary over the entire period. Trade union densities 
of all groups are non-stationary over the entire period (t value: -0.55 for NOQUAL, -0.199 for BOLEV, 
0.709 for OLEV, -0.834 for ALEV, -0.324 for HIGHER and -0.624 for DEGREE). Thus, the co-
integration problem is serious for the regression for specific sub-groups and sub-periods.        
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Next, the tax wedge show the right mark up effect as the model expects, but 
insignificant; the benefit variable of high skilled workers (reprjt) is also insignificant 
as in Table 4.1. However, the benefit variable of the unskilled group (reprnt) becomes 
significant. One point increase of benefit variable of unskilled workers can decrease 
the skill premium by about 0.39 percent.  
 
Furthermore, as the theoretic model predicts, unemployment rates of skilled 
workers (ujt) now show a negative association with the skill premium (-0.47). Hence, 
the higher unemployment rate of skilled workers will bring down their wages and 
decrease the skill premium. This is consistent with the model of Koeniger et al (2004) 
and the wage cyclicality literature (Solon et al 1994 for the USA and Devereux and 
Hart 2006 for the UK). Moreover, more skilled workers in the private sector are 
employed in manufacturing will decrease the skill premium (-0.24). The technology 
change also shows the right direction for both skilled (0.26) and unskilled groups (-
0.44). More computer usage in the unskilled workers appears to increase their wages 
and decrease skill premiums.  
 
For the public sector, we find that trade union density of unskilled workers is 
negatively associated with skill premiums in long run (-0.4), but positive in short run 
(0.64). However, skilled workers in the public sector do not benefit from their trade 
unions. Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) also find that trade unions compress 
wages of skilled members to compensate unskilled members (in the public sector, 
skilled and unskilled are to a large extent in the same unions, e.g. Unison). Another 
interesting point worthy of mention is the ECM variable, which is the lagged skill 
premium variable, sjt-1. Its coefficient is 0.71 in the private sector but around 1 in the 
public sector, and both significant. This result confirms our argument that the short 
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run wage adjustments in the private sector are more rapid than in the public sector. In 
fact, there may be no ECM in the public sector since the skill premium there appears 
to be static. A compensation model in Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001), or a 
bureaucratic and administered price model (Kaufman 2007) may be better for 
explaining wage management in the public sector. 
 
Table 4.3 estimates the contribution of each explanatory variable in equation 
(4.2) to the changes in the degree premium over three typical periods: 1972-1979 and 
1979-1998 and 1998-2002. All figures in Table 4.3 are calculated by using estimates 
in Table 4.2 and data in Table A4.1 (see Appendix 4.2). For simplicity, we only 
concentrate on the institutional effects on the degree premium (as a proxy to earnings 
inequality) in the private sector and ignore insignificant estimates in Table 4.2. 
 
The top panel shows changes in degree premium and changes in those 
explanatory variables such as trade union density, tax wedge, benefit replacement 
ratios, unemployment rates, manufacturing ratios and computer usage for both groups 
(NOQUAL and DEGREE). The middle panel shows effects of each explanatory 
variable on the degree premium. The bottom panel is the overall contribution of 
explanatory variable in different period. In analysis below, we concentrate on the long 
period 1979-1998, during which the degree premium (see Panel B of Figure 4.4) as 
well as earnings inequality (see Panel A of Figure 2.4) have increased to the highest 
level in our sample years.40     
 
                                                 
40 The degree premium (see Panel B of Figure 4.4) and earning inequality (see Panel A of Figure 2.4) 
change in a similar pattern in these three periods. We regard the degree premium as a proxy of earnings 
inequality (90th-10th percentile differential) in this part.  Thus, our analysis on the degree premium can 
be applies on earnings inequality. 
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From Table 4.3, the decline of trade union is the most important factor for the 
increasing degree premium during the period 1979-1998. The union decline in the 
DEGREE group (-30.75 percent) decreases the degree premium by about 5.53 percent 
(=0.18×30.75). At the same time, however, trade union density decline in the 
unskilled group (NOQUAL, -25.29 percent) increases the degree premium by about 
14.92 percent (=0.59×25.29), that is, about half of total rise in degree premium (27.4 
percent). Hence, the union decline in these two groups has a combined effect of 9.39 
percent (=14.92-5.53) increase on the degree premium, which is about 34.24 percent 
(=9.39/27.4) of the rise in degree premium. This result is consistent with literature on 
trade union effect on earnings such as Schmitt (1995, about 21 percent of the rise in 
degree premium), Machin (1997, about 40 percent of the rise in male variance) and 
Bell and Pitt (1998, about 20 percent of the male earnings distribution). 
 
Following the same way, we calculate the overall effect of the tax and benefit 
system. The increasing benefit replacement ratio in unskilled workers (6.54 percnet) 
can reduce the degree premium by about 2.55 percent, which is about 9.31 percent 
(=2.55/27.4) of the rise in degree premium. The market condition variable (as a proxy 
of business cycle) and the industrial shifts variable can only account for a small part, 
3-4 percent of the rise in degree premium.  
 
Moreover, the increasing computer usage in the DEGREE group (61.21 
percent) increase the degree premium by about 15.91 percent (=0.26×61.21). At the 
same time, however, the increasing computer usage in the unskilled group (24.31 
percent) decreases the degree premium by about 10.69 percent (=0.44×24.31). Hence, 
the increasing computer usage in these two groups has a combined effect of 5.22 
percent (=15.91-10.69) increase on the degree premium, which accounts for about 
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19.04 percent (=5.22/27.4) of the rise in degree premium during this period. 
Therefore, our results are consistent with the cross-country results of Koeniger et al 
(2007, p352), which claim “changes in these institutions can explain a substantial part 
of observed changes in male wage inequality — at least as much as is explained by 
our trade and technology measures.”  
 
4.5.3 Sensitivity Tests 
Results of sensitivity tests are summarised in Table 4.4. For simplicity, we only 
concentrate on the institutional effects on skill premiums in the private sector. 
Column (a) use weekly earnings as the dependent variable; Column (b) still uses 
hourly wage as the dependent variable and the six-skill-level framework, but only run 
the regression for the sub-group sample of low skilled workers (BOLEV and OLEV);  
Column (c) only takes the results from years after 1979. Since both the degree 
premium and trade union density are non-stationary after 1979, we only apply the 
fixed effect ECM model equation (4.4) to avoid the co-integration problem. 
 
In column (a), the skill premium equation (4.4) also works on weekly earnings. 
Trade union density of unskilled workers (-0.57) has bigger effect on the skill 
premium than that of skilled workers (0.19). Hence, the similar decline in trade union 
for skilled and unskilled worker should increase the skill premium. Moreover, 
unemployment benefits of unskilled workers can decrease skill premium (-0.45), 
while that of skilled workers is insignificant. Thus, our conclusions from hourly 
earnings estimation still remain for weekly earnings.41  
 
                                                 
41 This result also suggests that weekly working hours are not sensitive to these explanatory variables. 
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In column (b), a one point increase of trade union density in the low skilled 
group (BOLEV and OLEV, tudjt) can increase the skill premium by 0.23 percent in 
long run and by 0.27 percent in short run, while a one point increase of trade union 
density in the unskilled group (tudnt) will decrease the skill premium by 0.31 percent. 
Hence, the overall effect of union decline also pushes up skill premiums of low 
skilled workers. 
 
As far as special periods are concerned, column (c) show that the effect of 
trade union is much more prominent in the years after 1979, and only changes in trade 
union density of unskilled workers are important. A one point increase of trade union 
density in the unskilled group (tudnt) will decrease the skill premium by 1.58 percent. 
Unemployment benefits of unskilled workers can decrease skill premium (-0.4), while 
that of skilled workers is insignificant. Thus, our conclusion from the entire period 
still holds for the special period of 1980-2002. 
 
4.6 Conclusions  
This chapter analyzes the links between institutions and the skill premiums in the UK, 
controlling for other explanatory variables such as labour market conditions, 
industrial structure shifts and skill-biased technology. We find the institutional factors 
such as trade union, the tax and benefit system are very important for skill premiums 
hence earnings inequality.  
 
For the skill premium in the private sector, institutions are more important for 
the unskilled baseline group than the skilled groups. The trade union decline after 
1979 is associated with different effect on wages of skilled and unskilled workers and 
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pushes the skill premium up. By using the fixed effect ECM model, we find that the 
trade union decline in unskilled workers can explain about half of the rise in degree 
premium over the period 1979-1998. The overall effect of trade union in all workers 
can explain about one-third of degree premium increase in the same period. Trade 
union effect is also significant for skill premiums of low skilled workers and higher in 
years after 1979 than in the 1970s. Although the mark-up effects of tax wedge are not 
significant in this fixed effect ECM model, unemployment benefits of unskilled 
workers in the private sector reduce skill premiums by about 9.31 percent over the 
period 1979-1998.  
 
For the public sector, we also find the significant effect of the trade union of 
unskilled workers on skill premiums. However, skill premiums in the public sector 
appear to be more static than in the private sector. A compensation model (Acemoglu 
et al 2001) or a bureaucratic and administered price model (Kaufman 2007) might be 
better for explaining wage management in the public sector. 
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Figure 4.1: Effects of trade union bargaining on wages by skill 
Figure 4.1a: Trade union effect on wages of unskilled workers  
 
Figure 4.1b: Trade union effect on wages of skilled workers 
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Figure 4.2: Tax wedge effect on wages by skill   
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Figure 4.3: Effects of unemployment benefit and unemployment on wages 
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Figure 4.4: Relative wages of the baseline group and skill premiums by sector, 
estimates from equation (4.2)  
A. Wages of males in the NOQUAL group by sector, 1972-2002
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Private Public
 
 
 
B. Skill premiums of males in the private sector, 1972-2002
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C. Skill premiums of males in the public sector, 1972-2002
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Note: All results are calculated from equation (4.2) by private/public sector using the GHS 1972-2002. 
There are 114, 491 workers in the private sector and 23,612 workers in the public sector. Wages are 
deflated based on 1995 pounds. Wage samples include only male full-time workers (weekly working 
hours >35) aged 16-66 years who were not self-employed. In order to smooth out the trend, the 3-year 
moving averages are presented. 
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Figure 4.5: Trade union density in the UK, males 1972-2002 
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Note: All figures are calculated from the GHS 1983, the FES 1982-2002, the FWLS 1994/1995 and the 
BHPS 1991-2002.  
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Figure 4.6: Trade union density in the UK by education level and sector, males 
1972-2002 
A. Trade union density by education level in the private secctor, 
males 1972-2002
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B. Trade union density by education level in the public sector, 
males 1972-2002
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Note: All figures are calculated from the combined dataset of the FWLS 1994/1995 and the BHPS 
1991-2002.  
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Figure 4.7: The tax and benefit system in the UK by education level, males 1972-
2002  
A. Tax wedge by education level, males 1972-2002
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B. Benefit indices by education level, males 1972-2002
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Note: All figures are calculated from the GHS 1972-2002 and the FES 1972-2002.  
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Figure 4.8: Unemployment rates, manufacturing ratio and computer usage in the 
UK by education level, males 1972-2002 
 
A. Unemployment rates by education level, males 1972-2002
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B. The manufacturing proportion of total emplyment by 
education level, males 1972-2002
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C. Computer usage density by education level, males 1972-2002
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Note: All figures are calculated from the GHS 1972-2002.  
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Table 4.1: Institutions and the skill premium, male 1972-2002, estimation from 
equation (4.3) 
 
Dependent variable: the skill 
premium (sjt, j = b, o, a, h and d) Private  Public 
Trade union density (tudjt) 0.15* -0.03 
  (0.09) (0.06) 
Trade union density (tudnt) -0.21 -0.09 
  (0.17) (0.15) 
Tax wedge (taxjt) 1.03 -0.15 
  (0.82) (1.13) 
Tax wedge (taxnt) -1.70** -0.80 
  (0.84) (1.05) 
Benefit index (reprjt) -0.13 -0.16 
  (0.15) (0.19) 
Benefit index (reprnt) -0.19 0.39 
  (0.24) (0.25) 
Unemployment rate (ujt) -0.25 0.50 
  (0.28) (0.37) 
Unemployment rate (unt) -0.01 0.69** 
  (0.21) (0.31) 
Manufacturing proportion (indjt) -0.23* -0.08 
  (0.14) (0.17) 
Manufacturing proportion (indnt) -0.23 1.45** 
  (0.49) (0.32) 
Computer usage (compjt) 0.29*** -0.09 
  (0.11) (0.16) 
Computer usage (compnt) -0.57*** 0.50 
  (0.19) (0.30) 
Minimum wages (MW) 1.08 - 
  (3.24) - 
Observations 140 140 
Groups 5 5 
R2 (within) 0.50 0.66 
Group dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Year trend Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are under the coefficients. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels for two-tail tests. We use Stata’s fixed effect programme (xtreg, fe, see STATA 
2003b) to estimate equation (4.3). 
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Table 4.2: Institutions and the skill premium, male 1972-2002, estimation from 
equation (4.4) 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of the skill 
premium (dsjt, j = b, o, a, h and d) Private  Public 
Trade union density (tudjt) 0.18** 0.03 
  (0.10) (0.07) 
Trade union density (dtudjt) 0.12 -0.12 
  (0.10) (0.07) 
Trade union density (tudnt) -0.59*** -0.40** 
  (0.26) (0.20) 
Trade union density (dtudnt) -0.24 0.64*** 
  (0.23) (0.13) 
sjt-1 -0.71*** -1.12*** 
  (0.09) (0.10) 
Tax wedge (taxjt) 0.46 -0.01 
  (0.80) (1.11) 
Tax wedge (taxnt) -0.72 -0.78 
  (0.95) (1.04) 
Benefit index (reprjt) -0.05 -0.20 
  (0.15) (0.19) 
Benefit index (reprnt) -0.39* 0.63** 
  (0.26) (0.29) 
Unemployment rate (ujt) -0.47* 0.59 
  (0.28) (0.37) 
Unemployment rate (unt) 0.07 0.47* 
  (0.31) (0.30) 
Manufacturing proportion (indjt) -0.24* -0.15 
  (0.14) (0.17) 
Manufacturing proportion (indnt) 0.15 0.38 
  (0.41) (0.35) 
Computer usage (compjt) 0.26*** -0.06 
  (0.11) (0.16) 
Computer usage (compnt) -0.44*** 0.47 
  (0.17) (0.30) 
Minimum wages (MW) -  - 
   -  - 
Observations 140 140 
Groups 5 5 
R2 (within) 0.61 0.82 
Group dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Year trend Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are under the coefficients. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels for two-tail tests. We use Stata’s fixed effect programme (xtreg, fe, see STATA 
2003b) to estimate equation (4.4). 
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Table 4.3: Contribution of explanatory factors to the degree premium,  
the private sector 
 
 1972-1979 1979-1998 1998-2002 
a. Changes of each variable, percentage 
Degree premium (sdt) -17.67 27.41 -17.56 
Trade union density (tuddt) 4.55 -30.75 5.78 
Trade union density (tudnt) 8.41 -25.29 -1.29 
Tax wedge (taxdt) 3.83 -0.36 -0.55 
Tax wedge (taxnt) 3.40 -1.40 -1.32 
Benefit index (reprdt) -2.60 5.66 -3.97 
Benefit index (reprnt) -3.40 6.54 -2.13 
Unemployment rate (udt) -0.72 2.16 -0.42 
Unemployment rate (unt) 1.05 5.59 -4.29 
Manufacturing proportion (inddt) 7.72 -3.74 -4.18 
Manufacturing proportion (indnt) 0.38 -6.70 -4.42 
Computer usage (compdt) 11.83 61.21 16.57 
Computer usage (compnt) 3.96 24.31 22.49 
        
b. Effects of changes in each explanatory variable, percentage 
Trade union density (tuddt) 0.82** -5.53** 1.04** 
Trade union density (tudnt) -4.96*** 14.92*** 0.76*** 
Tax wedge (taxdt) - - - 
Tax wedge (taxnt) - - - 
Benefit index (reprdt) - - - 
Benefit index (reprnt) 1.32* -2.55* 0.83* 
Unemployment rate (udt) 0.34* -1.02* 0.20* 
Unemployment rate (unt) - - - 
Manufacturing proportion (inddt) -1.85* 0.90* 1.00* 
Manufacturing proportion (indnt) - - - 
Computer usage (compdt) 3.08*** 15.91*** 4.31*** 
Computer usage (compnt) -1.74*** -10.69*** -9.90*** 
c. Overall contribution of each factor, percentage  
Trade union density  23.45 34.24 -10.26 
Tax wedge  - - - 
Benefit index  -7.50 -9.31 -4.72 
Unemployment rate  -1.92 -3.71 -1.13 
Manufacturing proportion  10.49 3.28 -5.71 
Computer usage -7.55 19.04 31.82 
 
Notes: All figures in Table 4.3 are calculated using estimates in Table 4.2 and data in Table A4.1 (see 
Appendix 4.2). ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tail tests. 
Significance of each variable in the middle panel is from Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.4: Institutions and the skill premium (Sensitivity Tests), male 1972-2002, 
estimation from equation (4.4) 
 
Dependent variable: 
growth rate of the skill 
premium (dsjt, j = b, o, a, h 
and d) 
( a) 
Weekly 
earnings
( b) 
Semi- 
skilled 
(c) 
1980- 
2002 
 
Trade union density (tudjt) 0.19** 0.23* 0.14 
  (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) 
Trade union density (dtudjt) 0.11 0.27** 0.05 
  (0.10) (0.12) (0.14) 
Trade union density (tudnt) -0.57** -0.31** -1.58*** 
  (0.27) (0.16) (0.69) 
Trade union density (dtudnt) -0.22 0.01 -0.62 
  (0.24) (0.13) (0.43) 
sjt-1 -0.64*** -0.68*** -0.82*** 
  (0.09) (0.16) (0.11) 
Tax wedge (taxjt) 0.54 -0.45 -0.05 
  (0.83) (0.42) (1.04) 
Tax wedge (taxnt) -0.83 0.58 -0.51 
  (0.98) (0.39) (0.57) 
Benefit index (reprjt) 0.00 0.03 -0.03 
  (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) 
Benefit index (reprnt) -0.45* 0.05 -0.40** 
  (0.27) (0.18) (0.21) 
Minimum wages (MW) - - 1.66 
  - - (2.32) 
Observations 140 56 105 
Groups 5 2 5 
R2 (within) 0.58 0.60 0.58 
Group dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes No Yes 
Year trend Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: as for Table 4.2. 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
The union bargaining model in Koeniger et al (2004) 
 
(1) Perfect competition 
This appendix reviews the union bargaining model in Koeniger et al (2004) and 
derives the empirical specification for the Chapter 4. In this model, institutions affect 
the wage differential by altering labour demand and the surplus of producers and 
workers.  Koeniger et al (2004) firstly consider the perfect competitive situation in a 
2×2 model: there are two sectors in the economy that produce two goods (k=1, 2). 
Workers can be skilled or unskilled (j=h, l). The economy is endowed with H skilled 
and L unskilled workers who inelastically supply labor. Both sectors employ skilled 
and unskilled labor but with different technology, which has different TFP and skill 
requirement. The production function in both sectors is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas 
with constant returns to scale:42 
kk
kkkk lhaY
αα −= 1 , k=1, 2                                          (A1) 
where ak is the total factor productivity (TFP) in sector k; and αk is the skill intensity 
in sector k, 0<αk<1 and α1> α2.   
 
In a perfect competitive market, there is no entry barrier and risk to both 
producers and workers. Then, the inelastic labor supply will be fully employed by two 
sectors. And, employment of skilled and unskilled workers in the economy is denoted 
as h and l, which are equal to the endowment: h= h1+h2=H and l= l1+l2=L. The price 
of output in sector k is Pk, which is given for a small open economy. The wage of 
skilled/unskilled workers is equal to the value of marginal product of labor inputs 
when producers maximize profit, i.e. Max PkYk-(whhk+ wllk). Since there is no entry 
barrier for workers, the skilled/unskilled workers can have the same wage in each 
sector: 
2
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αα −=−=                                    (A3)  
                                                 
42 The year subscript t is dropped here to simplify equation form. 
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The system of four equations in (A2) and (A3) determines wages and skill 
ratios in both sectors. Using φk=hk/lk to denote the skill ratio in sector k, the relative 
wage between skilled and unskilled workers within the same sector is: 
1
2
2
21
1
1
1
11
−−
−=−= ϕα
αϕα
α
l
h
w
w                                       (A4)  
 
That is, if the relative demand hence the skill intensity (α1 and α2) does not 
change, the increase in relative supply of skilled workers will decreases the relative 
wage of skilled workers. This result does not depend on the different TFP of each 
sector (a1 and a2) and prices of products (P1 and P2). Rearranging equation 
(A4):
2
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1 1
1 ϕα
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αϕ −
−= , it shows that the skill ratio in sector 1 is higher than that in 
sector 2 (φ1> φ2), since it applies more skill-biased technology than sector 2 (α1> α2). 
Hence sector 1 is a skill intensive sector like the computer software industry while 
sector 2 is a labor intensive sector like textile industry. By using equation (A1), the 
relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers across sectors implies that  
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Just as the relative wage within the same sector, the negative co-variation 
between relative wage and relative supply still hold, given TFP of each sector (a1 and 
a2) and prices of products (P1 and P2). However, the cross-sector relative wage 
depends on the relative supply in two sectors (φ1 and φ2). Thus, if one more skilled 
worker entered a sector, the relative wage of skilled worker within and cross sector 
would decrease.43 
 
                                                 
43 This process can be described in a simple way: as one more skilled worker joins the sector 1, the 
marginal product of skilled worker in sector 1 hence price of skill in the whole economy would 
decrease. All producers in the economy can save wage cost and have higher profit. More potential 
producers will join the economy and push the wage of unskilled workers up. Thus, the simple supply-
demand framework in Chapter 3 is consistent with current 2×2 model in Koeniger et al (2004). 
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Moreover, the higher are the relative TFP (
2
1
a
a ) and relative prices of products 
(
2
1
P
P ) between the skill-intensive sector 1 and labor-intensive sector 2, the higher is 
relative wage of skilled workers. Within and between-sector relative wages must be 
the same under perfect competition, hence equation (A4) and the first part of equation 
(A5) can be combined as: 
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Using equation (A6) and the second part of equation (A4), the relative demand for 
skill and hence the skill ratio in the labor intensive sector 2 is:44       
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Equation (A7) shows that the higher relative TFP (
1
2
a
a ) and relative prices of products 
(
1
2
P
P ) increase the relative demand for skill in the sector 2. Plugging equation (A7) 
back into equation (A6), the equilibrium relative wage under perfect competition is:  
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 Thus, the relative wage of skilled workers at equilibrium depends on three 
main factors: (1) relative TFP (
2
1
a
a ); (2) relative price (
2
1
P
P ); (3) skill-biased 
technology within two sectors ( 1α  and 2α ). Since sector 1 uses a more skill-biased 
technology, 1α > 2α , the relative skilled wage increases as the relative price of the 
skill-intensive good and relative TFP of skill-intensive sector increase. However, the 
relationship between the relative skill wage and the skill-biased technology within 
sectors ( 1α  and 2α ) is dependent on more assumptions hence inconclusive.  
                                                 
44 Because of the symmetric structure of equations, the results from the first part of equation (A5), i.e. 
the relative wage of skilled workers in sector 1 to unskilled worker in sector 2 is the same as that by 
using the second part of equation (A5) i.e. the relative wage of skilled workers in sector 2 to unskilled 
worker in sector 1. Thus, we only need to discuss the first part of equation (A5).    
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(2) Institutional Environment  
Koeniger et al (2004) loosen the perfect competition assumption firstly by assuming a 
sunk cost (C>0) of setting up a production sector. It builds a natural barrier for 
potential producer to enter any sector. The producers should make sure that the capital 
value of production is strictly positive to compensate for this sunk cost before they 
enter the production sector.  
 
The second loosened assumption is the zero business risk. The production unit 
may be closed down for exogenous reasons with Poisson probability ρ. Hence, the full 
employment assumption is correspondingly given up. As ρ production units are closed 
down, the same probability (ρ) of employed workers are collectively dismissed by 
producers. This dismissal will incur a once-for-all cost to producers, (Δj=εjwj, j=h, l) 
which is a fixed proportional to wage cost for each skilled or unskilled worker. If the 
production units are closed down, producers would lose not only the all production 
capital but also this dismissal cost. For the whole production sector k, the collective 
dismissal costs are εhwhhk+εlwllk. Then, the outside option for the whole production in 
sector k is worsened to the collective dismissal costs. Following the rational 
expectation assumption, the business risk in economy with the possible dismissal cost 
is expected by rational producers and workers. Thus, this dismissal cost does not 
change labour demand, but only worsen the outside option of producers and become a 
mark-up of wages. 
 
The government gives benefit to unemployed workers as a proportion of wage 
they earned, that is γjwj, j=h, l, where γj is the replacement ratio. It is assumed that the 
benefit can cover all unemployed worker. Hence, the government budget for 
unemployment benefit is: γhwh(H-h) + γlwl(L-l). Government taxes labor income of 
skilled and unskilled workers using mark-up rates, τh and τl to finance the 
unemployment benefits. The balance of fiscal budget of government implies: 
τhwhh+ τlwll= γhwh(H-h) + γlwl(L-l)                       (A9)   
  
Since rational producers can also expect the tax rate on wage, income tax will 
be absorbed by demand through the mark-up on the wage. Koeniger et al (2004) 
denote the capital value of production in sector k as Vk and market interest rate as r. 
Following free entry for production, producers can only get the average return on 
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capital. The expected value of production in each sector at the end of this period is 
only the time value, which is the original value multiply one plus the market interest 
rate, i.e. (1+r)Vk.  
 
On the other hand, capital value at the end of period comprises three parts: (1) 
income from production, i.e. kkYP ; (2) production cost including wage and income 
tax: (1+τh)whhk+(1+τl)wllk; (3)expected residual capital value of production: -
ρ(εhwhhk+εlwllk)+(1-ρ)Vk. Thus, the time value of production is equal to the 
production profit and expected residual value, that is:(1+r)Vk=PkYk-[(1+τh)whhk+ 
(1+τl) wllk] +[-ρ(εhwhhk+ εlwllk)+(1- ρ)Vk].  Rearrange it into the form of: 
(r+ρ)Vk= PkYk - [(1+τh+ ρεh) whhk+ (1+τl+ ρεl) wllk]         (A10)  
 
Hence, the profit of the production must cover the market return and business 
risk of its capital value. Moreover, free entry for producers implies that the producers 
have been setting up production units until the capital value of production is just equal 
to the sunk cost, i.e. Vk= C. Since the capital value is beyond the outside option 
kV =0, sunk costs generate quasi-rents after firms have entered the market. Once firms 
have sunk their investment and hired the workers, collective bargaining decreased the 
producer’s outside option from kV =0 to kV =-(εhwhhk+εlwllk). Thus, the rent of 
production becomes even bigger, C+(εhwhhk+εlwllk), which can be appropriated by 
producers or workers. Workers collectively bargain with producers to share these 
rents. Thus, collective dismissal costs worsen the outside option for producers and 
create a hold-up problem that allows workers to collectively bid up their wage.  
 
Koeniger et al (2004) only consider the perfect competition with C=0 under 
the described institutional environment. Producers maximize the capital value of 
production in equation (A10) as done in the last part. Since the dismissal cost and 
income tax only mark up wage, the equilibrium relative wage in equation (A8) can be 
rewritten as:    
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The gross wages before any tax and deduction are defined as kkk ww )1( τ+≡ . 45  
Multiplying equation (A11) by 
l
h
τ
τ
+
+
1
1  and taking logs, noting the ln(1+x)≈x for small 
x, the log form wage differentials are:  
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Thus, the skill premium increases when the relative price (
2
1
P
P ) of skill 
intensive goods or TFP (
2
1
a
a ) of sector 1 increases. The higher is the dismissal cost of 
skilled workers, the smaller is skill premium. However, log wage differentials of 
skilled workers increase as the dismissal cost of unskilled workers increases. It 
implies that the expected firing cost is passed to workers in a competitive economy 
even workers attempt to mark up the wages. Thus, the expected dismissal costs ( kρε ) 
of skilled or unskilled workers decrease their gross wages if there is no collective 
bargaining from workers in the competitive market. The overall effect of dismissal 
cost on the skill premium depends on whether the dismissal cost is skill-biased, that is, 
the sign of )( hl εε − .  
 
Moreover, gross wages hence the wage differentials do not depend on mark up 
taxes because the Cobb-Douglas production function is unit elastic: the fall in labor 
demand and thus net wages wk exactly offsets the direct positive effect of income tax 
kτ  on gross wage kw . Under perfect competition, employed workers can be replaced 
so that they cannot bid up their wages ex post. Instead, this is no longer the case if 
unions bargain for workers. 
 
(3) Workers’ behaviour and trade union 
Workers are assumed risk-neutral and have an infinite horizon. As described in the 
last part, if workers are employed, they can earn wage wj (j=h, l). Employed workers 
                                                 
45 It is the gross earnings before any deduction, as we observe empirically in the GHS. Empirically, the 
gross wages of skilled or unskilled workers do not include the expected firing cost. 
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are collectively dismissed by producers with business risk ρ, then unemployed 
workers receive a once-for-all dismissal fee εjwj and unemployment benefit γjwj 
thereafter. If the once-for-all dismissal fee is small enough, it will not enter the 
expectation of workers since they have infinite horizon. Obviously, as the 
replacement ratio γj is less than one in the usual situation, the capital value of 
employment, Wj is more than that of unemployment, Uj. Since workers supply labor 
inelastically with exogenous business risk, they cannot decrease the wage hence 
employment capital value by increasing labor supply. Thus, there is employment rent 
existing, which provides rent-seeking space for trade union. 
 
The capital value of employment at the end of period t comprises two parts: 
(1) income from employment, i.e. wj; (2) the expected residual capital value of 
employment: ρUj+(1-ρ)Wj as workers have probability of ρ to be dismissed by 
producers. Thus, the time value of employment is equal to wage and the expected 
residual value of employment, that is: (1+r)Wj=wj+ρUj+(l-ρ)Wj. It can be rearranged 
into the form: 
rWj= wj - ρ(Wj -Uj)                                         (A13) 
 
Thus, the financial return of employment is wage depreciated by business risk. 
Following the same line, the capital value of unemployment at the end of period t also 
comprises two parts: (1) income from unemployment, that is, the unemployment 
benefit γjwj; (2) the expected residual capital value of unemployment: θjWj+(1-θj)Uj, 
where θj is the probability of reemployment. As ρ producers are closed down in 
period t, there are ρ fresh producers taking their places in the market, which will 
employ hρ skilled workers and lρ unskilled workers from the unemployed workers. 
Then, unemployed workers have chances to be reemployed by producers:
hH
h
h −≡
ρθ  
and
lL
l
l −≡
ρθ . Thus, the time value of unemployment is equal to the unemployment 
benefit and the expected residual value of employment, that is: (1+r)Uj = γjwj + θjWj + 
(1-θj)Uj. We can rearrange it into the form of: 
 rUj= γjwj+ θj (Wj -Uj)                                     (A14) 
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Thus, the financial return of unemployment is the unemployment benefit 
appreciated by reemployment chances. Koeniger et al (2004) have implicitly assumed 
that Uh≥Wl so that it is not optimal for skilled workers to perform unskilled tasks. 
Consequently, the skilled workers would rather keep unemployed than be employed 
as unskilled workers.  
 
Moreover, since the replacement ratio γj<1 so that the capital value of 
employment is bigger than that of unemployment, workers find it optimal to supply 
labor inelastically. Subtracting equation (A13) from equation (A14), we can find the 
employment rent is: 
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where uj ( H
hHuh
−≡  and 
L
lLul
−≡ ) is the unemployment rate of j=h, l, so that the  
jθρ + = 1−juρ . Thus, an increase in wage ( jw ) or unemployment rate ( ju ) brings an 
increase in the employment rent, while higher market interest rate (r), replacement 
ratio ( jγ ) or business risk ( ρ ) will decrease the employment rent.  
 
Producers and a workers’ union bargain over how to split the production 
surplus in the two sectors. It is assumed the trade unions can bargain at the country 
level which covers the both sectors. However, nothing prevents interpreting k as the 
suitable unit of disaggregation such as firm, profession, sector or industry. Koeniger 
et al (2004) adopt the right-to-manage framework, in which unions and employer 
associations bargain over the wage. Producers then unilaterally choose employment 
so that labor is on the labor demand curve. They argue that although the right-to-
manage setup is not the best solution in economy since producers and unions could 
bargain efficiently over both wages and employment, right-to-manage for producers is 
considered more realistic by most economists.  
 
In this right-to-mange model, the Nash bargaining problem is  
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where σ is the relative bargaining power of the union, superscript D denotes the 
demand curve and )( kk VV − is the production surpluses. And, the trade unions’ 
objective function is defined as  
)()( llhhk UWUW −+−≡Ψ ψ                                (A17) 
 
The union only cares about employed workers and ψ denotes the relative 
weight of skilled employed workers in unions’ objective function. The larger is the 
weight of skilled workers (ψ), the more employment rent of skilled workers would 
enter unions’ objective function. As we will see later, larger ψ increase the relative 
union objective elasticity for skilled workers and then decrease the relative skilled 
wage.46 Moreover, since the collective dismissal cost in sector k has decreased the 
producer’s outside option from kV = 0 to kV = - (εhwhhk + εlwllk). From equation 
(A10), the total production surpluses are:  
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first-order condition of equation (A16) for skilled wages implies that the total 
earnings of the skilled workers are: 
∑
∑
=
=
+−+
−+
= 2
1
,
2
1
)1)(1(
)()(
k
kh
k
hh
k
kkh
h
e
h
hr
VVre
hw
ετ
ρσ
                                  (A18) 
where ))(( Ψ∂Ψ∂≡ hhh wwe  and ))((, khhkkh hwwhe ∂∂≡  denote the elasticity of the 
union objective and labor demand with respect to skilled wage, wh. Analogous 
derivation for unskilled wage allows writing the relative total earnings of the skilled 
workers as  
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46 Note that, being different from Acemoglu et al. (2001), trade unions in Koeniger et al (2004) do not 
cross-subsidize between workers. Both skilled and unskilled workers earn their marginal product. 
However, interactions between both factors arise, as long as the production technology implies some 
complementarities between factors. The larger ψ encourages producers to substitute unskilled workers 
by skilled workers. As described later, it will increase the total earnings of skilled workers along the 
demand curve, with decreasing wage and increasing employment. Thus, if trade union paid more 
attention on employment rent of skilled workers, the relative wage for skilled worker would decrease.  
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Therefore, if trade unions pay more attention on the employment rent of 
skilled workers, that is, higher ψ, the elasticity of the union objective for skilled 
workers would increase and hence the earnings share of skilled workers, ceteris 
paribus. The Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the second term on the 
right hand side of equation (A19), that is, 
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 equals 1.47 By using equation 
(A1)-(A3) and (A10), with producers maximizing the capital value of production, the 
labour demand for skilled and unskilled workers is:  
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Thus, the relative labor demand φ=h/l is the ratio of (A20) to (A21):   
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It is not surprising that relative demand negatively depends on the relative 
wage. Given stable institutional environment, the Cobb-Douglas technology implies 
that the total labor share is constant unless prices or TFP change. Using equation 
(A15) and (A17), the relative union objective elasticity with respect to wage is: 
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Replacing the h/l and eh/el by using equation (A22) and (A23) and multiplying two 
sides of equation (A19) by
l
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1 , the relative gross wage is: 
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47 This apply L’HÔpital’s rule for the CES function and use the limit to the Cobb-Douglas case. 
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Taking logs and using again that ln(1+x)≈x for small x, the proxy of wage 
inequality, i.e. the relative gross wages of skilled workers under the supply-demand-
institution framework for our empirical test:  
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The empirical specification used in Chapter 4 is based on the equation (A25):48  
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48 The EPL index is not included in the empirical specification since the EPL index appears to be stable 
in the UK for the last thirty years. See a summary of EPL in Daniel and Siebert (2005, Figure 4 and 5).  
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APPENDIX 4.2 
The dataset for regressions in Chapter 4 
Table A4.1: Dataset used for equation (4.3) and (4.4), private sector 
 
a. Baseline group (NOQUAL, n, %) 
Skill level Year nt tudnt taxnt reprnt unt indnt compnt MW 
NOQUAL 1972 0.00 42.96 13.44 36.36 5.55 40.24 0.00 0.00 
NOQUAL 1973 7.01 43.01 13.90 35.45 4.20 42.79 0.00 0.00 
NOQUAL 1974 14.02 42.10 15.78 32.29 3.37 43.00 0.00 0.00 
NOQUAL 1975 21.30 42.24 18.41 31.04 5.24 44.27 0.00 0.00 
NOQUAL 1976 15.41 58.70 19.25 31.67 7.50 40.90 0.99 0.00 
NOQUAL 1977 11.91 50.86 18.27 34.21 6.30 42.54 1.98 0.00 
NOQUAL 1978 14.45 51.84 25.34 30.81 6.03 43.33 2.97 0.00 
NOQUAL 1979 22.92 51.37 16.84 32.97 6.60 40.61 3.96 0.00 
NOQUAL 1980 27.85 50.72 18.37 31.35 8.81 40.70 4.95 0.00 
NOQUAL 1981 21.57 49.92 18.50 35.73 14.70 42.39 5.94 0.00 
NOQUAL 1982 16.79 48.74 18.29 34.73 15.95 39.91 6.93 0.00 
NOQUAL 1983 17.38 46.37 18.53 30.01 18.10 41.86 7.92 0.00 
NOQUAL 1984 18.44 44.17 18.15 31.63 18.52 37.93 8.91 0.00 
NOQUAL 1985 21.33 43.01 17.40 31.06 19.34 33.81 14.13 0.00 
NOQUAL 1986 22.74 41.29 19.10 27.81 18.40 33.32 19.15 0.00 
NOQUAL 1987 20.87 39.72 15.89 31.44 15.47 35.20 23.86 0.00 
NOQUAL 1988 28.15 39.33 16.32 24.84 13.77 31.95 21.94 0.00 
NOQUAL 1989 30.42 39.36 15.83 30.38 13.61 31.88 23.71 0.00 
NOQUAL 1990 30.46 37.61 15.43 30.08 12.25 31.65 26.13 0.00 
NOQUAL 1991 26.33 38.50 17.35 29.95 17.26 31.62 24.09 0.00 
NOQUAL 1992 17.05 36.60 13.99 30.63 18.78 31.33 25.48 0.00 
NOQUAL 1993 17.80 34.27 14.37 32.74 20.94 30.63 24.98 0.00 
NOQUAL 1994 20.73 32.75 13.48 32.12 16.83 29.62 24.06 0.00 
NOQUAL 1995 16.83 32.22 16.43 31.65 15.39 28.58 22.79 0.00 
NOQUAL 1996 19.59 33.70 16.20 31.05 16.06 28.62 23.12 0.00 
NOQUAL 1998 14.94 26.08 15.44 39.51 12.19 33.91 28.27 1.28 
NOQUAL 2000 22.46 23.07 15.11 39.18 8.33 28.96 41.94 1.31 
NOQUAL 2001 23.95 27.12 11.76 42.29 6.58 30.49 49.59 1.41 
NOQUAL 2002 34.80 24.79 14.13 37.38 7.90 29.49 50.76 1.44 
b. Educated groups (BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, HIGHER and DEGREE, j=b, o, a, h and d, %) 
Skill level Year sjt tudjt taxjt reprjt ujt indjt compjt MW 
BOLEV 1972 12.83 57.67 14.68 31.48 3.55 43.88 0.00 0.00 
BOLEV 1973 10.16 49.26 15.13 32.01 2.27 44.11 0.00 0.00 
BOLEV 1974 6.31 53.04 17.11 30.49 1.60 44.95 0.00 0.00 
BOLEV 1975 9.53 58.21 19.94 29.22 2.99 43.71 0.00 0.00 
BOLEV 1976 10.42 57.25 20.79 29.23 4.03 44.71 1.44 0.00 
BOLEV 1977 7.53 69.83 19.83 31.24 3.66 42.49 2.88 0.00 
BOLEV 1978 11.38 64.89 27.14 28.26 3.14 44.81 4.32 0.00 
BOLEV 1979 9.04 65.05 18.22 30.22 4.10 45.59 5.76 0.00 
BOLEV 1980 7.64 64.94 18.23 35.33 6.23 42.56 7.20 0.00 
BOLEV 1981 8.08 65.00 18.81 31.37 9.13 38.89 8.64 0.00 
BOLEV 1982 11.38 64.33 18.44 31.98 11.47 42.89 10.08 0.00 
BOLEV 1983 7.63 64.14 18.65 30.43 14.20 40.78 11.52 0.00 
BOLEV 1984 3.96 60.89 18.02 34.35 12.37 31.78 12.96 0.00 
BOLEV 1985 7.49 58.58 18.01 32.14 13.42 36.99 18.07 0.00 
BOLEV 1986 10.23 53.16 16.97 22.59 11.15 32.50 24.03 0.00 
BOLEV 1987 8.17 55.01 16.39 31.40 10.37 32.01 25.68 0.00 
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BOLEV 1988 9.16 47.44 16.17 24.28 7.65 31.35 24.09 0.00 
BOLEV 1989 9.46 46.88 15.85 27.42 5.25 31.32 27.10 0.00 
BOLEV 1990 11.76 46.81 15.53 28.20 8.65 33.17 28.00 0.00 
BOLEV 1991 11.58 46.73 15.54 28.72 10.92 28.76 28.33 0.00 
BOLEV 1992 9.19 48.51 15.14 30.36 15.77 30.68 32.70 0.00 
BOLEV 1993 9.19 43.93 14.87 28.80 15.19 29.35 33.44 0.00 
BOLEV 1994 8.99 40.71 15.29 28.33 11.84 28.98 33.03 0.00 
BOLEV 1995 13.48 45.43 15.91 27.36 9.99 28.05 31.95 0.00 
BOLEV 1996 10.60 35.42 14.83 26.79 9.56 29.11 34.48 0.00 
BOLEV 1998 7.86 27.78 14.01 38.25 6.75 32.03 33.78 1.28 
BOLEV 2000 13.83 32.03 14.58 38.72 6.53 29.05 50.69 1.31 
BOLEV 2001 2.91 28.81 13.85 33.25 4.57 27.94 56.68 1.41 
BOLEV 2002 1.09 28.11 14.02 36.62 5.14 29.01 65.77 1.44 
OLEV 1972 23.63 54.46 14.16 25.41 2.14 31.65 0.00 0.00 
OLEV 1973 22.38 55.91 14.65 27.93 1.25 35.19 0.00 0.00 
OLEV 1974 16.79 54.05 16.54 24.08 1.25 31.82 0.00 0.00 
OLEV 1975 17.25 52.38 19.34 24.90 2.73 33.41 0.00 0.00 
OLEV 1976 20.59 56.87 20.21 24.18 2.40 35.04 1.73 0.00 
OLEV 1977 17.79 58.59 19.19 27.14 3.19 30.20 3.47 0.00 
OLEV 1978 16.06 58.72 26.18 28.64 3.80 35.95 5.20 0.00 
OLEV 1979 17.61 58.06 17.77 23.69 2.00 33.44 6.93 0.00 
OLEV 1980 17.20 56.78 17.66 28.74 5.07 32.89 8.67 0.00 
OLEV 1981 15.39 54.13 18.31 33.79 7.92 33.61 10.40 0.00 
OLEV 1982 17.06 52.12 18.34 28.94 9.07 33.37 12.13 0.00 
OLEV 1983 16.01 49.60 18.63 27.92 11.95 31.42 13.87 0.00 
OLEV 1984 11.46 46.85 18.65 26.45 8.49 29.64 15.60 0.00 
OLEV 1985 13.89 46.10 18.21 27.04 9.33 29.25 24.39 0.00 
OLEV 1986 16.70 46.80 18.06 20.58 9.30 26.23 32.02 0.00 
OLEV 1987 14.47 48.35 17.47 25.97 7.05 30.44 29.98 0.00 
OLEV 1988 16.83 47.26 16.08 23.69 6.10 28.83 31.89 0.00 
OLEV 1989 18.65 45.47 16.11 27.85 5.30 28.62 34.81 0.00 
OLEV 1990 18.67 44.91 16.03 26.13 6.69 27.01 35.08 0.00 
OLEV 1991 18.91 44.87 16.45 27.12 9.94 29.50 35.63 0.00 
OLEV 1992 18.05 44.21 15.90 28.18 12.55 27.89 38.61 0.00 
OLEV 1993 12.90 43.55 15.67 26.44 13.95 28.03 35.17 0.00 
OLEV 1994 12.27 39.43 16.35 24.67 11.06 23.92 36.19 0.00 
OLEV 1995 16.58 30.14 16.75 26.47 11.11 29.13 37.69 0.00 
OLEV 1996 13.33 26.22 15.37 24.54 9.45 26.10 38.86 0.00 
OLEV 1998 15.63 25.35 14.81 36.54 6.71 27.59 45.00 1.28 
OLEV 2000 16.09 24.99 15.19 32.90 4.81 25.96 60.97 1.31 
OLEV 2001 20.57 27.41 14.46 34.31 5.29 25.35 64.75 1.41 
OLEV 2002 14.78 24.63 14.35 35.07 4.53 23.40 71.31 1.44 
ALEV 1972 31.05 65.84 13.84 23.50 3.78 34.38 0.00 0.00 
ALEV 1973 31.70 54.82 14.50 24.94 1.12 39.17 0.00 0.00 
ALEV 1974 27.36 65.37 16.39 22.21 1.71 38.07 0.00 0.00 
ALEV 1975 26.95 68.11 19.26 23.61 1.53 36.30 0.00 0.00 
ALEV 1976 29.90 65.95 20.20 22.21 2.42 35.15 2.13 0.00 
ALEV 1977 27.66 62.61 19.07 24.57 1.64 36.65 4.26 0.00 
ALEV 1978 23.16 55.62 26.54 23.89 2.07 36.17 6.39 0.00 
ALEV 1979 23.28 60.17 17.65 22.18 3.15 37.25 8.51 0.00 
ALEV 1980 25.00 68.01 17.83 26.97 3.00 32.16 10.64 0.00 
ALEV 1981 30.52 67.75 18.36 23.30 5.53 37.85 12.77 0.00 
ALEV 1982 27.24 55.42 18.31 23.78 8.32 37.89 14.90 0.00 
ALEV 1983 26.65 55.82 18.78 21.22 8.33 32.62 17.03 0.00 
ALEV 1984 27.81 50.40 19.33 22.18 7.30 29.82 19.16 0.00 
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ALEV 1985 28.07 49.57 19.37 21.62 4.90 32.37 27.76 0.00 
ALEV 1986 24.53 45.50 18.71 19.64 7.00 30.25 29.33 0.00 
ALEV 1987 29.53 42.51 18.20 24.96 6.61 26.09 36.55 0.00 
ALEV 1988 29.38 41.52 16.87 18.29 5.21 31.47 33.55 0.00 
ALEV 1989 29.70 44.39 17.27 19.80 3.43 32.17 37.65 0.00 
ALEV 1990 30.53 35.35 17.56 19.62 4.64 28.92 38.54 0.00 
ALEV 1991 34.61 37.48 16.78 21.77 7.21 27.84 38.32 0.00 
ALEV 1992 29.83 36.92 16.56 23.95 9.10 26.67 43.03 0.00 
ALEV 1993 24.74 36.38 16.24 23.81 10.27 25.76 42.64 0.00 
ALEV 1994 29.78 34.89 17.22 20.15 10.70 25.99 46.73 0.00 
ALEV 1995 29.03 35.03 17.26 21.64 8.21 23.74 44.38 0.00 
ALEV 1996 27.97 27.76 15.29 22.62 7.23 27.62 44.99 0.00 
ALEV 1998 26.46 30.52 15.95 30.59 5.33 26.89 57.34 1.28 
ALEV 2000 23.59 30.89 15.72 33.31 4.26 25.25 67.46 1.31 
ALEV 2001 30.23 30.06 15.38 30.34 4.39 25.16 72.15 1.41 
ALEV 2002 22.94 26.94 15.04 32.19 3.71 23.89 81.95 1.44 
HIGHER 1972 51.40 41.62 15.06 19.56 0.49 28.38 0.00 0.00 
HIGHER 1973 50.35 36.05 15.59 18.33 0.15 25.35 0.00 0.00 
HIGHER 1974 43.83 45.76 17.60 17.82 0.39 29.87 0.00 0.00 
HIGHER 1975 44.07 48.64 20.59 19.25 1.58 28.48 0.00 0.00 
HIGHER 1976 37.54 51.52 21.26 19.55 1.06 33.85 2.53 0.00 
HIGHER 1977 38.33 55.85 20.29 21.32 1.47 30.00 5.06 0.00 
HIGHER 1978 34.49 52.06 27.13 21.91 1.24 30.62 7.58 0.00 
HIGHER 1979 35.53 54.53 18.78 21.59 0.67 30.88 10.11 0.00 
HIGHER 1980 35.93 51.22 18.61 16.70 1.03 35.54 12.64 0.00 
HIGHER 1981 36.80 51.50 18.85 22.73 2.95 33.33 15.17 0.00 
HIGHER 1982 41.10 54.16 18.83 21.37 4.08 35.94 17.70 0.00 
HIGHER 1983 43.03 52.02 19.94 17.99 3.40 40.09 20.22 0.00 
HIGHER 1984 39.76 50.76 20.65 13.58 2.88 36.55 22.75 0.00 
HIGHER 1985 47.65 44.17 20.56 15.17 2.87 36.10 27.14 0.00 
HIGHER 1986 40.62 48.07 19.89 16.11 3.15 35.17 34.37 0.00 
HIGHER 1987 40.00 43.52 19.48 20.56 3.77 39.59 38.54 0.00 
HIGHER 1988 44.28 44.61 18.00 17.26 3.29 33.96 38.55 0.00 
HIGHER 1989 45.08 42.27 18.35 19.81 1.61 33.74 37.32 0.00 
HIGHER 1990 46.55 39.39 18.95 15.59 2.04 33.52 39.81 0.00 
HIGHER 1991 45.63 39.51 19.21 17.75 3.31 34.82 43.03 0.00 
HIGHER 1992 37.61 39.43 18.55 20.08 5.49 31.00 43.50 0.00 
HIGHER 1993 35.16 35.00 18.61 17.03 5.93 31.41 43.52 0.00 
HIGHER 1994 39.81 31.25 19.69 15.58 6.04 32.88 48.12 0.00 
HIGHER 1995 40.09 30.47 19.25 17.37 4.82 34.69 49.22 0.00 
HIGHER 1996 47.61 28.14 17.27 16.93 5.19 32.01 50.95 0.00 
HIGHER 1998 38.48 25.90 17.18 22.68 1.59 34.70 63.86 1.28 
HIGHER 2000 43.82 26.47 17.35 29.48 3.82 32.89 70.54 1.31 
HIGHER 2001 37.40 27.27 17.02 25.11 3.18 30.03 74.70 1.41 
HIGHER 2002 41.20 27.31 15.91 33.23 2.59 27.18 84.76 1.44 
DEGREE 1972 73.59 40.74 14.78 17.73 1.93 16.80 0.00 0.00 
DEGREE 1973 73.46 38.66 15.58 16.46 0.76 20.49 0.00 0.00 
DEGREE 1974 64.41 37.47 17.38 16.56 1.45 22.61 0.00 0.00 
DEGREE 1975 60.97 35.59 20.44 15.07 0.48 23.37 0.00 0.00 
DEGREE 1976 65.70 42.27 21.19 13.62 2.44 23.22 2.96 0.00 
DEGREE 1977 61.25 44.55 20.28 15.43 1.45 20.37 5.92 0.00 
DEGREE 1978 59.22 44.81 29.09 18.69 1.11 23.63 8.88 0.00 
DEGREE 1979 55.92 45.30 18.62 15.12 1.21 24.52 11.83 0.00 
DEGREE 1980 59.10 45.68 18.69 7.13 2.01 20.84 14.79 0.00 
DEGREE 1981 59.81 43.32 20.10 9.48 3.67 24.82 17.75 0.00 
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DEGREE 1982 59.24 44.76 19.00 19.65 4.15 23.14 20.71 0.00 
DEGREE 1983 62.19 42.80 20.92 12.21 3.60 22.04 23.67 0.00 
DEGREE 1984 67.14 42.58 21.57 16.86 5.51 23.36 26.63 0.00 
DEGREE 1985 63.39 37.59 21.28 19.26 2.69 27.43 28.52 0.00 
DEGREE 1986 59.19 41.79 20.46 19.33 3.28 24.45 31.47 0.00 
DEGREE 1987 65.40 42.19 20.93 15.30 3.95 29.30 39.67 0.00 
DEGREE 1988 68.01 35.41 19.31 16.30 2.22 20.96 37.89 0.00 
DEGREE 1989 71.13 34.48 19.43 15.07 3.82 21.07 40.90 0.00 
DEGREE 1990 80.38 32.33 19.87 16.33 2.46 24.11 42.03 0.00 
DEGREE 1991 73.85 33.66 19.40 15.75 5.66 21.96 44.41 0.00 
DEGREE 1992 62.88 31.11 19.55 14.25 4.88 20.75 49.65 0.00 
DEGREE 1993 70.68 28.05 19.58 14.24 6.53 19.32 53.34 0.00 
DEGREE 1994 75.06 28.45 19.97 11.44 6.11 21.29 58.31 0.00 
DEGREE 1995 70.89 14.46 20.22 11.11 4.92 18.42 59.70 0.00 
DEGREE 1996 65.27 18.80 18.79 10.42 2.52 20.24 64.28 0.00 
DEGREE 1998 83.33 14.55 18.26 20.78 3.37 20.78 73.04 1.28 
DEGREE 2000 76.25 13.47 18.67 18.53 2.60 18.67 83.15 1.31 
DEGREE 2001 75.52 16.99 17.92 17.85 3.37 19.27 84.95 1.41 
DEGREE 2002 65.77 20.33 17.71 16.81 2.95 16.60 89.61 1.44 
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Table A4.2: Dataset used for equation (4.3) and (4.4), public sector 
 
a. Baseline group (NOQUAL, n, %) 
Skill level Year nt tudnt taxnt reprnt unt indnt compnt MW 
NOQUAL 1972 0.00 53.55 13.64 35.55 5.07 40.65 0.00 0.00 
NOQUAL 1973 7.75 45.13 14.32 34.57 4.26 42.80 0.00 0.00 
NOQUAL 1974 10.43 51.88 16.04 31.47 3.18 43.32 0.00 0.00 
NOQUAL 1975 20.63 50.84 18.68 30.72 4.76 45.01 0.00 0.00 
NOQUAL 1976 19.35 61.61 19.46 31.56 6.87 41.01 0.99 0.00 
NOQUAL 1977 11.47 69.66 18.48 33.76 5.52 43.25 1.98 0.00 
NOQUAL 1978 13.72 68.64 26.32 30.18 5.28 43.36 2.97 0.00 
NOQUAL 1979 20.14 67.16 17.02 32.35 5.88 40.59 3.96 0.00 
NOQUAL 1980 27.86 63.20 18.34 30.54 8.19 41.11 4.95 0.00 
NOQUAL 1981 23.19 64.31 18.52 35.97 14.74 42.33 5.94 0.00 
NOQUAL 1982 18.03 65.33 18.36 33.26 14.07 40.72 6.93 0.00 
NOQUAL 1983 12.96 67.06 18.61 29.34 16.90 42.55 7.92 0.00 
NOQUAL 1984 12.23 65.60 18.25 31.80 20.02 37.30 8.91 0.00 
NOQUAL 1985 21.71 63.34 17.55 31.09 19.16 33.28 14.13 0.00 
NOQUAL 1986 20.39 59.87 19.08 27.56 18.83 32.97 19.15 0.00 
NOQUAL 1987 31.96 61.50 15.94 31.03 15.28 34.99 23.86 0.00 
NOQUAL 1988 38.96 64.17 16.16 23.68 13.10 31.73 21.94 0.00 
NOQUAL 1989 35.47 64.12 15.89 30.58 13.21 32.03 23.71 0.00 
NOQUAL 1990 28.15 65.69 15.51 30.56 11.33 31.39 26.13 0.00 
NOQUAL 1991 28.51 60.31 17.32 29.84 17.29 31.58 24.09 0.00 
NOQUAL 1992 20.04 60.09 13.92 30.70 18.61 31.05 25.48 0.00 
NOQUAL 1993 16.75 57.08 14.20 31.93 20.18 30.34 24.98 0.00 
NOQUAL 1994 25.05 58.25 13.74 32.34 15.66 29.94 24.06 0.00 
NOQUAL 1995 28.07 59.58 16.51 31.17 14.80 27.94 22.79 0.00 
NOQUAL 1996 29.51 45.23 16.10 31.69 16.10 29.17 23.12 0.00 
NOQUAL 1998 13.53 41.67 15.66 40.68 11.13 34.35 28.27 1.28 
NOQUAL 2000 9.70 58.34 15.59 40.56 9.21 28.38 41.94 1.31 
NOQUAL 2001 28.17 50.02 12.34 42.23 7.03 29.81 49.59 1.41 
NOQUAL 2002 25.23 50.75 13.86 38.48 8.12 29.13 50.76 1.44 
b. Educated groups (BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, HIGHER and DEGREE, j=b, o, a, 
h and d, %) 
Skill level Year sjt tudjt taxjt reprjt ujt indjt compjt MW 
BOLEV 1972 19.89 36.20 14.76 31.57 3.44 43.99 0.00 0.00 
BOLEV 1973 19.75 25.51 15.05 32.57 2.26 43.93 0.00 0.00 
BOLEV 1974 20.36 35.63 17.07 30.83 1.60 45.92 0.00 0.00 
BOLEV 1975 7.74 31.57 19.99 28.70 2.83 44.13 0.00 0.00 
BOLEV 1976 7.31 30.45 20.72 28.89 3.89 44.83 1.44 0.00 
BOLEV 1977 15.13 26.67 19.77 31.96 3.41 43.40 2.88 0.00 
BOLEV 1978 4.20 33.01 27.43 27.72 2.95 45.31 4.32 0.00 
BOLEV 1979 13.71 42.98 18.40 29.48 3.74 45.28 5.76 0.00 
BOLEV 1980 10.96 35.95 18.16 37.49 6.19 42.46 7.20 0.00 
BOLEV 1981 9.65 42.87 18.89 31.48 9.12 39.08 8.64 0.00 
BOLEV 1982 14.76 45.39 18.49 33.49 10.19 43.35 10.08 0.00 
BOLEV 1983 16.34 40.02 18.49 30.97 13.44 39.79 11.52 0.00 
BOLEV 1984 20.44 46.64 18.08 33.50 12.15 32.22 12.96 0.00 
BOLEV 1985 8.27 54.65 18.15 31.33 12.15 37.45 18.07 0.00 
BOLEV 1986 16.94 52.08 17.07 22.92 11.28 32.13 24.03 0.00 
BOLEV 1987 8.82 60.32 16.98 30.61 8.74 33.08 25.68 0.00 
BOLEV 1988 19.82 41.75 16.31 21.29 7.85 31.41 24.09 0.00 
BOLEV 1989 10.44 55.68 15.98 28.05 4.74 31.05 27.10 0.00 
 156
BOLEV 1990 14.99 45.78 15.61 28.61 8.11 33.41 28.00 0.00 
BOLEV 1991 17.02 54.72 15.86 28.37 9.86 29.72 28.33 0.00 
BOLEV 1992 16.69 36.37 15.14 29.64 15.55 28.02 32.70 0.00 
BOLEV 1993 20.94 41.01 14.89 26.98 15.30 28.08 33.44 0.00 
BOLEV 1994 13.28 46.43 15.72 28.91 10.78 28.68 33.03 0.00 
BOLEV 1995 19.42 36.54 16.00 27.09 9.76 26.02 31.95 0.00 
BOLEV 1996 -6.08 43.45 14.78 26.51 9.64 28.50 34.48 0.00 
BOLEV 1998 22.99 54.10 14.09 36.26 6.49 32.06 33.78 1.28 
BOLEV 2000 28.04 46.16 14.66 39.58 6.43 28.90 50.69 1.31 
BOLEV 2001 9.51 54.39 14.05 34.00 3.64 27.77 56.68 1.41 
BOLEV 2002 22.48 58.87 13.93 35.38 4.92 28.76 65.77 1.44 
OLEV 1972 32.48 32.08 14.22 25.07 1.74 31.85 0.00 0.00 
OLEV 1973 35.40 30.16 14.71 27.66 1.17 34.95 0.00 0.00 
OLEV 1974 33.73 38.16 16.61 23.09 1.07 32.06 0.00 0.00 
OLEV 1975 25.83 36.99 19.46 24.02 2.50 33.79 0.00 0.00 
OLEV 1976 33.35 34.66 20.36 23.40 1.96 34.78 1.73 0.00 
OLEV 1977 22.18 33.23 19.39 27.69 2.95 30.75 3.47 0.00 
OLEV 1978 19.28 35.47 26.73 28.60 3.38 35.09 5.20 0.00 
OLEV 1979 27.12 35.63 17.85 22.49 1.72 33.06 6.93 0.00 
OLEV 1980 28.57 37.83 17.84 28.47 4.66 32.83 8.67 0.00 
OLEV 1981 27.77 43.96 18.37 33.22 7.38 33.80 10.40 0.00 
OLEV 1982 28.70 42.04 18.48 28.92 8.58 33.64 12.13 0.00 
OLEV 1983 40.93 34.01 18.84 27.49 10.54 32.65 13.87 0.00 
OLEV 1984 39.00 38.34 19.00 26.13 8.30 30.30 15.60 0.00 
OLEV 1985 29.62 44.15 18.65 26.20 8.59 30.52 24.39 0.00 
OLEV 1986 34.58 42.90 18.49 20.29 8.31 27.35 32.02 0.00 
OLEV 1987 22.58 45.92 17.56 25.83 7.05 31.19 29.98 0.00 
OLEV 1988 18.22 38.11 16.37 23.17 6.17 29.26 31.89 0.00 
OLEV 1989 19.04 50.50 16.35 26.54 4.96 29.29 34.81 0.00 
OLEV 1990 39.50 43.93 16.65 24.79 6.34 28.02 35.08 0.00 
OLEV 1991 27.44 40.94 16.98 26.86 8.89 30.70 35.63 0.00 
OLEV 1992 23.27 39.96 16.06 27.17 11.61 28.39 38.61 0.00 
OLEV 1993 28.92 45.25 16.19 25.17 12.67 29.76 35.17 0.00 
OLEV 1994 25.71 50.28 16.87 22.89 10.17 24.55 36.19 0.00 
OLEV 1995 15.41 54.71 16.93 25.28 10.63 29.41 37.69 0.00 
OLEV 1996 23.54 69.07 15.60 23.75 8.93 26.01 38.86 0.00 
OLEV 1998 29.63 59.82 15.08 34.11 5.72 27.33 45.00 1.28 
OLEV 2000 47.29 63.05 15.38 32.53 4.60 25.91 60.97 1.31 
OLEV 2001 21.32 53.95 14.67 34.26 4.15 25.36 64.75 1.41 
OLEV 2002 25.06 45.28 14.19 35.64 4.56 23.45 71.31 1.44 
ALEV 1972 37.93 29.74 13.78 23.33 3.57 33.29 0.00 0.00 
ALEV 1973 45.93 14.95 14.65 25.29 1.03 38.40 0.00 0.00 
ALEV 1974 37.05 25.87 16.53 21.69 1.54 37.56 0.00 0.00 
ALEV 1975 31.54 25.00 19.23 23.49 1.61 35.28 0.00 0.00 
ALEV 1976 36.78 35.83 20.03 22.14 2.57 34.72 2.13 0.00 
ALEV 1977 35.07 28.71 19.01 24.88 1.67 35.83 4.26 0.00 
ALEV 1978 27.54 26.88 26.78 23.83 1.75 36.40 6.39 0.00 
ALEV 1979 33.59 33.12 17.63 23.19 3.15 36.64 8.51 0.00 
ALEV 1980 28.22 60.31 17.89 25.19 2.90 32.06 10.64 0.00 
ALEV 1981 40.50 56.14 18.60 23.35 5.22 38.45 12.77 0.00 
ALEV 1982 28.32 45.10 18.76 22.27 8.53 37.56 14.90 0.00 
ALEV 1983 43.76 43.58 19.16 19.66 8.11 34.63 17.03 0.00 
ALEV 1984 40.93 40.24 19.62 22.12 7.01 30.47 19.16 0.00 
ALEV 1985 40.71 52.22 19.75 22.04 4.32 33.70 27.76 0.00 
ALEV 1986 37.86 68.64 18.44 18.71 7.60 29.20 29.33 0.00 
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ALEV 1987 29.90 55.00 18.14 24.72 6.35 25.91 36.55 0.00 
ALEV 1988 26.49 51.07 16.89 18.44 5.58 31.60 33.55 0.00 
ALEV 1989 35.90 46.94 17.27 19.61 3.25 31.04 37.65 0.00 
ALEV 1990 44.79 41.67 17.64 19.62 4.47 29.27 38.54 0.00 
ALEV 1991 46.06 32.85 17.23 21.47 6.16 29.05 38.32 0.00 
ALEV 1992 41.82 24.00 17.19 23.76 8.47 28.36 43.03 0.00 
ALEV 1993 24.93 28.21 16.73 22.85 9.27 27.02 42.64 0.00 
ALEV 1994 33.25 29.03 17.28 19.91 10.56 26.41 46.73 0.00 
ALEV 1995 24.75 50.98 17.18 21.28 8.60 23.22 44.38 0.00 
ALEV 1996 36.90 44.50 15.90 22.05 6.58 27.36 44.99 0.00 
ALEV 1998 41.11 48.80 16.06 29.60 5.16 27.00 57.34 1.28 
ALEV 2000 51.53 64.05 15.87 34.67 4.38 25.06 67.46 1.31 
ALEV 2001 22.29 58.36 15.84 30.25 4.02 26.41 72.15 1.41 
ALEV 2002 37.77 51.10 15.44 30.45 3.38 24.89 81.95 1.44 
HIGHER 1972 57.97 46.53 15.23 18.47 0.41 27.15 0.00 0.00 
HIGHER 1973 46.62 47.56 15.69 19.30 0.35 24.24 0.00 0.00 
HIGHER 1974 41.76 62.22 17.85 17.81 0.74 28.80 0.00 0.00 
HIGHER 1975 37.94 60.09 20.68 19.15 1.48 28.22 0.00 0.00 
HIGHER 1976 46.79 56.80 21.72 19.38 1.15 30.75 2.53 0.00 
HIGHER 1977 44.64 55.15 20.46 21.65 1.39 29.31 5.06 0.00 
HIGHER 1978 40.01 55.41 27.48 20.78 1.28 30.06 7.58 0.00 
HIGHER 1979 33.48 71.91 19.03 20.56 0.78 30.15 10.11 0.00 
HIGHER 1980 38.66 69.27 19.34 14.95 1.46 32.23 12.64 0.00 
HIGHER 1981 43.13 65.13 19.03 20.23 2.76 30.16 15.17 0.00 
HIGHER 1982 41.27 70.70 19.14 20.13 4.10 34.79 17.70 0.00 
HIGHER 1983 48.01 73.22 20.02 17.19 3.27 38.66 20.22 0.00 
HIGHER 1984 43.97 74.33 20.74 14.68 3.13 33.37 22.75 0.00 
HIGHER 1985 40.44 72.17 20.92 14.54 2.86 34.22 27.14 0.00 
HIGHER 1986 40.84 73.35 19.99 17.22 3.28 33.53 34.37 0.00 
HIGHER 1987 33.90 82.93 19.85 20.86 3.31 39.46 38.54 0.00 
HIGHER 1988 41.24 79.09 18.10 16.42 3.53 32.46 38.55 0.00 
HIGHER 1989 40.27 72.28 18.52 19.89 1.71 34.33 37.32 0.00 
HIGHER 1990 44.42 75.09 19.19 14.69 1.75 33.19 39.81 0.00 
HIGHER 1991 46.84 75.19 19.43 18.46 3.29 34.79 43.03 0.00 
HIGHER 1992 38.73 70.78 18.59 19.12 5.32 31.20 43.50 0.00 
HIGHER 1993 45.05 73.99 19.12 16.76 5.52 31.54 43.52 0.00 
HIGHER 1994 29.15 70.51 20.20 15.74 6.66 31.73 48.12 0.00 
HIGHER 1995 36.16 65.51 19.03 17.98 5.39 34.42 49.22 0.00 
HIGHER 1996 31.05 61.96 17.98 19.27 5.33 31.08 50.95 0.00 
HIGHER 1998 46.08 62.36 17.37 22.85 1.25 34.50 63.86 1.28 
HIGHER 2000 58.76 59.77 17.84 26.39 3.62 31.42 70.54 1.31 
HIGHER 2001 35.84 59.38 16.92 25.36 3.21 30.25 74.70 1.41 
HIGHER 2002 40.75 63.57 16.22 35.22 2.60 27.83 84.76 1.44 
DEGREE 1972 84.18 60.70 15.06 15.75 1.19 14.84 0.00 0.00 
DEGREE 1973 72.55 61.78 15.58 16.46 0.81 20.29 0.00 0.00 
DEGREE 1974 65.70 69.09 17.53 17.64 1.95 21.07 0.00 0.00 
DEGREE 1975 67.89 63.67 20.64 14.96 0.46 23.17 0.00 0.00 
DEGREE 1976 66.51 72.32 21.34 13.72 1.80 21.61 2.96 0.00 
DEGREE 1977 63.52 69.64 20.26 15.57 1.54 20.42 5.92 0.00 
DEGREE 1978 57.88 70.62 29.49 18.31 1.02 23.49 8.88 0.00 
DEGREE 1979 56.05 69.65 18.95 16.89 1.20 23.35 11.83 0.00 
DEGREE 1980 54.75 69.45 19.12 9.10 2.10 20.81 14.79 0.00 
DEGREE 1981 60.82 77.10 20.22 9.48 3.04 25.01 17.75 0.00 
DEGREE 1982 55.86 76.40 19.40 20.27 3.94 22.66 20.71 0.00 
DEGREE 1983 71.64 74.14 21.36 11.97 2.44 21.09 23.67 0.00 
 158
DEGREE 1984 71.47 72.16 21.79 16.14 5.09 23.60 26.63 0.00 
DEGREE 1985 52.94 72.44 21.52 19.45 2.40 26.92 28.52 0.00 
DEGREE 1986 54.34 70.21 20.68 21.12 2.42 24.30 31.47 0.00 
DEGREE 1987 56.33 65.48 21.06 15.31 3.41 28.19 39.67 0.00 
DEGREE 1988 54.64 63.17 19.49 16.10 2.20 20.64 37.89 0.00 
DEGREE 1989 54.48 64.66 19.59 13.81 3.35 20.31 40.90 0.00 
DEGREE 1990 61.83 62.09 20.15 16.53 2.07 23.08 42.03 0.00 
DEGREE 1991 66.98 53.34 19.54 15.56 5.25 21.46 44.41 0.00 
DEGREE 1992 57.38 54.43 19.76 13.68 4.04 20.71 49.65 0.00 
DEGREE 1993 47.12 56.09 20.01 13.88 5.51 18.82 53.34 0.00 
DEGREE 1994 52.78 54.33 20.29 11.33 6.11 20.67 58.31 0.00 
DEGREE 1995 55.90 60.43 21.04 10.70 4.03 17.78 59.70 0.00 
DEGREE 1996 49.37 67.69 19.26 9.90 2.01 19.78 64.28 0.00 
DEGREE 1998 68.69 60.77 18.62 19.89 2.84 21.32 73.04 1.28 
DEGREE 2000 72.45 63.02 19.24 17.66 2.14 17.83 83.15 1.31 
DEGREE 2001 59.13 63.05 18.57 18.40 2.54 19.06 84.95 1.41 
DEGREE 2002 65.47 60.72 18.05 17.26 2.32 17.15 89.61 1.44 
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APPENDIX 4.3 
The family and working lives survey (FWLS 1994/1995) 
 
This Appendix provides technique notes on how to extract data from the FWLS. The 
FWLS is a life and work history data, which provide representative information about 
people living in Britain. The dataset was collected in the period 1994/1995 and the 
final sample consists of information for 11,237 respondents. The focus of the survey 
is not only on current living conditions, but also a broad variety of retrospective 
questions about the family and working lives of the respondents. In this way, the 
survey tries to get information about the basic event history of the family and working 
lives beginning with the 16th birthday of the respondents. Hence, the FWLS provides 
time series information on socio-economic characteristics of persons and households; 
training and education including on and off the job; detail on current job and key past 
events in particular union membership; spells of unemployment and  details of 
benefits claims since the 1970s.  
 
The focus here is on preparing the raw data for cross-sectional and 
longitudinal analyses with the computer program TDA (Transition Data Analysis), in 
which the FWLS is stored. The FWLS in TDA is a highly compressed data archive 
that has been designed for statistical analyses with cross-sectional and longitudinal 
data. The currently available FWLS raw data are contained in one big ASCII data of 
1,551,086 records for 11,237 respondents, in which 1,179,885 records are cross-
sectional. Thus, we have 105 cross-sectional records and average about 33 
longitudinal records for each respondent (Rohwer 1996, p1-7). 
 
 The FWLS has a large sample of individuals, for which employment history 
can be constructed (also see a summary in Disney et al 1998). We concentrate on 
trade union density by skill level. Since the FWLS can provide retrospective 
individual data on employment history and trade union membership as well as 
workers’ characteristics (gender, age and education), we are permitted to build an 
event history data of union membership over a long time period. Hence, we construct 
about 48,814 separate employment spells of 11,192 workers since 1970, in which 
5,033 workers have ever had union membership.  
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Firstly, we extract workers’ characteristics variables from the cross-sectional 
data file in the FWLS. We have information about personal identification (PID), 
record type (RTYPE, cross-sectional records 1-45, 52-54 and 74-130=1, event history 
records 63-73 =2), interview year (INTY), year of birth (1924 to 1978, S1AY) and 
sex (S2B_1). We use the year of birth plus 16 to represent the starting year of 
respondent in the FWLS (SYEAR). Thus, we have enough information to build a 
cross-sectional dataset.  
 
Secondly, we extract trade union membership variable for the event history 
data file in the FWLS. We have information about personal identification (RJID), 
original state (RJORG), destination state (RJDES), starting and ending year of event 
(RJTSY1 and RJTFY1), trade union membership (RJTUMEM), full/part time status 
(RJWTIME), labour contract type (RJEMPLT), firm-size of workplace (RJFSIZE), 
occupation (RJSOC) and industry (RJSIC). We merge this even history dataset with 
above cross-sectional by personal identification. Thus, we build the event history 
dataset with worker’s characteristics. 
 
Thirdly, we categorize respondent’s highest educational/training qualifications 
in the FWLS. In order to simplify the complicated structure of British qualifications, 
all qualifications earned by the respondent are categorized into six groups: NOQUAL, 
BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, HIGHER and DEGREE as in the GHS analysis. The 
complete list and brief description of education variables are the same as in the Table 
2.1.  
 
The FWLS provides accurate information about 53 kinds of education and 
trainings qualifications. However, questions about qualifications are a multiple choice 
way in the FWLS. Respondents can at most provide 6 kinds of qualifications they 
have. Hence, there are about 318 dummies (=6×53) about qualifications in the FWLS: 
T22_1_01 ~ T22_1_53, T22_2_01 ~ T22_2_53, T22_3_01 ~ T22_3_53, T35_1_01 ~ 
T35_1_53, T35_2_01 ~ T35_2_53 and T35_3_01 ~ T35_3_53. In addition, the 
highest qualification may be in any one of these variables. Thus, I recode these 318 
dummy variables into 36 dummies (=6×6) by categorizing 53 qualifications into 6 
groups.  
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Next, I give different value to each group: NOQUAL (0), BOLEV (8), OLEV 
(10), ALEV (11), HIGHER (14) and DEGREE (15). All qualifications of each 
respondent are compared to find the maximum value. Thus, we build the education 
dataset (3highestedu.dat) for respondent’s highest qualification. Finally, we merge the 
education dataset with the trade union dataset to build the dataset for further analysis.  
 
We put some examples in the event history dataset in Table A4.3. In Table 
A4.3, the event history data of employment and trade union membership are presented 
for the first thirteen workers in the FWLS. The first column of pid is the individual 
personal identifier; sex is gender set as 1 for males and 2 for females; biryear is the 
birth year of individual; tu is trade union membership dummy set 1 for yes; tucn is 
counting times of trade union membership; syear is the starting year of the event; 
fyear is the finishing year of the event; ind is the 4 digit Standard Industrial 
Classification 92 (SIC 92) of worker’s main job; and yrsed is the highest educational 
qualifications: 0 for the NOQUAL group, 8 for the BOLEV group, 10 for the OLEV 
group, 11 for the ALEV group, 14 for the HIGHER group and 15 for the DEGREE 
group (see definitions in Table 2.1).  
 
The basic information about employment and trade union membership can be 
extracted from Table A4.3. For example, the first individual (pid: 10011) is a male 
born in 1968, who has not any educational qualification (yrsed=0) and took his first 
job in 1987. The individual worked for a firm of reproduction of sound recording (ind 
=2231) for one year before he moved to a firm of manufacture of grain mill (ind 
=1561) for another year in 1988. In 1989, he was a worker of processing of fruit and 
vegetable (ind =1533). Then, he lost his job for 4 years until he found a job in the 
public sector (the NHS) as a health and social worker (ind =8511) in 1993. In the 
same year, he joined a trade union which lasts to the survey year 1995. 
 
Following the same line, we can describe the history of employment and union 
membership for other individuals. It is worth mentioning that workers possibly move 
from one union to another union, which will be counted by the variable tucn.  It may 
happen as the worker moves between jobs. For example, a male worker (pid=40541) 
was born in 1967, who has not any educational qualification (yrsed=0) and took his 
first job as a general (overall) public service worker (ind =7511) in 1987. In the same 
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year, he joined a trade union in the public service. However, he lost his job for 7 years 
until he found a job in radio and television activity (ind=9220) in 1994. Then, he 
joined in another union (tucn=2). Another case is a male worker (pid=50591) born in 
1946 with A-level qualification. He joined the first trade union at age of 20 and has 
changed job/union five times between 1969 and 1992 in telecommunications industry 
(ind=6420). In 1992, he was unemployed first time in his employment history.  
 
Consequently, using the event history data in the Table A4.3, we calculate the 
numbers of employee and trade union member by gender, education and experience 
(see details of definition in Chapter 2) in the private and public sector. For simplicity, 
Table A4.4 only presents results of the private sector. For example, there are about 
198 male workers without any qualification, with experience less than 5 years in 1972 
(e72), 69 of which had trade union membership (tu72). The union density for this cell 
is about 34.8 percent (=69/198).  
 
Using information in Table A4.4, the aggregated trade union density can be 
calculated. As can be seen, there are many missing values in the part of females, 
especially for the skilled female workers in the 1970s. Hence, we only concentrate on 
males in Chapter 4. Union densities of male workers by skill are presented in Figure 
4.5 and 4.6, as well as in Table A4.1 and Table A4.2.  
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Table A4.3: The event history dataset of trade union membership, the FWLS 
94/95  
 
pid sex biryear tu tucn syear fyear ind yrsed
10011 1 68 0 0 87 87 2231 0 
10011 1 68 0 0 88 88 1561 0 
10011 1 68 0 0 89 89 1533 0 
10011 1 68 1 1 93 95 8511 0 
10101 2 72 0 0 90 90 7420 0 
10101 2 72 0 0 91 91 9261 0 
10101 2 72 0 0 94 95 7482 0 
10541 2 66 0 0 83 84 9500 14 
10541 2 66 0 0 84 84 8010 14 
10541 2 66 0 0 85 95 8010 14 
10631 2 29 0 0 47 59 7411 0 
10631 2 29 0 0 60 64 9132 0 
10631 2 29 0 0 64 65 4521 0 
10631 2 29 0 0 75 85 7413 0 
10681 2 69 0 0 87 88 2215 0 
10941 1 72 0 0 94 95 5164 14 
20381 2 46 0 0 65 67 9231 8 
20381 2 46 0 0 67 68 9231 8 
20381 2 46 0 0 82 92 6512 8 
20381 2 46 0 0 92 95 7450 8 
40211 2 61 0 0 78 80 5231 0 
40211 2 61 0 0 80 81 5231 0 
40211 2 61 0 0 81 82 5231 0 
40211 2 61 0 0 82 84 5242 0 
40211 2 61 0 0 84 87 5231 0 
40281 1 51 0 0 68 82 2222 0 
40281 1 51 1 1 84 95 8030 0 
40541 1 67 1 1 87 87 7511 0 
40541 1 67 1 2 94 94 9220 0 
41421 1 49 0 0 75 79 7511 0 
41421 1 49 0 0 79 82 5530 0 
50591 1 46 0 0 63 63 7530 11 
50591 1 46 0 0 63 65 6720 11 
50591 1 46 0 0 65 66 5020 11 
50591 1 46 0 0 66 66 5020 11 
50591 1 46 1 1 66 69 6420 11 
50591 1 46 1 2 69 80 6420 11 
50591 1 46 1 3 80 80 6420 11 
50591 1 46 1 4 80 85 6420 11 
50591 1 46 1 5 85 92 6420 11 
51891 2 30 0 0 44 48 5246 0 
51891 2 30 0 0 48 51 5212 0 
51891 2 30 0 0 57 59 1584 0 
51891 2 30 0 0 71 79 2222 0 
… … … .. … … … … … 
 
Notes: All figures in this table are from the cross-sectional and longitudinal data in the FWLS 
1994/1995. 
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Table A4.4: Numbers of employees and trade union members by skill in the private 
sector, the FWLS 94/95  
 
Gender Edu Exp tu72 e72 tu73 e73 tu74 e74 … tu94 e94 
Male NOQUAL 5 69 198 62 196 77 234 … 14 222 
Male NOQUAL 10 71 186 73 190 82 175 … 46 192 
Male NOQUAL 15 89 170 87 173 78 178 … 53 223 
Male NOQUAL 20 105 193 112 203 99 191 … 63 204 
Male NOQUAL 25 96 175 96 177 98 172 … 41 150 
Male NOQUAL 30 118 213 113 199 117 206 … 48 133 
Male NOQUAL 35 21 42 45 85 67 125 … 41 105 
Male NOQUAL 40 - - - - - - … 31 89 
Male BOLEV 5 27 51 20 46 17 45 … 1 25 
Male BOLEV 10 22 29 21 31 30 43 … 12 42 
Male BOLEV 15 7 20 11 22 14 24 … 7 26 
Male BOLEV 20 5 10 6 10 6 13 … 14 32 
Male BOLEV 25 13 15 12 15 9 12 … 10 24 
Male BOLEV 30 6 12 6 9 7 9 … 13 23 
Male BOLEV 35 2 2 1 3 3 6 … 10 19 
Male BOLEV 40 - - - - - - … 5 10 
Male OLEV 5 34 62 40 73 47 88 … 4 21 
Male OLEV 10 32 58 44 76 38 69 … 14 43 
Male OLEV 15 36 70 29 60 33 74 … 23 56 
Male OLEV 20 40 60 47 66 40 60 … 29 69 
Male OLEV 25 33 65 35 62 49 71 … 35 67 
Male OLEV 30 42 63 48 75 45 71 … 21 45 
Male OLEV 35 11 13 15 19 20 28 … 13 36 
Male OLEV 40 - - - - - - … 17 34 
Male ALEV 5 8 11 10 14 12 19 … 0 5 
Male ALEV 10 4 6 4 10 5 6 … 6 16 
Male ALEV 15 12 17 10 17 11 17 … 7 18 
Male ALEV 20 3 5 5 6 4 5 … 9 24 
Male ALEV 25 1 1 1 2 3 4 … 4 11 
Male ALEV 30 1 2 2 3 1 2 … 3 8 
Male ALEV 35 - - - - - - … 6 10 
Male ALEV 40 - - - - - - … 2 3 
Male HIGHER 5 22 46 24 44 25 43 … 0 5 
Male HIGHER 10 9 15 9 21 9 20 … 4 13 
Male HIGHER 15 5 8 7 12 6 8 … 8 27 
Male HIGHER 20 6 17 3 9 4 8 … 8 17 
Male HIGHER 25 4 9 8 17 9 15 … 9 25 
Male HIGHER 30 1 3 1 5 2 5 … 2 14 
Male HIGHER 35 - - - - - - … 4 8 
Male HIGHER 40 - - - - - - … 1 5 
Male DEGREE 5 22 51 19 46 25 55 … 2 21 
Male DEGREE 10 12 27 14 28 13 32 … 8 29 
Male DEGREE 15 10 17 12 18 14 19 … 11 44 
Male DEGREE 20 12 23 9 21 8 24 … 7 29 
Male DEGREE 25 6 18 10 21 10 21 … 11 27 
Male DEGREE 30 3 9 3 12 4 13 … 9 24 
Male DEGREE 35 - - - - - - … 8 14 
Male DEGREE 40 - - - - - - … 0 9 
Female  NOQUAL 5 62 195 72 228 87 270 … 10 207 
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Female  NOQUAL 10 49 184 38 169 38 156 … 36 222 
Female  NOQUAL 15 33 134 45 140 42 159 … 40 219 
Female  NOQUAL 20 26 110 36 117 41 138 … 50 219 
Female  NOQUAL 25 40 137 39 138 35 122 … 29 148 
Female  NOQUAL 30 53 156 54 157 58 173 … 27 119 
Female  NOQUAL 35 8 33 18 56 32 96 … 27 119 
Female  NOQUAL 40 - - - - - - … 22 84 
Female  BOLEV 5 14 55 15 49 19 69 … 0 24 
Female  BOLEV 10 11 28 10 28 9 25 … 15 45 
Female  BOLEV 15 3 19 5 19 4 17 … 9 48 
Female  BOLEV 20 4 17 9 23 9 22 … 10 40 
Female  BOLEV 25 7 14 7 14 10 18 … 8 31 
Female  BOLEV 30 2 12 1 7 1 12 … 0 16 
Female  BOLEV 35 1 1 2 8 2 8 … 2 17 
Female  BOLEV 40 - - - - - - … 4 13 
Female  OLEV 5 4 26 4 23 11 33 … 1 12 
Female  OLEV 10 7 20 9 30 10 25 … 1 14 
Female  OLEV 15 3 15 3 15 4 15 … 4 14 
Female  OLEV 20 6 15 5 14 6 16 … 3 11 
Female  OLEV 25 2 5 4 8 4 11 … 2 16 
Female  OLEV 30 6 8 4 6 3 4 … 8 16 
Female  OLEV 35 2 4 3 5 3 6 … 1 10 
Female  OLEV 40       … 4 12 
Female  ALEV 5 2 8 3 6 3 10 … 0 4 
Female  ALEV 10 0 1   0 1 … 4 19 
Female  ALEV 15 3 5 1 1 1 1 … 3 11 
Female  ALEV 20 - - 0 1 0 1 … 1 6 
Female  ALEV 25 - - - - - - … 1 5 
Female  ALEV 30 - - - - - - … 0 1 
Female  ALEV 35 - - - - - - … 1 2 
Female  ALEV 40 - - - - - - … 0 1 
Female  HIGHER 5 6 18 6 26 6 27 … 0 9 
Female  HIGHER 10 1 4 1 5 1 10 … 1 10 
Female  HIGHER 15 0 7 1 8 2 8 … 3 13 
Female  HIGHER 20 0 5 1 8 2 8 … 0 13 
Female  HIGHER 25 4 7 3 6 2 5 … 1 9 
Female  HIGHER 30 - - 1 2 2 5 … 1 4 
Female  HIGHER 35 - - - - - - … 2 6 
Female  HIGHER 40 - - - - - - … 0 1 
Female  DEGREE 5 9 20 9 23 10 28 … 0 9 
Female  DEGREE 10 0 6 0 8 1 8 … 4 27 
Female  DEGREE 15 0 3 0 1 0 2 … 3 12 
Female  DEGREE 20 1 4 1 3 0 3 … 1 10 
Female  DEGREE 25 - - - - 1 2 … 5 9 
Female  DEGREE 30 - - - - - - … 2 7 
Female  DEGREE 35 - - - - - - … 0 3 
Female  DEGREE 40 - - - - - - … 1 2 
 
Notes: tu represents the total numbers of employees who are trade union members; e represents the 
total numbers of employees. All figures in this table are from the cross-sectional and longitudinal data 
in the FWLS 1994/1995. 
 
 
 
 166
CHAPTER FIVE: 
REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY IN ITALY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters, we described and analyzed the changes of earnings inequality 
over the last thirty years using a supply-demand-institution framework. We find that 
the decline of trade union in unskilled workers accounts about half of the degree 
premiums increase in the private sector. This result implies that institutions are very 
important to the evolution of earnings inequality in the UK.  
 
Moreover, many European countries such as Italy, Germany and Sweden have 
some form of centralized wage setting and had little increase in earnings inequality 
since the late 1970s (see Erickson and Ichino 1995 for Italy, Abraham and Houseman 
1995 for Germany, and Edin and Holmlund 1995 for Sweden). The Krugman 
hypothesis states that the rise in wage inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries and the 
rise in unemployment in continental Europe reflect a fall in the relative demand for 
unskilled workers under different wage setting institutions (see Krugman 1994, p28 
39, Nickell and Bell 1996, p302 and Puhani 2003, p1). Thus, wage setting institutions 
play a key role in the changes of earnings inequality. Changes in the labour market 
institutions such as the decline of trade unions presumably affect the wage responses 
to the business cycle.  
 
As Machin (1996, p57) notes, the usual approach to analyze earnings 
inequality begins by considering a standard supply-demand framework, and then 
generalizes further by considering labour-market institutions and the role of 
unemployment. In Chapter 5 and 6, we will analyze the real wage adjustment over the 
business cycle, i.e. wage cyclicality under different wage setting institutions in three 
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countries: Italy, Germany and the UK. As trade unions declined after 1979 in the UK, 
wages were set at the company or individual level, compared with the centralised 
collective agreements in Italy and Germany. In fact, highly centralised and 
coordinated wage setting institutions may be associated with rigid wages, which are 
insensitive to changes in market conditions such as unemployment.  
 
In this chapter, we aim to analyze the real wage adjustment over the business 
cycle using panel micro data for Italy 1994-2001, which have recently become 
available from the European Community Household Panel. Italy has a regulated 
economy which forms an interesting contrast to the more flexible economies of the 
US and the UK which have been extensively studied (starting with Bils 1985 for the 
US; see also Devereux and Hart 2006 for the UK). The Italian labour market has been 
performing badly, with only about 55% of Italians in the 15-64 age range in 
employment during the 1990s, compared to over 70% in the UK and US (OECD, 
2004). The 2001 Italian White Paper on reform of the labour market (EIRO, 2001) 
sees a “local” wage policy, with “more space for decentralised bargaining”, as part of 
the cure. Put simply, it may be that nationally bargained wages cannot adjust 
downwards enough in response to adverse shocks to avoid job losses (see also Ochel, 
2005, for a similar argument for Germany). In this study, we aim to give a factual 
basis to the debate, making comparisons with the well-developed research results for 
the UK and the US. In the next chapter, we make a further analysis of the UK and 
Germany. 
 
In fact, Italy’s wage-setting institutions have a dual nature. On the one hand, 
the Constitution makes collective agreements generally binding (OECD, 2004, p149), 
and the courts use minimum wages from sectoral agreements to determine whether 
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wages conform to constitutional requirements. Also, studies by Ammermueller et al 
(2007) and Devicienti et al (2006) note the importance of industry agreements, and 
the limited role of local bargaining. Indeed, Limosani’s (2004) recent model of Italian 
unemployment simply assumes no regional differentiation in wages. On the other 
hand, the debate on bargaining reform (EIRO, 2004) reveals nearly 300 sectoral wage 
agreements registered with the National Statistical Institute, which indicates 
flexibility. Certainly, firm-specific agreements are important for large private sector 
firms as the work of Guiso et al (2005) shows. Moreover, it is possible that the 1993 
bargaining reforms (Devicienti et al, 2006; Eurofound, 2004) made industry wage-
setting more flexible by stressing local top-up components and abolishing wage 
indexation. On balance, however, Italy’s wage-setting institutions have been 
characterised as distinctly coordinated and centralised (OECD, 2004, Table 3.5). An 
indication of this centralisation is Italy’s relatively high, over 80%, collective 
bargaining coverage. Whether, in fact, there is effective central power is something 
our regressions will test. 
 
We will distinguish between the Italy’s North and South49. Many authors have 
remarked on the differences between the regions, and Ammermueller et al (2007, p9) 
even talk of “progressive polarisation”. For example, the public-private wage 
differential has been estimated (Dell’Aringa et al, 2005, p31) as two to five times 
higher in the South than the North. Also, there is much higher unemployment in the 
South, which gives prima facie grounds to expect labour markets to be working worse 
in the South. In fact, Devicienti et al (2006) note that the top-up components in 
                                                 
49 The ECHP provides information for 11 regions. We categorise the Nord Ovest (Piemonte, Valle 
D’Aosta and Liguria), Nord Est (Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia), Lombardia 
and Emilia-Romagna as the North. Centro (1) (Toscana, Umbria and Marche), Lazio, Abruzzo-Molise, 
Campania, Sud (Puglia, Basilicata and Calabria), Sicilia and Sardegna are defined as the Centre-South. 
This division gives about 40% of the sample classified as the Centre-North (see Table 5.1). 
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national agreements are less likely to be used in southern regions. Hence we would 
expect less real wage procyclicality in the South. 
 
Our approach offers two advances. First, we use data on real wage movements 
from a panel of individuals, the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
rather than aggregate data. Using aggregate data, most studies of real wage behaviour 
(e.g., Blanchard and Fischer, 1989) have concluded that real wages are at best weakly 
procyclical. However, aggregate data ignore the fact that, over the cycle, more 
unskilled workers become employed in expansion and pull the aggregate average 
wage downwards. The converse occurs in recession. Thus, an aggregate wage series is 
counter-cyclically biased. Our panel method avoids this bias which is strong, as we 
show below. 
 
Second, following Devereux and Hart (2006), we make a threefold distinction 
between job stayers (remaining in the same job over the year), internal movers (i.e., 
within-company movers), and external movers (between-company). Each of these 
three groups is likely to have a different wage reaction to business cycle conditions. 
As regards the broad distinction between movers and stayers, research has found that 
real wages are more procyclical for those who change companies, than for those who 
do not (Bils 1985 and Shin 1994 for the US, Hart 2006 and Devereux and Hart 2006 
for the UK). Beaudry and DiNardo’s (1991) implicit contracting model can explain 
this result. Risk-averse employees may be shielded from productivity shocks, 
implying smoother wage adjustments for job stayers. In contrast, workers who are 
forced to change jobs have no access to insurance, and their new wage rates are likely 
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to be more dependent on spot market conditions, leading to higher fluctuations in 
wages.50  
 
As for wage movements within the company, Reder’s (1955) theory of 
promotion/demotion along a firm’s internal job ladders shows that wages can change 
for internal movers even while job stayers’ wages – set perhaps by collective 
agreement – are unresponsive to the cycle. In fact, for the UK, Devereux and Hart 
(2006) find that wages for job stayers are quite flexible, so that internal job moves 
play a minor role in wage cyclicality. Nickell and Quintini’s (2003) also find that 
around 20% of job stayers experienced nominal wage cuts annually during the 1990s, 
pointing to high UK wage flexibility. However, the Italian results might be different, 
given the greater importance of collective agreements. Our threefold distinction is 
potentially important therefore. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present 
our estimation methodology, and in Section 3, we describe the data. Section 4 
examines the basic predictions of theoretical models by region and compares our 
results with other findings. We also test the robustness of our results by firm size and 
public-private sector. The final section concludes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50Using the PSID and CPS, Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) find empirical evidence to support their 
model. Grant (2003) also finds support for Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) using the NLS. Barlevy 
(2001) provides an alternative hypothesis that the strong wage procyclicality of job changers is due to 
compensating wage differentials. Workers who voluntarily switch jobs in booms enter temporary jobs 
with unemployment risk and receive compensating higher wages in the new jobs. 
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5.2 Estimation 
The standard decomposition of wage growth (Solon et al, 1997, and Devereux and 
Hart, 2006), distinguishing between job-stayers and internal and external movers is: 
 
        E(ΔlnW) =(1- PW - PB) E(ΔlnWS)+ PW E(ΔlnWW)+ PB E(ΔlnWB) 
             = E(ΔlnWS)+ PW E(ΔlnWW - ΔlnWS)+ PB E(ΔlnWB - ΔlnWS)         (5.1) 
 
where PW and PB denotes the proportion of workers changing jobs within and between 
companies, and E(ΔlnWS), E(ΔlnWW), and E(ΔlnWB) is the expected wage growth of 
job stayers (S), internal movers (W) and external movers (B). 
 
Differentiating equation (5.1) with respect to the change in the unemployment 
rate, Δu, which is the commonly used cyclical indicator, provides a decomposition of 
total wage cyclicality: 
 
       ∂E(ΔlnW)/ ∂(Δu) =  ∂E(ΔlnWS)/ ∂(Δu)  
                                     + PW [∂E(ΔlnWW - ΔlnWS)/ ∂(Δu)]  
                                     + PB [∂E(ΔlnWB - ΔlnWS)/ ∂(Δu)]  
                                     + ∂PW /∂(Δu) [E(ΔlnWW - ΔlnWS)]  
                                     + ∂PB /∂(Δu) [E(ΔlnWB - ΔlnWS)]                                      (5.2) 
 
The first term is the wage response of job stayers; the second term defines the 
incremental effect of wage cyclicality on internal movers relative to stayers, and the 
third term defines the incremental effect of wage cyclicality on external movers 
relative to stayers. The last two terms represent the cyclicality of the probability of 
internal and external job changes. Since the last two terms are small, we concentrate 
on the wage responses. 
 
Our empirical work uses the now-standard two-step estimation procedure 
(beginning with Solon et al 1994). The two-step procedure is designed to get round 
the Moulton (1986) problem of explaining earnings based on individual data with 
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unemployment based on aggregate data.51 In step 1, we use all our individual panel 
observations to estimate the wage change equation for an individual i at time t. This 
equation is given by: 
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where wit is the real hourly wage rate, Ageit  is a cubic in age, Tenit  is a cubic in job 
tenure, Dt denotes a year dummy, and itε is a random error term. MWit denotes a 
dummy variable for internal movers, and MBit is a dummy variable for external 
movers. Here we control for changes in worker age as a proxy for experience, and for 
changes in tenure which might be correlated with unobservables such as motivation. 
Then the sequences of estimated time dummies trace out controlled real wage changes 
for stayers ( tsˆ ), and internal ( twˆ ) and external ( tbˆ ) job movers. 
 
Two approaches are possible in step 2. The conventional approach is to use 
only time series variation. An alternative is to use both time and regional variation, 
which we also report. In the conventional approach, the three sets of dummy variable 
estimates tsˆ , twˆ , and tbˆ , are regressed on the change in the current year’s 
unemployment rate (Δut), which picks up labour market disequilibrium, thus:  
 
s
tttt Yearauaas ν++Δ+= 210ˆ                                  (5.4a) 
                                 wtttt Yearbubbw ν++Δ+= 210ˆ  
                                  .ˆ 210
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51 Moulton (1986) shows that individuals in the same year/area will share some common component of 
variance that is not entirely attributable either to their measured characteristics (e.g., gender and age) or 
to the aggregate unemployment rate in the year/area. In this case, the error component in OLS 
regression will be positively correlated across people in the same year/area, causing the estimated 
standard error of the unemployment effect to be downward biased. A similar two-stage procedure is 
used in the wage curve literature (Nijkamp and Poot 2005, p434).  
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In these equations we also include a time trend (Year). Since the aim of the chapter is 
to examine cyclical variability, long-run changes both in real wages and in 
unemployment need to be swept out by the time trend variable. Equations (5.4a) link 
directly to the decomposition of wage cyclicality in equation (5.2). Using tsˆ  in 
equation (5.4a), the estimated value of a1 gives the cyclical wage response of job 
stayers. Using twˆ and tbˆ we obtain estimates of b1 and c1, that is, the incremental wage 
effects of within- and between-company movers relative to stayers.  
 
Our time series analysis covers almost the full business cycle that began in 
Italy in 1992. As is conventional in the estimation of these two-step models, we use 
weighted least squares where the weights are the numbers of individuals observed in a 
given year. While the time series is short, only 7 years, short time series are often 
found in panel data analyses (for example, Shin, 1994). We also use a region-time 
model with more data points (see below). 
 
In Italy’s case, with marked divergence between North and South, the 
appropriate indicator of market disequilibrium would be the regional rather than the 
national unemployment rate. Hence, the regional unemployment rate is our first 
choice. On the other hand, wage negotiators at central level may have in mind the 
national unemployment rate, and we accordingly report results for this measure as 
well. Moreover, it is even possible that national negotiations operate perversely, 
giving rise to a sort of pattern bargaining in which market conditions in the 
prosperous North determine wage movements in the South. In this case, Southern 
wage movements will be determined better by Northern than Southern unemployment 
conditions, and we will also test for this possibility. 
 174
 
An alternative approach is to use both regional and time variation. Here, we 
maintain the division between North and Centre-South, so as to give comparability 
with the time-series analysis. Hence we form two panels, that for the North’s four 
regions having 28 region-year observations, and that for the Centre-South’s seven 
regions having 49 observations. For the North, the step 2 equations then become: 
 
1 2ˆ
s
jt j jt t jts A a u a Y ν= + Δ + +                                      (5.4b) 
                          1 2ˆ
b
jt j jt t jtw B b u b Y ν= + Δ + +  
                           1 2ˆ
w
jt j jt t jtb C c u c Y ν= + Δ + +  
 
where j = 1, 2,..., 4 regions. In this specification, we allow fixed effects for each 
region (Aj, Bj, Cj), but restrict the coefficients on ∆U and Yt to be the same across 
regions within the North. In this specification, with more observations available, we 
introduce time dummies Yt, to sweep out trend effects (such dummies being more 
flexible than the Year trend variable, which however gives very similar results).52 We 
have a similar set of equations for the Centre-South where j = 1, 2,…,7, again 
restricting the coefficients on ∆U and Yt to be the same across regions within the 
Centre-South. We therefore maintain our basic North vs. Centre-South distinction 
which gives comparability with the conventional analysis. In fact both approaches 
come to much the same conclusion, as we will see. 
 
5.3 Data Description 
Our main data source is the ECHP, which is a harmonised cross-national longitudinal 
survey focusing on household income and living conditions (Eurostat, 2007). The 
surveys in Italy were carried out as eight waves from 1994 to 2001. Approximately 
                                                 
52 See this specification with region and time intercepts in Hart (2008, equation 12). 
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7,100 households were interviewed in the first wave. Households have an average 
attrition rate of about 9% a year. This attrition is partially compensated in the design 
by a yearly supplementary sample (average 5% a year), which keeps the net attrition 
rate to about 4% a year. Hence, for our last wave in 2001, about 5,600 households 
were interviewed. Compositional changes due to attrition appear slight. For example, 
there is a tendency for heads of household’s average education to decrease. Such a 
decrease is to be expected as less advantaged households are more likely to leave the 
panel, but it is only 3%. 
 
Our panel restrictions are as follows. First, we restrict the analysis to males as 
is common (see also Devereux 2001; Shin and Solon 2006). In any case, female 
participation in Italy is low, giving too small a sample for analysis of sub-groups. 
Second, we only include workers present in the panel for two adjacent years so as to 
be able to compute mover-stayer status. Thus our sample does not include any new 
entrants into work, for example from unemployment, since these have no wage or job 
information for the past year53. The average length of time for a worker in our panel is 
about 4 years. Our panel is therefore unbalanced, but we can also construct a smaller 
balanced panel, and will report results for comparison where appropriate. 
 
We use two questions from the ECHP to distinguish between job stayers and 
movers: the starting year of the employee’s job spell in the organization, and his 
movement in job status (supervisory, intermediate or non-supervisory etc.). We 
identify a job stayer as an employee who has no change in starting year or job status – 
                                                 
53 In fact, 25% of our sample for the Centre-South region has experienced one or more unemployment 
spells, compared to only 10% of the Northern sample. However, a past unemployment spell can have 
little direct impact on wage movement due to the restriction that individuals must have two adjacent 
years in employment.  
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the large majority, 75%, of the sample in any year (Table 5.1). An internal mover is a 
worker who has no change in starting year, but has a change in job status. An external 
mover is simply identified as a worker who changes his starting year, that is, the 
starting year becomes the current year. This category is the smallest, about 7% (Table 
5.1).  
 
Our main dependent variable is the real hourly wage, which we compute as the 
ratio of annual gross labour income to annual hours of work. Gross annual earnings 
are composed of normal wages, 13th and 14th month salary, and extra payments for 
overtime, holiday pay, earnings from an additional job, and other earnings not 
specified separately. Hence, the corresponding annual working hours are also from 
the main and any additional job including overtime. This broad hourly wage measure 
is conventional (e.g., Solon et al 1994, and Devereux 2001), though likely to show 
higher procyclicality than a basic wage measure. Since we distinguish between Italy’s 
North and Centre-South, we deflate wages using the corresponding regional price 
index for family consumption (ISTAT, 2005). However, we also provide a sensitivity 
test using the national price index since this index may be influential in negotiations 
over national collective agreements. 
 
The main concern about our wage variable is likely to be the measurement of 
hours. In particular, workers may report contract hours rather than actual hours 
worked, causing reported hours to remain overly steady from year to year. Devereux 
(2001) calls this the “clumping” problem, giving an understatement of the cyclicality 
of hours, and consequently an overstatement of the cyclicality of hourly wages. We 
have checked our hours variable. We find, on average, only 65% of job stayers had 
the same reported weekly hours in two adjacent years (the proportion varied between 
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56% for 1996/97 and 71% for 1999/2000). Thus, there seems to be significant 
variation in reported hours from year to year, especially given that true hours are 
likely to remain constant for most stayers, which give us some confidence in our 
hours measure. Nevertheless, to cross-check, we will also show (Table 5.4) that 
results from an analysis using annual earnings data are broadly similar to those for 
hourly earnings. 
 
The final important variable is the unemployment rate, changes in which act as 
our cyclical indicator. As noted above, our analyses distinguish between the North 
and Centre-South, hence we use the corresponding regional male unemployment rate 
derived (ISTAT, 2007) from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). These regional 
unemployment change measures are shown in the lower panel of Figure 5.1. The LFS 
is also the source for the national unemployment rate measure we use in some 
analyses.  
 
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics, distinguishing by region, for the key 
variables. Our sample includes 6363 males who are employed in the year and can 
provide clear information about job movement. The North and Centre-South have 
rather different workforce compositions. Fewer in the North are working in the public 
sector (18%) than in the Centre-South (28%). Also, there is a much smaller proportion 
who work in very small firms, employing less than 5 workers, in the North. This 
difference is partly because the North has a smaller proportion of workers in 
agriculture (5.3%) than does the Centre-South (9.1%), since agricultural 
establishments tend to be small. (Again, as can be seen, the North has more 
manufacturing, which tends to have large establishments.) We cater for these 
differences below by running separate regressions by public-private sector, and by 
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firm-size. Finally, while part-time work is unimportant in both regions, temporary 
contracts can be seen to cover a higher proportion of the workforce in the Centre-
South, 15%, an indication of the depressed business conditions in this region. In order 
to maintain sample sizes for separate regional analyses (below), we make no 
distinction between temporary workers and others. In fact, internal wage flexibility 
for temporary workers – as they are bumped up and down job ladders – should be 
higher than for permanent. The importance of temporary contracts the Centre-South 
should therefore assist wage flexibility. 
 
As regards wage changes, we see that stayers and internal movers have similar 
average real wage changes in the North and Centre-South, with increases averaging 4 
to 5% a year. There are fluctuations in these wage changes, as shown for stayers in the 
top panel of Figure 5.1. External movers in the Centre-South are an exceptional 
group, showing a negative real wage change on average, -8.6%. The implication here 
is that external movers are more likely to be involuntarily laid off in the South, and 
the large loss in wages for movers points to the possibility of above-equilibrium 
wages for stayers. Such above-equilibrium wages could be a result of the power of 
collective agreements which cater for the North, and prevent wages falling in the 
Centre-South. 
 
Finally, the unemployment statistics show a tight labour market for the North 
with an unemployment rate of 4.8%, and a slack market in the Centre-South with a 
rate of 11.1%. Moreover, as can be seen from the next row, the North shows a 
tendency for unemployment to decline over the period, while for the Centre-South the 
tendency is for unemployment to rise. 
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5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 Basic results 
Results for the two regions as a whole are reported in Table 5.2. We confine attention 
to the unemployment change coefficients, estimated in step two of our regressions, 
i.e., equations (5.4a). The table suggests markedly different labour markets in the 
North and Centre-South. Take first panel a), which uses regional unemployment rates. 
We see that wages of job stayers in the North show significant flexibility, with a semi-
elasticity of -9.11. This figure implies that a decrease of one standard deviation in 
Northern unemployment, 0.44 (Table 5.1), will increase real wages by 4.0% (=-
9.11×-0.44). Internal and external movers have insignificant coefficients, implying 
similar procyclicality (no extra effect) for these groups. Results for the Centre-South 
make less sense, with an insignificant effect for stayers (point estimate -3.14) and a 
positive incremental effect for internal movers (8.05), suggesting that this group’s 
wages even move with rather than against unemployment (-3.14+8.05=4.91). 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the reason for the contrasting North and Centre-South 
effects. As can be seen, wage movements for the main group, stayers, are similar at 
the aggregate level for the two regions. But the regional unemployment changes are 
different. Evidently, the forces moving real wages in the North and Centre-South are 
similar, but these forces apparently do not include the Centre-South’s labour market 
conditions.  
 
Table 5.2’s panel b) shows that wage movements in the Centre-South may be 
perverse. For stayers, we see that wage movements are much better explained by 
market conditions in the North, -6.76, than they are by conditions in the Centre-South 
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itself. There is no such effect for the North whose wage movements are determined by 
conditions in the North. Also, there is a large effect for external movers in the Centre-
South, -16.50. This result could fit in with the view that Southern wages are above 
equilibrium. If Southern wages are pushed up by Northern wage agreements, an extra 
burden of flexibility is placed on Southern external movers. In sum, the fact that 
Northern unemployment affects Southern wage movements suggests that wages are 
set in the north, and then communicated southwards via pattern bargaining and 
extension of collective agreements. 
 
Finally, Table 5.2’s panel c) shows the misleading results that arise if the 
national unemployment rate is used to predict wage changes in the regions. The 
change in the national unemployment rate is simply the weighted average of the 
regional changes: ΔU = aΔUS + (1-a)ΔUN where a ≈ 0.53 is the weight of the South 
(which can be taken as constant over the time period), and ΔUS, ΔUN are the 
unemployment rate changes in the South and North. We see that wages in both 
regions respond well to national unemployment changes, with significant wage 
procyclicality for stayers. However, this result is misleading because in fact the 
southern component of national unemployment makes no contribution. It can be 
shown that the explanatory power of total unemployment is never significantly higher 
than that of the North alone. Moreover, when both southern and northern 
unemployment are entered together in either the North or Centre-South’s wage 
equations, southern unemployment is always insignificant. Thus, the apparent strong 
influence of national unemployment conditions is really due to the underlying power 
of unemployment conditions in the North – as panels a) and b) make clear. 
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Making comparisons with the UK and the US, Table 5.2 shows that while 
wage cyclicality for the Centre-South appears to be almost zero, that for Northern 
Italy is, if anything, higher than the US and UK. Our definition is close to Devereux’s 
(2001, p845) definition of “average hourly earnings” for the US, and he finds that a 
one point fall in unemployment (approximately 1 standard deviation) is associated 
with a 2-3% rise in real wages. As noted above, our corresponding figure for workers 
in the North is a 4.0% rise in real wages. Other estimates for both the US and UK use 
narrower definitions of earnings, with accordingly less cyclicality. Thus, for male 
stayers in the US, Solon et al (1994) find a semi-elasticity of -1.2 for male stayers, 
and Shin and Solon (2006) find a similar -1.5. Also for the US, Devereux (2001) finds 
-1.09 for male job stayers. For the UK, Devereux and Hart (2006) find -1.83 for male 
stayers. In order to test the robustness of our broad results, we now estimate wage 
cyclicality for sub-groups within our sample.  
   
5.4.2 Results by firm size and sector 
We now contrast small and large firms, and public and private sectors .We would 
expect more flexibility in small firms, which may take a more laissez faire approach 
to industry wage agreements. Also small firms (under 15 employees in the legislation) 
are less likely to be covered by employment protection laws (Boeri and Jimeno 2005), 
meaning less shielding of job stayers and accordingly more wage flexibility. Because 
of small firm importance, more flexibility is likely to be found in the private than the 
public sector. Moreover, the greater centralisation of wage bargaining in the public 
sector, with very little room for public bodies to add wage increases on top of national 
agreements (Dell ‘Aringa et al, 2005) will constrain flexibility.  
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Panel a) of Table 5.3 gives results using corresponding regional 
unemployment rates as before, with panel b) switching rates. In general, we continue 
to find that Southern unemployment has little explanatory power. The first rows of 
panels a) and b) contrast the public and private sectors as a whole. In the North, we 
see that there is significant wage flexibility in both the public and private sectors, but 
flexibility is lower in the public sector, as expected. (In fact, low wage flexibility 
appears to be a feature of public sector labour markets, since we find it also in panel 
studies of the UK and both East and West Germany – see Peng and Siebert, 2007.) 
The South exhibits little flexibility in either sector, unless we use the North’s 
unemployment, as shown in panel b). 
 
The next rows consider the private sector in more detail, distinguishing 
between four categories of firm, from the very small to the large (defined in Table 
5.1). Sample sizes become quite small for some sub-groups in this analysis, but we 
pursue it because very small firms are important in the South (Table 5.1), while large 
firms for their part deserve a separate analysis because of their possible role in pattern 
bargaining. Let us take the very small firms in the North first. The puzzling aspect 
here is that now only panel b) coefficients are significant, indicating that such firms 
respond more to unemployment conditions in the South. However, in some 
experiments with industry composition, we find that this effect largely drops away if 
we exclude agriculture. Hence, we believe it shows the importance of the large 
Southern agricultural sector on Northern farm workers. 
 
As for other firm size groups in the North, we see high procyclicality for all 
groups, with semi-elasticities in the -6 to -8 range. These findings suggest that the 
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system of centralised wage negotiations for the larger firms adapts well to local labour 
market conditions in the North.  
 
Turning to the Centre-South, we again see a pattern of wage response to 
Northern conditions. Only large firms react to local conditions (-7.18). The flexibility 
of large Southern firms suggests that such firms’ special agreements indeed give them 
freedom as noted above (see Guiso et al 2005). But in general, the North sets the tone 
for Southern wage movements. 
 
5.4.3 Sensitivity Tests 
Results of tests are summarised in Table 5.4. For brevity we show only the results for 
the important job-stayer group. The benchmark result is given in column (a) taken 
from Table 5.3 (with a simplified firm size breakdown), using hourly wages and the 
regional CPI as wage deflator, together with the full, unbalanced sample. In the 
remainder of the table, we consider the consequences of varying this basic 
specification. 
Column (b) gives the results of a traditional aggregate analysis which does not 
use the panel element, and is therefore subject to the composition effects mentioned 
earlier. As can be seen, while the signs for the various sub-groups are all negative 
which indicates procyclicality, the coefficients are never significant in either the 
North or Centre-South. The implication is that the panel approach is necessary, 
otherwise the composition effect is strong enough to obscure cyclical movements in 
individuals’ real wages. 
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Column (c) takes annual wages as the dependent variable. (Hourly wages 
would probably be preferable, but the ECHP has no measure of annual weeks worked; 
consequently we restrict this analysis to full-timers.) This regression avoids using 
hourly wages which are based on an hours worked measure whose variability may be 
under-reported, imparting a spurious cyclicality to measured hourly pay. In fact, the 
results are quite similar (as also found by Ammermueller et al Tables 1a and 1b). 
Thus, it is not mismeasurement of working hours which is driving our results. 
Column (d) takes the results from a “balanced” dataset (see, e.g., Solon et al 
1994). Because individuals must then be observed each year, such samples are 
necessarily smaller, with only 750 observations yearly in the North and 1231 in the 
Centre-South. The results are close to the results for the larger, unbalanced sample for 
the North, and again no coefficient is significant for the Centre-South.  
 
Finally, column (e) gives the consequences of choosing a different wage 
deflator, the national CPI rather than the regional CPIs. There is not much change in 
the coefficients for the groups in the North, but interestingly, the Centre-South’s 
public sector coefficient now becomes significantly negative, indicating 
procyclicality. The implication here is that public sector negotiations take place with 
the national CPI in mind. However, the implication is not clear-cut, because public 
sector wages in the North need to be deflated by Northern (not national) prices to 
respond significantly to market conditions. Overall, however, it can be said that the 
choice of price deflator does not make much difference.54 
 
                                                 
54Results of wage deflated by the National CPI on unemployment rates calculated from the ECHP are 
presented in Peng and Siebert (2008), which are consistent with our findings in this chapter. 
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5.4.4 Regional analysis 
Results are given in Table 5. For this analysis, we use 28 region-year data points for 
the North, and 49 for the Centre-South (equations 4b). The cyclical unemployment 
measure for each of the 11 regions is now that region’s own change in unemployment. 
Looking first at the top panel contrasting the public and private sectors, we see little 
evidence of wage procyclicality in the public sector in either the North or Centre-
South. Nor is there wage procyclicality in the Centre-South’s private sector. However, 
in the North’s private sector there continues to be significant procyclicality, with a 
semi-elasticity of -3.14 for job stayers. Thus the picture of more flexibility in the 
North than the South, and in the private than the public sectors remains using the 
regional analysis. 
 
 However, breaking down the private sector into small and medium/large firms 
we obtain somewhat different findings from before, with larger firms not having 
procyclical wages in either region (and in the Centre-South having the wrong sign). 
As can be seen, only job stayers in Northern small firms now exhibit significant 
procyclicality, -8.62, with very small firms also showing signs of procyclicality. To 
find small firms having more flexible wages than large is no surprise, but finding no 
flexibility in larger Northern firms contradicts the time series results in Table 3. This 
issue is important, because the large Northern firms at the centre of Italy’s system of 
national agreements should be able to negotiate wage flexibility at least for 
themselves – as we found in the times series results. However, as noted above, wages 
in large firms are more likely to respond to more aggregated unemployment levels 
than the simple region. On the other hand, small firms are likely to respond to local 
unemployment conditions, which is what we find here. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
Following the methodology of earlier studies of the USA and the UK, we are able to 
make a fine distinction between wage movements of job stayers, of internal job 
movers, and external job movers. Job stayers are most important, and we find that 
stayers in Northern Italy have procyclical real wages. When we cut the samples, we 
find that the procyclicality of Northern wage movements is stronger for the private 
than the public sectors, and for small firms than large. This pattern is plausible. 
However, wages in the Centre-South have a perverse pattern of responding only to 
Northern unemployment conditions, and not at all to local conditions. Wages even of 
the smallest firms are irresponsive to local conditions. It looks as though the Northern 
labour market works in an efficient way, but the Southern does not.  
 
The argument that Italy’s system of institutional wage setting can explain our 
contrasting results for the North and Centre-South receives qualified support. At first 
blush, that fact that Northern unemployment determines Southern wage movements 
(as well as Northern) implies that wages are negotiated in the North, with only 
Northern conditions in mind, and then communicated southwards by institutional 
means such as extended collective agreements. It is easy to fit public sector wage 
determination into this picture since public sector wages are not regionally 
differentiated, and could easily be set in the North. Also, in this setup, wages in the 
South should be above equilibrium. Then, the high procyclicality of external movers’ 
wages in the South would also fit, since above-equilibrium wages in the South could 
give rise to a “hitting the jackpot” effect when a job is won. But the fact that the very 
smallest firms in the Centre-South have wage movements which only match labour 
market conditions in the North does not easily fit. Wages in this group, with its many 
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fringe and underground workers, are least likely to be closely tied by the North’s 
collective agreements. More research is needed here.  
 
Two results stand out, and will need to be tested in future work, as the ECHP 
panel lengthens. First, Italy’s centralised institutional arrangements have worked well 
for the North. The fact that all firm size categories in the North, both large and small, 
and even the public sector, have flexible wages shows that benefits can be achieved 
from high collective bargaining coverage. But, second, this institutional system has 
worked badly for the poorer Southern regions of the country.  
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Figure 5.1: Real Wage Changes (Job-stayers) and Unemployment Changes, by 
Region 
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Table 5.1: Means and Standard Deviations, Male Employees in the ECHP 1994-
2001 (Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
Variable  North Centre
-South 
Public sector:  0.180 0.280 
Very small firm(<5)  0.387 0.517 
Small firm(5≤ <20)  0.242 0.224 
Medium firm (20≤ 
<100) 
 0.190 0.139 
Private 
sector 
Large firm(100≤ )  0.181 0.120 
Agriculture  0.053 0.091 
Manufacturing  0.323 0.190 
Temporary contracts  0.070 0.152 
Workforce 
composition: 
proportions of 
total: 
Part-time workers  0.031 0.053 
Job stayers  0.755 0.764 
Internal movers  0.176 0.168 
Worker movement: 
proportions of total 
observations: External movers  0.069 0.067 
Job stayers (ΔlnWS)  0.045 
(0.41) 
0.050 
(0.38) 
Internal movers (ΔlnWW)  0.057 
(0.41) 
0.043 
(0.40) 
Real wage 
changes*: (ΔlnW): 
External movers (ΔlnWB)  0.045 
(0.70) 
-0.086 
(0.79) 
Average unemployment rate (%) **  4.8 11.1 
Average change in unemployment rate (ΔU)**  -0.030 
(0.44) 
0.552 
(0.56) 
Number of individuals  2,489 3,874 
Number of observations  6947 10,789  
 
Notes: * Wages are deflated by the corresponding regional CPI for the North and Centre-South. The 
change of wage calculation includes only full-timers. Other figures include part-timers. 
** Unemployment rates are calculated from the Labour Force Survey. 
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Table 5.2: Real Hourly Wage and Unemployment Changes  
(coefficients on Δut from wage change equations 5.4a) 
 
Region Job stayers Incremental effect for internal movers 
Incremental effect 
for external movers 
 a) Corresponding regional unemployment rates used to calculate ΔUt  
North -9.11*** -0.01 3.25 
 (2.19) (2.89) (23.8) 
Centre-South -3.14 8.05*** 0.61 
 (3.69) (3.37) (16.7) 
 b) Switched regional unemployment rates used to calculate ΔUt  
North -4.57 -4.89*** -6.94 
 (4.73) (1.74) (24.5) 
Centre-South -6.76*** 0.50 -16.5 
 (1.93) (5.08) (13.9) 
 c) National unemployment rates used to calculate ΔUt  
North -12.8*** -4.92* -1.55 
 (3.04) (3.21) (33.4) 
Centre-South -9.23*** 8.31 -15.1 
 (2.90) (5.79) (21.3) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
for two-tail tests. Wages for the North and Centre-South are deflated by corresponding regional CPIs.  
In panel (b), the unemployment rates are switched by region, so that wage changes in the North 
(Centre-South) are regressed on Centre-South (Northern) unemployment changes.
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Table 5.3: Real Hourly Wage and Unemployment Changes by Sector and Firm Size 
(coefficients on Δut from wage change equations 5.4a) 
 
  North  Centre-South 
  
Job 
stayers 
Incremental 
effect for 
internal 
movers 
Incremental 
effect for 
external 
movers 
Job 
stayers 
Incremental 
effect for 
internal 
movers 
Incremental 
effect for 
external 
movers 
 
a) Corresponding regional unemployment rates used to calculate 
ΔUt 
 
Public sector  -5.58** -7.03*** -2.86  -2.87 1.71 14.3 
  (2.92) (2.88) (71.8)  (2.76) (5.98) (18.8) 
Private sector -10.1*** 2.37 7.08  -3.54 12.0** -0.15 
  (2.90) (3.67) (17.7)  (4.50) (5.13) (18.9) 
-23.0 -8.73 49.7  2.28 19.2 -12.7 V. small 
firm (19.8) (19.3) (30.8)  (10.2) (15.2) (47.0) 
-7.41*** -3.59 7.89  -7.00 8.69*** 29.2 Small 
firm (2.47) (13.8) (20.0)  (6.31) (2.95) (26.2) 
-8.16** 0.27 -18.9  -0.77 25.0* -70.1** Medium 
firm (3.93) (12.2) (31.9)  (6.47) (15.94) (37.8) 
-6.41* 9.16* 10.7  -7.18 -2.21 26.7 
Private 
sector  
Large 
firm (3.58) (5.60) (17.9)  (5.22) (3.8) (45.6) 
 b) Switched regional unemployment rates used to calculate ΔUt  
Public sector  -2.97 -0.9 17.4  -4.06** 0.66 7.88 
  (3.94) (4.72) (74.4)  (2.22) (5.83) (19.0) 
Private sector -5.12 -6.92*** -4.68  -8.45*** -0.65 -19.0 
  (5.52) (2.04) (18.6)  (1.98) (7.59) (15.6) 
-33.5* 16.5 -2.91  -16.4*** 2.92 -26.0 V. small 
firm (17.3) (19.1) (41.7)  (5.41) (17.2) (46.7) 
3.55 -23.1*** -9.31  -6.67 4.20 14.3 Small 
firm (4.32) (8.98) (20.9)  (6.15) (4.63) (28.1) 
4.08 -15.0* 1.19  -7.12* -11.5 -47.1 Medium 
firm (5.46) (10.0) (34.2)  (5.04) (18.4) (43.1) 
-6.99** -1.72 14.5  -3.60 1.34 -43.3 
Private 
sector : 
Large 
firm (3.41) (7.30) (17.6)  (5.95) (3.83) (41.3) 
 
Notes: as for Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.4: Sensitivity Tests - Job Stayers  
(coefficients on Δut from wage change equations 5.4a) 
 
 
 Benchmark: 
Table 3 
results for 
stayers 
Aggregate 
results (not 
using panel 
data) 
Annual 
rather than 
hourly 
wages 
Balanced 
dataset 
National 
rather than 
regional 
CPI 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
North 
-5.58** -0.18 -3.81** -7.43*** -3.91 Public Sector 
(2.92) (0.83) (1.91) (1.62) (3.19) 
-10.1*** -2.02 -9.72*** -9.04** -8.51** Private Sector 
(2.90) (2.13) (2.77) (4.94) (4.56) 
-13.6** -3.34 -13.2** -11.62 -11.9* Small 
firm 
(< 20) 
(6.50) (7.65) (5.96) (8.50) (8.16) 
-7.35*** -1.49 -6.86*** -6.96** -5.83** 
Private 
Sector 
 
Medium
+ firm 
(20 +) 
(2.23) (3.46) (2.52) (3.40) (2.87) 
Centre-South 
Public Sector -2.87 -4.39 -3.24 -1.45 -5.46* 
 (2.76) (4.25) (2.76) (3.97) (3.50) 
-3.54 -4.85 -1.44 -1.45 -5.96 Private Sector 
(4.50) (3.97) (4.34) (4.09) (4.29) 
-2.61 -5.58 0.64 0.02 -4.94 Small 
firm 
(< 20) 
(6.42) (5.21) (5.40) (5.33) (5.62) 
-3.83 -4.05 -3.04 -2.74 -6.43 
Private 
Sector 
 
Medium
+ firm 
(20 +) 
(5.23) (4.20) (5.04) (3.29) (5.75) 
 
Notes: Basic model uses panel data with hourly wages deflated by regional CPIs, regressed on 
corresponding regional unemployment rates. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tail 
tests.  
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Table 5.5: Regional Real Hourly Wage and Unemployment Changes Using Region-
Year Data  
(coefficients on Δujt from wage change equations 4b) 
 
  North  Centre-South 
  
Job stayers Incremental 
effect for 
internal 
movers 
Incremental 
effect for 
external 
movers 
 Job stayers Incremental 
effect for 
internal 
movers 
Incremental 
effect for 
external 
movers 
Public sector  0.76 -9.89** 5.85  0.40 0.21 14.2* 
  (2.28) (3.99) (31.8)  (0.79) (1.57) (9.26) 
Private sector -3.14* -0.06 -6.33  2.40** -2.85* -0.70 
  (2.30) (4.87) (7.66)  (1.12) (1.79) (4.87) 
-2.97 -20.9 -26.9  0.02 -1.33 6.84 small firm 
(0-5) (10.5) (22.3) (31.4)  (2.69) (4.79) (8.66) 
-8.62** -3.13 9.22  0.68 -1.93 -2.77 small firm 
(5-20) (4.12) (12.1) (13.7)  (1.51) (2.51) (8.78) 
-0.67 2.24 -2.63  4.30*** -3.45 -1.42 Large firm 
(20-100) (3.82) (6.37) (18.9)  (1.42) (4.18) (8.58) 
1.51 0.53 -2.10  4.12** -0.98 -6.19 
Private 
sector  
Large firm 
(100-500) (2.62) (3.31) (15.4)  (1.96) (3.05) (10.0) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for 
two-tail tests. There are 4×7 region-years in the North and 7×7 region-years in the Centre-South. 
Corresponding regional unemployment rates are used to calculate ΔUt for each of the 11 regions.  Wages 
are deflated by corresponding regional CPIs.  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY IN GERMANY AND THE UK: NEW 
RESULTS USING PANEL DATA 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses real wage adjustment over the business cycle using panel micro 
data for Germany 1984-2002 and the British Household Panel Survey 1991-2004. We 
follow Chapter 5 which analyses real wage adjustment in Italy. Germany, like Italy, has a 
regulated economy which forms an instructive contrast with the more flexible economies 
of the US and the UK, which have been shown to have wider wage differentials as well 
as significant real wage flexibility, using micro panel data. Our aim is to analyze the 
wage flexibility picture in this chapter, using microeconomic panel data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). We will apply the same variable definitions and 
analytical methods to the UK’s British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), thus allowing a 
close comparison between Germany and the UK, and with Italy in the previous chapter. 
Our study will have the further interest, for the UK economy, of providing results from 
the BHPS which can be compared to Devereux and Hart’s (2006) analysis using the New 
Earnings Survey. 
 
In practice, it is difficult unambiguously to classify a country’s wage-setting 
institutions. Most discussions accept that collective agreements in the UK and the US are 
only important in certain sectors, and are neither centralised and/or coordinated. But 
Germany is more difficult. Franz and Pfeiffer (2006, Table 3) find that 57% of (private 
sector) employers they questioned believed labour union contracts were very important in 
preventing wage cuts for unskilled workers. However, this figure leaves a substantial 
minority, and the more skilled workers, for whom union contracts are not important. At 
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the same time, Germany’s system of pattern bargaining can be taken as highly 
coordinated (see e.g., Kenworthy, 2001, Figure 1), and also “governable” in Traxler’s 
(2003) terms due to the legal enforceability of collective agreements. Ochel (2005, 105) 
argues that pattern bargaining, with wage agreements following the metalworking 
industry located in prosperous regions, may result in wages which are “excessive” for the 
economically weaker regions. On the other hand, he notes the possibility that Germany’s 
coordinated wage setting results in wages being more responsive to macroeconomic 
shocks, since coordination assists in aligning the bargaining parties’ expectations. In 
other words, the parties’ gains to changing wages are higher if all change, so that there is 
a “strategic complementarity” (Ball and Romer, 1991) in wage adjustments. In this 
chapter we directly test whether such coordination makes real wages responsive to 
macroeconomic shocks, making a crucial distinction between West and East Germany. 
 
Our methodology here is similar to Chapter 5, and relies on panel data for 
individuals. Data used in this chapter allow fine distinctions to be made between country 
regions, between public and private sector, and by firm size. It is worth testing all of 
these distinctions, which have implications for the way institutions affect wage flexibility 
hence earnings inequality. Thus, lower real wage procylicality among large firms - which 
are more affected by collective bargaining – would suggest this factor causes stickiness 
and less earnings inequality. Similarly, lower procyclicality in the public than the private 
sector would point to the extra authority of the state in setting public sector wages 
(Traxler, 1999), as well as softer public sector budget constraints.  
 
The alternative approach is to use country data, which is the method followed by 
current studies from the international wage flexibility project (Dickens et al, 2006; also 
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Holden and Wulfsberg, 2007). This approach suggests widespread real wage rigidity 
since wage changes clump near expected inflation rates. Downward nominal wage 
rigidity also appears common. However, the aggregate method cannot test for differences 
within countries, which is our contribution. 
 
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) argue on the effect of implicit contracts on the 
movement of wages over the business cycle using micro data. Their model shows that in 
a rigid labour market, in which workers cannot move costlessly, they would accept a 
fixed wage decided by the market condition in their first employment year. It implies in a 
segmented and rigid labour market, such as the Centre-South of Italy in the previous 
chapter, we will see, also maybe the East of Germany in this chapter, wages are set by 
collective bargaining following a “standard rate” principle and hence show more 
homogeneity. However, Devereux and Hart (2007) find evidence that this kind of implicit 
contract is not very important in the UK, maybe because workers in the UK can move 
costlessly and wages here are set at individual or company level according to 
contemporaneous market conditions. Thus, the UK would show a different “The Spot 
Market Matters” model from “The Institutions Matters” model in the continental 
European countries such as Italy and Germany. This chapter aims to explore this 
difference by comparing the real wage cyclicality in these three countries, allowing deep 
analysis and comparison on distinctions by country regions, sector and firm size using 
micro data.      
 
A further advantage of our methodology is that we can again follow Devereux 
and Hart’s (2006) distinction between job stayers (remaining in the same job over the 
year), internal movers (i.e., within-company movers), and external movers (between-
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company). While job stayers are the most important numerically, bumping workers 
within the company up and down a job ladder as in Reder’s (1955) theory of internal job 
ladders, can provide a valuable further form of flexibility even if wages for stayers are 
rigid. Furthermore, as regards external movers, if this group experiences large real wage 
changes with the cycle, the implication is that incumbents are receiving rents. Again, 
such a finding might provide an insight into the working of labour market institutions in 
the particular case.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present our 
estimation methods, and in Section 3, we describe the data. Section 4 examines the basic 
predictions of theoretical models by region and compares our results with other findings. 
The final section concludes. 
 
6.2 Estimation methods 
As in Chapter 5, our empirical work uses the-standard two-step estimation procedure 
(beginning with Solon, 1997), to get round the Moulton (1986) problem that, though we 
have thousands of individuals, each year provides only one business cycle 
(unemployment) observation. To circumvent this problem, in step 1 we estimate a wage 
change equation using individual data. This equation is the same as equation (5.3): 
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Definitions of all variables are also the same as in equation (5.3). In step 2, we 
then derive estimates of the wage cyclicality of stayers, for example, by regressing st on 
the unemployment change variable (Δut), and a linear time trend. In this step, we only 
have time series variation, reducing the number of observations – in our case 19 years for 
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West Germany (1984-2002), 11 years for the East Germany (1992-2002) and 13 years for 
the UK (1991/2-2003/4). Our data cover more than one full business cycle in Germany 
and the UK. Following Chapter 5, we use weighted least square regression, where the 
weights are the numbers of individuals observed in a given year. This equation is the 
same as equation (5.4a): 
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Specification of the variables in equations (6.1) and (6.2) requires care in several 
respects, which we will cover in turn. First, there is the definition of the wage variable. 
Here we take quite a broad definition55, including overtime, bonuses, and profit-sharing 
(and also pay from second jobs in the case of the GSOEP) because this definition allows 
the best comparison between the GSOEP and the BHPS, and to our results for Italy in 
Chapter 5. This wage measure is also close to the measures used in Solon et al (1994) and 
Devereux (2001) for the United States. Use of the broad definition will reduce the 
measured extent of rigidity: basic wages could be rigid while there could be flexibility in 
other components, especially bonuses and overtime. Thus, our results may show higher 
flexibility than results using the basic wage such as Devereux and Hart (2006) for the UK 
(see below). Still, flexibility imparted by variation in overtime and bonuses is genuine 
flexibility and should be considered. 
 
A further issue is the definition of the wage deflator. Both the GSOEP and the 
BHPS provide data on consumer prices. We find it appropriate to deflate wages in 
                                                 
55 Specifically, labour earnings is the sum of income from primary job, secondary job, 13th and  14th  month 
pay,  Christmas bonus pay, holiday bonus pay, miscellaneous bonus pay, and profit-sharing income. We 
exclude the self-employed, because of difficulties with the reliability of their self-reported pay figures. 
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Germany (West or East) by price indices for the appropriate region. In the case of the 
UK, we use a single price index. 
 
Next, there is the definition of the hours variable. Since we work with annual 
earnings for Germany, we require a measure of annual hours. Annual hours worked is 
calculated by adding together the estimated annual hours of full-time, part-time, and 
short-time work.56 For the UK, the hourly wage is computed as the latest gross pay 
divided by the number of hours in the pay period. The working hours of the last pay 
period is the product of the number of weeks in the last pay period times weekly working 
hours including normal and overtime.  
 
Errors in reporting of hours can give rise to spurious cyclicality of wages. In 
particular, workers may report contract hours rather than actual hours worked, causing 
reported hours to remain overly steady from year to year. Such understatement of the 
cyclicality of hours will give an overstatement of the cyclicality of hourly wages. We 
have checked our hours variable carefully. We find, even with 10 percent tolerance of the 
change in hours, on average, only 65% of job stayers had the same reported weekly hours 
in two adjacent years in the Germany. Tests on the BHPS also show many changes year-
on-year in working hours. Only about 77% of job stayers have the same reported normal 
weekly hours in adjacent year. Thus, there seems to be significant variation in reported 
hours from year to year in both Germany and the UK, especially given that true hours are 
likely to remain constant for most stayers. Furthermore, hours show some significant 
procyclicality in a regression with the unemployment rate. Thus, we take it that the bias 
from misreporting of hours is not large for our data.  
                                                 
56 Annual hours of work in each of these three states is calculated by multiplying the average number of 
hours worked per week by the number of months worked in each of these three states for the previous year 
and by 4.33 (the average number of weeks per month). 
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Next, there is the issue of whether to use a regionally differentiated 
unemployment variable, or a country-wide variable. If labour mobility between regions is 
low, then regional differentiation is indicated. We experimented with both types, 
including a South versus North-Central split for the UK, as well as the obvious East-West 
split for Germany. We found that regional differentiation for Germany gave the most 
sensible results, together with a single unemployment variable for the UK, and 
accordingly report this specification. 
 
There is also the question of forming the stayer and the within- and between-
company mover groups. For both datasets, we use tenure with the company: if the tenure 
is one year or less, the respondent is a between-company mover, otherwise, a job stayer 
or within-company mover. (We remove new entrants to the labour market from the 
category of external movers.). The BHPS asks a direct question: “What was the date you 
started working in your present position, by that I mean the beginning of your current 
spell of the job you are doing now for your present employer?” which provides clear 
information about the starting year of the job spell. We identify a job stayer as an 
employee who answers yes to the direct question in the case of the BHPS and a similar 
question for the GSOEP57. If there is a missing value for this question, we identify a 
stayer as an individual who has no change in residential area, working sector and 
industry. A within-company mover is then a worker whose tenure is more than one year 
but is not a job stayer.58 
                                                 
57 The GSOEP asks a direct question: “Did you change your job or start a new one? If not, are you working 
in your original position?”(DWI 2002), which provides clear information about the job spell.  
58 The GSOEP provides good data on 17 residential areas, public/private sector and one digit (9) and two 
digit (33) industries of current jobs. We choose one digit industries to define the job stayer here, because 
using two digit industries affects little. When we limit the sample only to those defined as job stayers from 
the direct question, our basic conclusions do not change. For the BHPS, we use 19 residential areas, 
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Finally, there is the question of what to do about structural breaks over time. For 
East Germany, we drop the 1991 observation, so as to avoid the special wage turbulence 
associated with re-unification. For West Germany, there is the possibility that over the 
long time period we consider, the underlying bargaining structure changes, particularly 
since the late 1990s (see Doellgast and Greer, 2007). In fact, our sample period for 
Germany ends in 2002, and hence will not be much affected by such recent changes. 
 
6.3 Data Description 
The GSOEP is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of private households in 
Germany. The same private households, persons and families have been surveyed yearly 
since 1984 (the GSOEP West). In June 1990, the survey was extended to the territory of 
the former German Democratic Republic (the GSOEP East). In 1984, 5,624 households 
containing a total of 15,729 individual respondents participated in the GSOEP West. 
After the joining of the GSOEP East in 1990, an immigrant sample was added as well to 
account for the changes that took place in Germany society in 1994/95. Further new 
samples were added in 1998, 2000 and 2002. Thus, with a high degree of stability over 
time, there were 12,055 households containing a total 29,982 individual respondents 
participating in 2002. 
 
For this research, we formed an unbalanced panel of 20,574 male workers with 
clear employment information, in which 16,474 workers are from West Germany for the 
period 1984-2002 and 4,100 from East Germany for the period 1992-2002 (see Table 
                                                                                                                                                 
public/private sector and four digit (9999) industries of current job to define job stayers. However, the 
BHPS updated the industry categorisation from the SIC80 to the SIC92 in the 2002/2003 survey. Thus, 
only in that year, we use one digit (5) industries. Our results for the UK are not sensitive to the choice of 
industry variables rather than the direct question. 
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6.1).59 In concentrating on males, we are following the literature (e.g., Devereux, 2001; 
Shin and Solon, 2006). In any case, the female participation rate in Germany is only 
about 65 percent, compared with about 80 percent for the males, so that our female 
sample would be much less than males, giving difficulties when we analyse sub-groups. 
 
For the United Kingdom, we use the first thirteen waves of the BHPS, which was 
designed as an annual survey of each adult (16+) member of a nationally representative 
sample of more than 5,000 households in the UK, making a total of approximately 
10,000 individual interviews yearly. The same individuals are re-interviewed in 
successive waves. A development in 1999/2000 was the recruitment of two additional 
samples from Scotland and Wales to increase the relatively small sample sizes for these 
regions. In 2001/2002, an additional sample from Northern Ireland was added. Thus, the 
sample should remain broadly representative of the whole population of the UK as it 
changed through the 1990s and beyond. From this dataset, we formed an unbalanced 
panel of 13,758 male workers with clear employment information. 
 
We use changes of the unemployment rate as our cyclical indicator. As noted 
above, our analyses distinguish between the West and East for Germany, as the national 
unemployment rates are used for the UK. Hence, we use the corresponding 
regional/national male unemployment rate derived (FSO 2007 and ONS 2007b) from the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) in Germany and the UK.60  
 
                                                 
59 Though the GSOEP East actually started in 1990, there is no employment information for workers in 
1990 and 1991. Thus, our data for the East Germany is actually for the period 1992-2002. 
60 Results on unemployment rates calculated from the GSOEP and BHPS are presented in Peng and Siebert 
(2007), which are consistent with our findings in this chapter. 
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Table 6.1 presents summary statistics for (the former) West and East Germany 
and the UK, for the key variables. The three columns seem quite similar in the first and 
second panels, apart from the fact that the workplaces are much smaller in the UK (68% 
small/medium companies) and East Germany (66.3%) than West Germany (only 47%).61 
There is a somewhat higher proportion working in private sector in the West Germany, 
but few temps and part timers in either country, as is to be expected in an all-male 
sample. It seems that the proportion of job stayers is a little higher in the West Germany, 
while the external movers’ proportion is a little higher in the East. The internal movers’ 
proportion is distinctly lower in the UK than Germany, either west or east. Perhaps the 
bigger firm size of German companies provides more space and resources for internal 
promotion/demotion than in the UK.  
 
As regards wage levels, we see that wages in the West are much higher than in the 
East. There is a stable wage gap by category of about 30 percent between the East and 
West. Also, for both German regions (and for the UK), public sector wages are 
equivalent to wages of large companies in the private sector, which are about 20 percent 
higher than small/medium companies in the private sector.  
 
In Germany, centralised collective agreements have been used to push East 
German wages up from 7% of West German levels at the time of unification in 1989, to 
about 72 % in 2002 (Ochel 2005). As Ochel (2005, p167) argues, the initial collective 
wage negotiations in Germany were “proxy negotiations” that were carried out by West 
Germany employers’ associations and trade unions with the aim of equalisation of wages 
                                                 
61 The GSOEP and the BHPS can only provide categorized information by employer size. We define a 
small company as a workplace with less than 20 (25) employees, a medium company as one with from 20 
(25) to 200 employees, and a big company as one with 200 to 2000 (1000) employees. A large company 
has 2000 (1000) or more employees in Germany (the UK).   
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across Germany. High welfare payments subsequently have permitted the high wages to 
continue. This uplifting of wages in the East seems to have had the same speed in the 
public and large-firm private sectors, but been somewhat slower in the small firm 
category (a 40% gap can be detected here between East and West).  
 
Evidence on the uplifting of East German wages is also shown in the wage change 
data at the bottom of the table, where we see that job stayers and internal movers in the 
East Germany have faster wage growth than those in the West. However, external movers 
do not. In fact, external movers in both East and West Germany suffer negative wage 
changes on average – in contrast to the UK – pointing to involuntary moves, and rents for 
incumbents62.  
 
6.4 Empirical results 
The GSOEP results for the unemployment change coefficients from equation (6.2) are 
reported in Table 6.2, for the East and West separately. We differentiate between the 
public sector and the private sector. Also, within the private sector we consider different 
size company categories to test whether the opt-out from collective agreements (Ochel, 
2005, p95) permitted to small firms makes their wage movements any more procyclical. 
Furthermore, small companies (under 5 or 10 employees in the legislation) are less likely 
to be covered by employment protection laws (Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst 2006, p19), 
meaning less shielding of job stayers and accordingly more wage flexibility. 
 
The table shows markedly different labour markets in the West and East. In the 
West, real wages of job stayers in the private sector exhibit significant and highly 
                                                 
62 Our wage change statistics for the UK are similar to those in Devereux and Hart (2006), in particular the 
large positive wage changes for between-company movers. 
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procyclical movements (-1.32). However, private sector wages in the East are rigid 
except for large firms with more than 2000 employees (-1.32). It appears as though the 
pattern bargaining in the West delivers wage flexibility in that area’s private sector, but 
not in the East. Interestingly, there is no evidence of greater flexibility among small firms 
in the West, which suggests that there is not so much benefit to being “untrammelled” by 
collective agreements. Put in another way, for the big firms which lead the collective 
bargaining, the benefits of coordination are real. However, these benefits do not extend to 
the East, where wages set are above equilibrium except for the very large firms (2000+). 
Public sector wage behaviour is more similar in the two regions, being completely 
inflexible. 
 
The results for the BHPS are presented in Table 6.3. The top panel gives results 
for the country as a whole, while the bottom reports on the South-North split. Taking the 
whole country first, we see that the pattern of real wage cyclicality is similar to that in the 
West Germany, with the private sector flexible, and the public sector not. Here we differ 
from Devereux and Hart (2006) who find significant, though lower, flexibility for the UK 
public sector based on New Earnings Survey data. It is also worth noting how in the 
public sector the incremental wage effect for external movers is high and significant (-
5.18). This result implies that moving into and out of public sector over the cycle has 
strong wage consequences, as would be expected if rents were available to incumbent 
workers in the sector. 
 
In the bottom panel we give some results from experiments with dividing the UK 
into two regions: the South, and the North. Here we pool the public and private sectors 
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for simplicity.63 As can be seen, there is not much difference in the estimates for the two 
regions, in both of which stayers’ real wages are significantly procyclical. The chi-square 
test for equality of coefficients is easily passed. Thus, there in no extra wage inflexibility 
in the UK’s North such as might occur if wage-setting mechanisms imposed wage 
movements derived from the prosperous South. The picture of regional labour 
segmentation in Germany, and Italy (see Chapter 5) is quite different.  
 
Comparing Tables 6.2 and 6.3 we see that wage flexibility in the private sector of 
the UK appears to be much larger than that in West Germany. Both small (<20) and large 
(>2000) firms in the West Germany show the right sign but insignificant wage 
procyclicality. Only the large-size firm category in the UK shows insignificant cyclical 
effect. Hence, the overall wage procyclicality in the private sector in the UK is almost 
double the size of that in West Germany. Further, it must be remembered that we are 
using a similar wage definition for both datasets, and are comparing like with like. The 
finding of considerable UK (private sector) wage flexibility is a point against the view 
that coordination of bargaining is necessary for firms in an industry to be willing to alter 
their wages, since there has not been much coordination of private sector bargaining in 
the UK for some time. For example, the famous engineering agreement came to an end in 
1989, when the Engineering Employers withdrew from national bargaining.  
 
Making comparisons with other research using panel data, our findings in Tables 
6.2 and 6.3 indicate that real wage cyclicality - for West Germany at least - is comparable 
with that in the US and UK. Thus, for male stayers in the US, Solon et al (1994) find an 
elasticity of -1.2 for male stayers, and Shin and Solon (2006) find a similar -1.5. Also for 
                                                 
63 If we only concentrate on the private sector, wages are more different between the south and the north-
central. The south (stayer:-2.78***) shows higher wage procyclicality in the private sector than the north-
central (-2.17***). But, the chi-square test for equality of coefficients is still insignificant (7.22, p>0.1246).  
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the US, Devereux (2001) finds -1.09 for male job stayers (using a narrow wage 
definition). For the UK, Devereux and Hart (2006) find -1.93 for male private sector 
stayers, which is a little lower than our findings for the BHPS, perhaps due to their using 
a more narrowly defined wage variable. For Italy, we find considerable wage cyclicality 
for male stayers in Northern Italy (-6.41~-8.16) but inflexibility in the Centre-South 
region. Thus, the problem of inflexible real wages affects specifically lagging regions 
such as East Germany and Southern Italy, and of course the public sector everywhere. 
. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This paper compares the cyclical behaviour of male real wages in Germany and the UK 
using the GSOEP 1984-2002 and the BHPS 1991-2004. Following the methodology in 
particular of Devereux and Hart (2006) we distinguish between job stayers (remaining in 
the same job), and within- and between-company job movers. Stayers are the large 
majority in both countries. Using changes in the unemployment rate as the cyclical 
measure, we find real wages of stayers in the private sector in West Germany – but not 
East Germany - to be procyclical, and quite sensitive to unemployment, comparable to 
the US and the UK. We find cyclicality in the public sector in neither country. 
Furthermore, for the UK we find that real wages in the North are just as procyclical as in 
the-South. There is nothing like the marked and continuing regional labour market 
segmentation that is to be found between West and East Germany, or North and South 
Italy. 
 
The results suggest that real wages are not sticky in the private sectors both of the 
UK and West Germany. It is in the public sector of both countries, and in East Germany, 
that stickiness occurs. However, we might argue that both these cases of sticky wages are 
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special. For the public sector case, there might be little reason to expect labour demand 
movements to be in step with the aggregate unemployment rate, and for East German 
case there is the unique shock of unification. We are then left with a comparison of the 
private sectors of the UK and West Germany. Wages in the UK show much larger 
procyclicality than in West Germany, both of which appear to be flexible, whatever the 
underlying differences in wage-setting institutions – be it the pattern bargaining 
coordination of West Germany, or the company bargaining and individualism of the UK. 
The policy conclusion seems to be that when regions within a country are reasonably 
prosperous, the two types of wage-setting institution give the same result. However, 
when a region is lagging, as in the case of East Germany or Italy’s South, pattern 
bargaining delays recovery. 
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Table 6.1: Means and Standard Deviations, Males in the GSOEP and the BHPS 
(Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
 
Variable 
 
West 
Germany 
(1984-
2002) 
East 
Germany 
(1992-
2002) 
UK 
(1991-
2004) 
Private sector 0.805 0.772 0.783 
Permanent contracts* 0.933 0.903 0.925 
Workers in small 
/medium company  
(employees<200) 
0.470 0.663 0.680 
Proportions 
of total 
observations: 
Full-time workers 0.872 0.872 0.921 
Job stayers 0.740 0.710 0.789 
Internal movers 0.146 0.135 0.079 
Worker 
movement: 
proportions 
of total 
observations: 
External movers 0.114 0.155 0.132 
Overall 3.22 
(0.45) 
2.82 
(0.44) 
1.93 
(0.49) 
Public sector 3.31 
(0.38) 
2.97 
(0.36) 
2.08 
(0.44) 
Big/large 
company (≥200) 
3.33 
(0.39) 
2.99 
(0.38) 
2.05 
(0.46) 
Mean real 
wage, 1995 
prices 
(lnW)**: 
Private 
sector: 
Small/medium 
company (<200) 
3.11 
(0.47) 
2.71 
(0.44) 
1.82 
(0.49) 
Job stayers (ΔlnWS)  
0.011 
(0.25) 
0.017 
(0.26) 
0.026 
(0.39) 
Internal movers (ΔlnWW)  
0.008 
(0.27) 
0.011 
(0.28) 
0.066 
(0.38) 
Real wage 
changes 
(ΔlnW)***: 
External movers (ΔlnWB)  
-0.017 
(0.36) 
-0.026 
(0.34) 
0.067 
(0.52) 
Number of individuals  16,474 4,100 13,758 
Average number of observations each year   5,687 2,096 5,789 
Total number of observations  108,056 23,052 75,262 
 
Notes: * The consistent contract variables in the GSOEP only appear in 1985, 1988 and 1995-2002 
           ** Log form wages are only for full-time workers. 
           *** Wage changes are only for full-time workers, excluding outlying cases.  
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Table 6.2: Real wage and unemployment changes, by sector and firmsize, Males in the GSOEP   
(coefficients on Δut from wage change equation 6.2) 
 
 
  West (1984-2002)  East (1992-2002) 
Incremental effects:  Incremental effects:  
 
Job  
stayers internal 
movers 
external movers
 Job  
stayers internal 
movers 
external 
movers 
Public Sector  -0.51 -1.75 -3.59  0.52 -1.18 -7.67 
  (0.50) (6.44) (6.24)  (0.76) (3.45) (8.15) 
Private Sector  -1.32** -1.88 -3.14  -0.41 -0.17 1.69 
  (0.62) (1.77) (2.78)  (0.40) (1.70) (2.17) 
-1.33 -2.89 0.79  -0.12 0.32 0.85 Small firm  
(~20) (1.07) (3.05) (3.09)  (1.03) (5.62) (2.78) 
-1.29*** -2.69 -5.08*  -0.03 -1.82 4.45 Medium firm 
(20~200) (0.58) (2.92) (3.27)  (0.51) (2.25) (3.85) 
-2.15*** -0.24 -2.05  -0.40 -0.24 6.05 Big firm 
(200~2000) (0.74) (1.67) (3.13)  (1.58) (3.21) (4.58) 
-0.43 -1.75 -6.99  -1.32* 6.97 -9.55 
Private 
sector: 
Large firm 
(2000~) (0.58) (2.28) (8.51)  (0.78) (4.33) (6.52) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tail tests. There are 55,233 individual observations in the first 
stage (46,848 for the west and 8,385 for the east), and 17/10 region-wide weighted observations for the west/east in the second stage. Unemployment rates are from the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS)-Germany. Wage is deflated by regional CPI, also provided by the Federal Statistics Office (FSO).  
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Table 6.3: Real wage and unemployment changes by sector and firm size, Males 
in the BHPS 1991-2004    
(coefficients on Δut from wage change equation 6.2) 
 
  Males (1991-2004) 
 
Job  
stayers 
Incremental 
effect for 
internal 
movers 
Incremental 
effect for 
external 
movers 
Whole Economy 
Public Sector  0.86 -1.14 -5.18*** 
  (0.93) (4.20) (2.49) 
Private Sector  -2.57*** 1.26 1.51 
  (0.58) (0.87) (1.44) 
-3.13*** 6.77*** 4.81** Small firm  
(~25) (0.86) (2.56) (2.46) 
-1.94*** 0.04 0.44 Medium firm 
(25~200) (0.61) (2.03) (1.33) 
-3.29*** -3.57 -1.65 Big firm 
(200~1000) (0.88) (3.05) (2.43) 
-0.49 -1.40 -1.12 
Private 
sector: 
Large firm 
(1000~) (1.86) (3.42) (5.34) 
North-South Split 
South -1.70*** 0.23 -1.46 
 (0.38) (1.91) (1.46) 
North-Central -1.77*** 1.00 1.15 
 (0.60) (0.72) (1.11) 
Chi-square test for equality of coefficients for South 
and North-Central 3.38 (p>0.7592) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
for two-tail tests. There are 25,667 individual observations in the first stage, and 12 region-wide 
weighted observations for the second stage. Unemployment rates are from the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS)-UK. Wage is deflated by national CPI, also provided by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 
What are institutions? Why are they important for earnings inequality? According to 
Hodgson (2006), this term “institutions” has a long history of usage in the social 
sciences, dating back at least to Giambattista Vico in his Scienza Nuova of 1725. 
Institutions are important to a society, since they can provide some kinds of “public 
goods” to the whole society or certain collective sub-groups within the society (such 
as trade union members), just as organizations of government and public service. 
Even though it is widely accepted that institutions are an indispensable part of a 
society, according to Hodgson (2006), there is no consensus in the definition of this 
concept.  
 
In North’s (1990, p3) simple words, institutions are “rules of the game … 
or …humanly devised constraints”. Institutions are identified with the making and 
enforcing of rules to govern collective human behaviors. Hence, we can regard 
institutions as rules of collective behaviour in a society or “a regularity of the conduct 
of individuals” (Hayek 1967, p67). In my thesis, institutions are the rules of collective 
behaviour in labour markets. Workers get paid from their jobs according to their 
productivity as well as the institutional environment they are under. 
    
As far as the different labour market performance between the UK and 
continental European countries is concerned, it is convenient to simply accept the 
“Krugman hypothesis”, that the high earnings inequality in the UK as well as the high 
unemployment rates in continental Europe are due to different institutions such as 
centralised collective bargaining, or employment protection laws. However, many 
years ago, Addison and Siebert (1979) said: 
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“Many labour economists of this persuasion have been curiously 
reluctant to believe that the genesis of labour market institutions 
may lie at least partly in economics. The task is, then to look for a 
broader framework - a structure that lies behind actual market 
forces - that provides explanations of why the latter take the form 
they do.” (Addison and Siebert, 1979, p5-6) 
 
On the one hand, institutions should arise from Nash equilibriums of games in 
a society (see the theoretic model in Koeniger et al 2004). Otherwise, institutions as 
game rules would be rejected by game players, including individuals and 
organizations in the society. On the other hand, institutions determine strategy sets 
and utility functions in games. Players’ behaviors arise from the given set of 
institutional rules, just as Hayek (1973, p11) emphasized that “man is as much a rule-
following animal as a purpose-seeking one.” Different institutions in the UK and in 
continental European countries may arise from long term social equilibriums as well 
as short and medium term shocks in a dynamic society. Thus, we can see “more 
pressures for reform, but also more opposition to change” in the whole Europe (Boeri 
2005, p8).  
 
We should not ignore other short or medium term impacts from new 
technologies and globalization. Garicano and Hansberg’s (2006) model suggests that 
a reduction in the cost of processing information leads to an increase in the 
knowledge-content of all jobs, an organisation decentralization and an increase in 
wage inequality within skill categories, while a reduction in the cost of 
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communication should reduce the knowledge content of production jobs, and increase 
centralization and skill hierarchies within the organization. This in turn should 
decrease wage inequality among less skilled workers but, increase inequality among 
skilled workers and between skilled and less skilled workers. Their theory shows that 
technological and organisational evolution may work together to change wage 
structures.  
 
At the same time, the rise of China and India is an important phenomenon in 
the international labor market. Freeman (1995) argued that the lack of compelling 
evidence that trade underlies the problems of the less skilled in the past does not rule 
out the possibility that trade will dominate labour market outcomes in the future. Even 
though we can generally reject international trade as the explanation of the past 
decline in the demand for unskilled workers (since the 1970s), there is a good chance 
that, in the future, pressures for factor price equalization will grow. Just as Freeman 
(1995) mentioned, maybe wages were not set in Beijing yesterday or today, but 
tomorrow they will be. 
 
With these ideas in mind, let me summarise my findings, and consider 
implications for future research. My study has aimed to describe and analyze earnings 
inequality in the UK, incorporating institutional measures and changes. Institutional 
reforms since the Thatcher-era in labour market are widely regarded as a major 
contributor to the UK’s better economic performance as well as her higher earnings 
inequality (see Blanchflower and Freeman 1993, and Devereux and Hart 2006). The 
conventional argument is that flexible labour market institutions in the UK allow 
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wages to adjust to changes of market conditions and achieve new equilibriums as 
required.  
 
In continental European countries, however, centralized wage setting 
institutions prevent wages from falling in response to economic shocks and the 
imposition of new marketing conditions “flows”. Hence, in the face of SBTC, the 
rigidity of labour markets maintains the wage of unskilled workers above equilibrium. 
There is an excess-demand for skilled workers as well as a higher unemployment rate 
for unskilled workers. Thus, it is not surprising to see evidence of a negative 
association between rigid institutions and wage inequality in cross-country analysis 
(e.g. Koeniger et al 2004, Table3, p27, see also the survey in Siebert 2006, Figure 1, 
p14).  
 
It is sometimes argued that wage flexibility can also perhaps be achieved by 
centralised and coordinated bargaining, as in Germany and Italy because of strategic 
complementarity (see Ball and Romer 1991, Guiso et al 2005 and Peng and Siebert 
2007, 2008). However, why then is wage bargaining at the individual or company 
level preferred in the UK? On the one hand, it may be supposed that coordination of 
wage bargaining is not, in fact, necessary for labour market flexibility. On the other 
hand, US-style labour market institutions may not seem to be the best way to improve 
labour market performance, especially considering the cost of higher earnings 
inequality. Thus, the efficiency of such institutional reforms is further questioned in 
this section. 
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In Chapter 2, I track the growth of earnings inequality in the UK from 1972 to 
2002. Earnings inequality has increased substantially over the last three decades, 
during which overall hourly wage inequality (90th-10th percentile differential) has 
increased by about 25 percent for males. Along with the increase of skill (mainly 
education) inequality and skill premiums, residual wage inequality of males has also 
increased by about 14 percent during the same period. This result implies that changes 
in skill endowments and market valuation cannot capture all the wage changes in the 
British labour market. A significant residual space is left for further analysis.  
 
Consequently, Chapter 3 tests whether relative supply shifts, given stable or 
steadily growing relative demand can explain the changes of relative wage (that is, 
Katz and Murphy hypothesis, alternatively, Machin hypothesis). From co-variation of 
relative wages and relative labour supply, we reject the hypothesis that relative labour 
demand is stable over time. However, steadily growing relative demand combined 
with relative supply shifts can help explain overall changes in the relative wage over 
the last thirty years. The market mechanism appears to perform well in the long term. 
 
At the same time, we also find a positive association between relative wages 
and supply in the 1980s and the 2000s which implies an acceleration of relative 
demand for skilled workers. These findings are obviously beyond the steadily 
growing relative demand model. Moreover, this supply and demand analysis cannot 
explain why there is a steadily growing relative demand, and what factors accelerate 
the relative demand for skills. Along with technology and industrial shifts, institutions 
including trade union, the combined system of taxes and welfare benefits and 
minimum wages could be important forces behind these changes. Much cross-country 
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research (for example Gottschalk and Joyce 1998, Card et al 2003 and Koeniger et al 
2007) treat the UK as an intermediate case between the rigid labour market of 
continental European countries and the flexible labour market of the United States. 
Thus, Chapter 4 analyzes changes of skill premiums in the UK, incorporating these 
various institutional forces.    
 
A fairly consensual position is that wage changes reflect both market factors 
and the institutional environment. Chapter 4 disentangle the impact of labour market 
institutions from traditional supply-demand framework. Controlling for explanatory 
variables such as industrial structure, technology and market conditions, the links 
between institutions and skill premiums are analyzed in this chapter. We find the 
institutional factors such as trade unions and unemployment benefits are significantly 
associated with changes in skill premiums. For instance, the decline of trade unions in 
the private sector explains about one third of the rise in degree premium since the 
1970s. On the other hand, increases in unemployment benefit over the period 1979-
1998 appear to reduce the degree premium in the private sector by about 9.31 percent. 
Therefore, we can conclude that institutional changes, especially the decline of trade 
unions after the 1970s, are important contributors to the increasing skill premiums and 
earnings inequality in the UK.  
 
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we provide clearer empirical facts on wage 
flexibility in three countries: Italy, Germany and the UK. We analyze the effect of 
different wage-setting institutions on the extent of wage adjustment over the business 
cycle. With worse economic performance than the US and the UK, policy-makers of 
many continental European countries have especially emphasized wage flexibility in 
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recent years. If wages respond to market conditions, adverse shocks from business 
cycles can result in wage adjustments rather than unemployment. Broadly speaking, 
private sector wages in the UK are set at the company or individual level, compared 
with the centralised collective agreements in Italy and Germany. These two chapters 
find an overall procyclical wage in the UK, in contrast to procyclical wages only in 
the prosperous regions of Italy (the north) and Germany (the west). Wage rigidity in 
the lagging regions in Italy (the centre-south) and Germany (the east) appears to be 
associated with the centralised and coordinated wage setting institutions in both 
countries.   
 
For Italy, we find that stayers in the Northern region have procyclical real 
wages, (which is strongest for the private sector and for small firms) but, wages in the 
Centre-Southern Italy have a perverse pattern. They seem to respond only to Northern 
unemployment conditions, and not at all to local conditions. Wages even of the 
smallest firms appear irresponsive to local conditions. Thus, it looks as though the 
Northern labour market works in an efficient way, but the Southern does not.  
 
Similarly, real wages of stayers in the private sector in West Germany – but 
not East Germany appear to be procyclical, and quite sensitive to unemployment, 
comparable to the US and the UK. But in Germany, as in Italy, wages in the public 
sector do not change over the business cycle.  
 
It is interesting to note that the private sectors of the UK, West Germany and 
Northern Italy all appear to be similarly flexible, whatever the underlying differences 
in wage-setting institutions – be it the centralised bargaining in Northern Italy, the 
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coordinated pattern bargaining of West Germany, or the company bargaining and 
individualism of the UK. Admittedly, the overall wage cyclicality in the UK is still 
higher than in these two regions, but the policy conclusion seems to be that when 
regions within a country are reasonably prosperous, the different types of wage-
setting institution give the same result. However, when a region is lagging, as in the 
case of East Germany or Italy’s South, centralised bargaining or coordinated pattern 
bargaining delays recovery. Thus, the advantages of company bargaining are not only 
better responsiveness of wage, but also the freedom to decide wages at a micro 
economic level. Flexible wage setting institutions allow wages to adjust to changes in 
the local market conditions, while rigid wage setting institutions only provide 
channels for some regions or firms.  
  
Now, we can go back to our arguments at the beginning of this chapter. Since 
institutions can regularize the conduct of individuals, different institutions means 
different Nash equilibriums of wages and employment in the labour markets, which 
are also above or below the equilibrium results in a competitive market (see Koeniger 
et al, 2004). We see the dramatic trade union decline since the 1970s with higher 
earnings inequality in the UK, but not in Germany and Italy.  
 
In a democratic country such as the UK, institutional evolution may only 
reflect preferences of the median voters. But, if the rich game player (such as trade 
unions in the North of Italy) can take advantage of rules of the game by imposing 
bargaining results that are good for them (the “insiders”) upon the poorer players, 
there must be “government failures”. And this inefficient institutional arrangement 
will bring inefficiency to the labour market and hence to the whole economy. Thus, in 
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an international comparison, there are “efficient” or “inefficient” distinctions and 
smart institutional choices. 
 
More research is needed here. Three results stand out, and will need to be 
tested in future work. First, as we argued at the beginning of this chapter, institutions 
are actually endogenous to the whole economic and social system. Acemoglu et al 
(2001) would rather regard institutional factors as consequences of labour market 
changes or an important intermediate than as an exogenous dominant reason. The 
changes in the skill premiums (earnings inequality) may induce institutional changes 
such as deunionization. We may need a model allowing channels from earnings 
inequality to institutions and corresponding empirical specifications. 
 
Secondly, Italy’s centralised institutional arrangements, as well as German 
coordinated wage setting, worked well for prosperous areas in both countries. The fact 
that all firm size categories in the north of Italy have flexible wages shows that 
benefits can be achieved from high collective bargaining coverage. The flexible wage 
in the private sector in the west of Germany also shows good aspects of pattern 
bargaining. However, this institutional system has worked badly for the poorer 
Southern Italy and East Germany, and more research is needed here. 
 
Finally, labour market reforms in the UK appear to have been successful in 
promoting economic performance. But, is rising earnings inequality necessary for a 
flexible labour market and better economic performance? Recent research shows that 
the National Minimum Wage contributes to decreased earnings inequality, without a 
negative employment impact for unskilled workers (see Metcalf, 2004). It seems there 
 221
is “the third way” in institutional choice. Further research is needed to find the origin 
of success or failure in labour market institutions and earnings inequality.      
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